Corporate cash-holding decisions: Amman stock exchange by Al Zoubi, Tariq
i 
 
 
 
 
Corporate Cash-Holding Decisions: 
Amman Stock Exchange 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
By: Tariq Al Zoubi 
 
 
 
 
Brunel University 
School of Social Sciences 
Department of Economics and Finance 
 
 
4
th
 March 2013 
 
 
 
 
© 2008-2013 
ii 
 
Abstract 
 
Using a panel data analysis of a sample of 80 listed non-financial Jordanian firms during the 
period from 2000 to 2011, we investigated the corporate cash-holding decision. The firm’s 
decision to hold cash has come to the fore in last two or three years as a result of the recent 
global financial crisis, and the impact that this has had on the firms’ ability to raise funds from 
external sources. There is evidence in the US, for example, that firms have increased their 
holdings of cash as a result of increasing constraints from external sources. This current study 
therefore examines this issue from the point of view of a developing economy. 
 
We started by investigating the empirical determinants of corporate cash holdings; the results 
showed that firm size and growth opportunities have no significant effect on corporate cash-
holding decisions, while firm’s cash flow, leverage, and liquid assets substitute have a 
significant negative effect on cash-holding decisions, and profitability and cash dividends 
have a positive effect on cash-holding decisions. 
 
Then we investigated empirically how cash-holding affects the value of corporate firms. 
Based on Fama and French’s (1998) valuation model and Faulkender and Wang’s (2006) 
model, the results showed that the marginal value of each Jordanian Dinar (JD) is valued at a 
discounted value of 0.41 JD; with higher leverage the marginal value of cash is declining, 
with a higher level of cash the marginal value of cash is increasing and, finally, cash 
dividends have no significant effect on shareholders’ value. 
 
We also investigated empirically how a group of explanatory variables affect a firm’s debt 
ratio by focusing on the liquidity variable. Results showed that the total debt ratio is positively 
affected by firm size and is negatively affected by growth opportunities, profitability, assets 
tangibility and total liquidity, cash, and non-cash liquidity. The long-term debt ratio is 
positively affected by firm size, non-debt tax shield, asset tangibility, total liquidity, cash, and 
non-cash liquidity, while the long-term debt ratio is negatively affected by growth 
opportunities and profitability. For the short-term debt models, the debt ratio is negatively 
affected by firm size, asset tangibility, and liquidity in its different forms. An investigation 
into the speed of adjustment showed that Jordanian firms quickly adjusted the total and long-
term debt ratio, while they do not have an optimal or target short-term debt ratio. 
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Chapter 1: General Introduction 
 
1.1. About the Amman Financial Market (AFM) 
 
1.1.1. Establishment of the AFM 
 
Issuing and trading in corporate stocks in Jordan goes back to 1930, when the first public 
shareholding company (Arab Bank) issued its stock to the public for the first time. In 1931, 
Jordan Tobacco and Cigarettes issued its stock, followed by Jordan Electric Power in 1938, 
and Jordan Cement Factories in 1951. Subsequently, many other corporate firms followed this 
trend and started issuing stock to the public. The first corporate bond was issued in Jordan in 
the early 1960s. All of this issuing and trading in stocks occurred in an unorganized security 
market. So, the Jordanian government tried to regulate the trading and dealing in securities in 
this unorganized securities market which was performed through non-specialist agents rather 
than brokerage firms. This action was taken in order to protect investors, ensure that the 
process of trading is easy and safe, and allow an appropriate mechanism to identify fair 
securities prices based on the laws of supply and demand. Since that time, the size of this 
unorganized market and the Jordanian economic system have both increased substantially. 
 
With Jordanian government support, the central bank of Jordan, in collaboration with the 
World Bank's International Finance Corporation (IFC), set up the Jordanian securities market. 
Those efforts resulted in the Amman financial market (AFM) which was formed and initiated 
on 1
st
 January 1978. The main roles assigned to this financial market are those of a securities 
and exchange commission and the traditional role of securities exchange. This financial 
market also aims to achieve other objectives including the following; encourage investors to 
invest in available securities in this market; support the national economy of Jordan; regulate 
trading and dealing in securities in a way that will protect all investors; make that process 
safe, easy and fast; and provide any required statistical information and data on this market to 
help the investors to take their investment decisions. When it was established on 1
st
 January 
1978, 66 firms were listed with a market capitalization of JD
1
 286 million.  
                                                 
1
 Each Jordanian Dinar (JD) = 1.41 US Dollars (the exchange rate between JD and $ is fixed) 
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1.1.2. The development of the AFM 
 
Twenty years after the Amman financial market (AFM) was established, and based on the 
experience that the Jordanian government has accumulated, a new comprehensive reform 
policy has been adopted. The main goals of this reform policy are as follows: To improve the 
laws and regulations of the national securities market to reach international standards of 
financial markets; support, improve and enhance the private sector in the Amman financial 
market; and diversify and expand the national economy. By setting those reform policies and 
goals, the Jordanian government aims to achieve the following: make some changes in the 
capital market and its institutions in order to improve this capital market; introduce and use 
electronic rather than manual systems for trading, settlement and clearance; enhance and 
improve investment in the Amman financial market by eliminating any investment 
restrictions or obstacles that investors might face; improve the control and supervision of the 
financial market in order to create a stronger financial market with a high level of safety and 
transparency to create the best possible investment environment for securities trading; and 
enable interaction with other financial markets around the world, thus making it more global. 
 
As a result of this reform policy, in 1997 the Temporary Securities Law No. 23 of the year 
1997 was enacted. This Law was a major milestone for the Amman financial market as it 
aims to create an infrastructure for the financial market consistent with international 
standards, regulate and restructure the financial market in Jordan, and create a safe, secure, 
and transparent securities trading environment. According to the new Temporary Securities 
Law, the financial market in Jordan has been restructured in a way that will ensure the 
separation of the supervisory and legislative roles from the executive role. Under the new law, 
the Amman financial market will now be represented by three new institutions which will 
replace the Amman financial market. The three new institutions are the Amman Stock 
Exchange (ASE), Jordan Securities Commission (JSC), and Securities Depository Centre 
(SDC). The Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) and Securities Depository Centre (SDC) will be 
responsible for the executive role, while Jordan Securities Commission (JSC) will be 
responsible for supervisory and legislative roles. 
 
1.1.2.1. The Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) 
The Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) was established on 11
th
 March 1999 as a private sector, 
non-profit organization with legal and financial autonomy as one of two institutions 
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responsible for the executive role beside the Securities Depository Centre (SDC). The ASE 
was the only authorized stock exchange market in Jordan according to the Temporary 
Securities Law, No. 23 of the year 1997. The new Securities Law number 76 for the year 
2002 allows other stock exchanges. This new Securities Law also entails the formation of an 
independent investor protection fund, stricter ethical and professional codes, and a more 
stringent observance of the rule of law. 
 
1.1.2.2. The Securities Depository Centre (SDC) 
The SDC is the second institution responsible for the executive role in the Amman financial 
market. The SDC was established on 10
th
 May 1999 as a private sector, non-profit 
organization with legal and financial autonomy. The aims of the SDC are as follows: ensuring 
safe custody of ownership of securities; transferring the securities ownership and registering 
the securities traded on ASE; and settling the prices of securities among brokers. 
 
1.1.2.3. The Jordan Securities Commission (JSC) 
This institution is responsible for supervisory and legislative roles among the three new 
institutions emerging from the Amman financial market’s restructuring. The JSC is also a 
private sector, non-profit organization with legal and financial autonomy. The aims of the JSC 
are as follows: Supervising the issuance of and dealing in securities; regulating and 
monitoring the activities and operations of those organs falling under its supervision; and 
regulating and supervising the disclosure of information related to securities, issuers, insider 
trading, and major shareholders. 
 
The JSC has a Board of Commissioners comprising five members who have the following 
roles: Drawing up draft laws and regulations on securities; approving the by-laws and 
regulations of the SDC and ASE; granting licenses issued under the Law; setting limits for 
commissions of financial services companies and members of the SDC; and adopting 
accounting and auditing standards for the organs falling under its supervision as well as 
standards for their qualified auditors. 
 
1.1.3. Some statistics 
 
Since it started, the ASE has been developed in many aspects. Table 1.1 shows the number of 
firms listed in the ASE, the market capitalization, the ratio of market capitalization to GDP, 
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the value of stock traded, the value of bonds traded, the market P/E ratio, the market P/BV, 
and the market dividend ratio from 2000 to 2011. Table 1.1 documents a very substantial 
increase in the market capitalisation of firms listed on the ASE, in part, but not exclusively 
driven by the significant increase in the number of firms listed on the market. The ratio of 
market capitalization to GDP shows quite substantial variation over a relatively short time 
period, and is currently somewhat lower than would be evident in a developed market such as 
the US or the UK, suggesting that the ASE still has some way to go in promoting market 
listing for firms. The value of stock traded on the market has fallen significantly over the last 
few years, since reaching a peak in 2008. At the same time, the value of bonds traded is very 
low, and indicated that the ASE does not yet provide firms with a liquid and effective market 
to raise capital through the issue of debt securities. 
 
Table 1.1 
Listed firms, their market capitalization, the ratio of market capitalization to GDP, value of stock traded, 
value of bond traded, market P/E ratio, market P/BV, and market dividend ratio for the period from 2000 
to 2011. 
Year 
No. of 
listed 
firms 
Market 
capitalization* 
Market 
capitalization 
to the GDP 
Value of 
Traded 
Stock* 
Value of 
Traded 
Bonds* 
P/E 
Ratio 
(Times) 
P/BV 
(Times) 
Dividend 
Yield Ratio 
% 
2000 163 3,509.6 58.4% 334.7 7.2 14.8 1.1 3.6 
2001 161 4,476.4 71.5% 668.7 7.2 15.3 1.4 2.7 
2002 158 5,029.3 80.4% 950.3 9.7 13.0 1.2 3.2 
2003 161 7,772.8 116.8% 1,855.2 11.4 21.7 1.9 2.4 
2004 192 13,033.8 184.7% 3,793.2 6.0 31.1 2.7 1.7 
2005 201 26,667.1 326.6% 16,871.0 3.1 44.2 3.2 1.6 
2006 227 21,078.2 233.9% 14,209.9 1.9 16.7 2.9 2.3 
2007 245 29,214.2 289.0% 12,348.1 3.8 28.0 3.0 1.8 
2008 262 25,406.3 226.3% 20,406.3 0.6 18.8 2.2 2.5 
2009 272 22,526.9 149.6% 9,665.3 2.5 14.4 1.8 2.8 
2010 277 21,858.2 122.7% 6,690.0 0.1 26.3 1.7 2.7 
2011 247 19,272.8 102.7% 2,850.3 0.6 22.6 1.5 3.3 
* Numbers in millions. 
Source: Amman stock exchange annual reports for several years. 
 
In the ASE, the manner of calculating the market index has been changed several times in the 
last few years. By introducing new ways to calculate the market index, the true value of the 
market performance would be reflected. The first index used in the ASE was the Unweighted 
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Price Index; this then changed to the Weighted Price Index and, most recently, to the Free 
Float Weighted Index. Table 1.2 shows the value of those indices for the period from 2000 to 
2011. 
 
Table 1.2 
Un-weighted Price Index, Weighted Price Index, and Free Float Weighted Index for the period from 2000 
to 2011. 
Year 
Un-weighted 
Price Index 
Weighted 
Price Index 
Free Float 
Weighted Index 
2000 575.6 1,330.5 813.3 
2001 646.1 1,727.0 1,060.6 
2002 691.7 1,700.2 1,090.9 
2003 1,117.5 2,614.5 1,761.5 
2004 1,535.9 4,245.6 2,729.1 
2005 2,171.0 8,191.5 4,259.7 
2006 1,608.1 5,518.1 3,013.7 
2007 1,798.1 7,519.3 3,675.5 
2008 1,235.5 6,243.1 2,758.4 
2009 1,057.7 5,520.1 2,533.5 
2010 834.4 5,318.0 2,373.6 
2011 606.8 4,648.4 1,995.1 
Source: Amman stock exchange annual reports for several years. 
 
Un-weighted Index 
The Un-weighted Index is calculated by giving an equal weight to the stock in the index 
sample regardless of market capitalization and price level. Only changes in the price will 
affect the index value. This index was introduced on 1
st
 January 1980 at a level of 100 points, 
based on the data of 1
st
 January 1980. In 1992 this index was modified, using the data of 31
st
 
December 1991 as the base period. The last change to this index occurred in 2004 when the 
base of this index changed to 1,000 points, as of 1
st
 January 2004. 
This index is calculated as; 
Indext = e
(ln
10
 × S) × 1,000
 
Where; 
S: Σ (Log Pti/Poi ÷ n). 
n: sample size. 
t: time. 
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e: exponential. 
ln: the natural logarithm. 
log: logarithm to the base of 10. 
Pti: price of the stock i at time t. 
Pti: price of the stock i at the base period. 
 
Weighted Index 
In this index the market capitalization is considered in order to calculate the value of the 
index. The data on 31
st
 December 1991 was used as the base period at a level of 100 points 
changed to 1,000 on 1
st
 January 2004. This index consists of 100 stocks representing about 
90% of the total market capitalization of ASE. 
This index was calculated as; 
Indext = Mt/Bt × 1,000 
Where; 
Bt = Bt-1 × Mt/Mad. 
Mad = Mt – It – Nt + Qt-1. 
t: time. 
Mt: market capitalization at time t. 
Bt: market capitalization at the base period. 
Mad: adjusted market capitalization at time t. 
It: market capitalization for the new issued stocks. 
Nt: market capitalization for the stocks added to the sample. 
Qt-1: market capitalization for the stocks removed from the sample. 
 
Free Float Index 
The Free Float index was introduced to better represent the price changes of the stocks that 
are traded in the market, avoiding the bias of large market capitalization stocks where 
relatively little stock is floated on the market. This index used a 1,000-point base system as of 
the 31
st
 December 1999. 
This index was calculated as; 
Indext = Σ (Pti × Sti × Fti) ÷ Dt 
Where; 
Pti: price of stock i at time t. 
Sti: the total number of stock listed at time t. 
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Fti: factor takes a value between 0 and 1 and represents the total listed shares minus shares 
owned by the board of directors, investors who owned 5% or more, and any government 
ownership to the total authorized shares for stock i at time t. 
Dt: divisor index at time t. 
 
It is evident from Table 1.2 that there are some quite significant differences between the three 
alternative indices, particularly in terms of their variation over time. The difference between 
the weighted and un-weighted indices reflects what appears to be a greater increase in the 
price of the larger stocks, since these will have a greater weight in the weighted index, and 
this index has enjoyed a much more sustained increase during this period compared to the un-
weighted index. Alternatively put, Table 1.2 suggests that the smaller stocks on the ASE have 
performed less well compared to the larger stocks. 
 
1.1.4. Laws and regulations controlling the AFM 
 
There are several laws and regulations controlling the financial market in Jordan. The main 
law that authorizes and controls the financial market in Jordan is the “The Securities Law No. 
76 for the Year 2002”. Here, we can find the definitions and explanation of the words and the 
phrases used in the law. It also defines what are considered securities and what are not, and 
when and in what circumstances this law should be applied. The law has established the legal 
framework of the JSC by giving it a legal identity with financial and administrative 
autonomy, and defines the aims, objectives, responsibilities, authority, and restrictions of this 
commission. Then it defines how the board of the JSC will be appointed, detailing their 
authority and responsibilities. The law also explains how the JSC deals with financial affairs 
and investor protection. Later, the law defines how firms can go public and explains the 
procedures for this process, as well as licensing, registration and monitoring for the brokers 
and financial services firms. Then the law establishes the legal framework of the ASE by 
giving it a legal identity with financial and administrative autonomy, and defines the 
responsibilities, authority, goals and objectives, as well as the members of the ASE. As well 
as the JSC and the ASE, the law also gives the SDC a legal identity with financial and 
administrative autonomy, and defines the responsibilities, authority, goals, and objectives of 
the SDC. Then the law defines the legal basis of the mutual funds and investment companies. 
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The law also has a section on violations and penalties. Finally, it deals with general and 
interim provisions
2
. 
 
Besides the “The Securities Law No. 76 for the Year 2002”, other laws also control the 
financial market in Jordan. The “Internal By-Law of the Amman Stock Exchange of 2004” is 
one of the important laws defining and explaining the legal framework of the ASE. After the 
“Internal By-Law of the Amman Stock Exchange of 2004” defines the words and the phrases 
related to this and gives a legal identity and financial and the administrative autonomy to the 
ASE, it defines the goals, aims, objectives, responsibilities, and authority. Then the Law gives 
more details about the process of securities trading in the ASE, and identifies the members of 
the ASE, explaining how they have qualified to be members. The Law also explains how the 
general assembly should be held and provides all the details about it. Then it defines how the 
ASE board of directors is composed, how they manage the ASE, their responsibilities, and the 
authority of the board. The Law then presents information about inspections, investigations 
and penalties for ASE members. Finally, there is a section on financial affairs and some 
general laws
3
. 
 
Another law relating to the ASE is the “Administrative Internal By-Law” issued by virtue of 
Article (65) of the Securities Law No. 76 of the year 2002. This Law defines the 
organizational structure of the ASE and all other administrative issues
4
. 
 
One of the laws that control the ASE is the “Listing Securities Directives” which was issued 
by virtue of the provisions of Article 72 of the Securities Law No. 76 of 2002, by the decision 
of the Board of Commissioners of Jordan Securities Commission No. (149/2004), and 
amended by the decisions of the Board of Commissioners No. (257/2005), No. (41/2006), No. 
(196/2006), No. (45/2011) and No. (214/2011). (See section 1.1.5.) 
 
“Trading Directives” is one of the laws that control securities trading in the ASE. It was 
issued in compliance with provisions of Article 67/c of the Securities Law No. 76 for 2002, 
                                                 
2
 Full code of the “The Securities Law No. 76 for the Year 2002” is available at http://exchange.jo/en/securities-
law. 
3
 Full code of the “Internal By-Law of the Amman Stock Exchange of 2004” is available at 
http://exchange.jo/en/internal-law. 
4
 Full code of the “Administrative Internal By-Law” is available at http://exchange.jo/en/administrative-internal-
law. 
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and amended upon a resolution by the Board of Commissioners of the Securities Commission 
No. (159/2009) of 16/3/2009. (See section 1.1.6.) 
 
Other important laws, regulations and directives also control the ASE, as follows: “Directives 
for Internet Trading”, issued by virtue of the provisions of Article 67/C of the Securities Law 
No. 76 for the year 2002 and article 24/B/1 of the Internal By-Law of the Amman Stock 
Exchange for the year 2004. “Disclosure Directives”, issued by virtue of the provisions of 
Article 24/b/(3&4) of the ASE By-Laws of 2004. “By-Laws for Fees, Charges and 
Commissions”, which specify the fees, commissions and charges applicable in the ASE.  
“Dispute Resolution Directives” which explain how to resolve any dispute arising between 
the members of ASE and their clients, and were issued by virtue of the provisions of Article 
24/b/7 of the ASE By-Laws of 2004; and “Code of Ethics of ASE”, which defines the ethical 
issues in the ASE, issued by virtue of the provisions of Article 26/e of the Securities Law No. 
23 of 1997
5
. 
 
Beside the laws and regulations that were discussed earlier, another important factor plays a 
significant role in Jordan are the Islamic regulations.
6
 According to the Islamic regulations, it 
is forbidden to deal with interest, either by paying or accepting that interest. Although it is 
forbidden to deal with interest, many firms and individuals are still accepting interest, either 
because they do not apply religious rules too strictly or because they have to deal with interest 
because there is no other option available. Based on this fact, we believe that this Islamic rule 
might affect the firm’s decisions either directly or indirectly, especially those concerning its 
capital structure. 
 
1.1.5. Securities listing in the ASE 
 
According to “Listing Securities Directives”, any security can be registered in the ASE as 
long as the following apply: The relevant securities are registered with the JSC; the relevant 
securities are deposited with the SDC; there are no restrictions on the transfer of ownership of 
relevant securities; there is an Audit Committee at the Issuer, in the sense used in the 
Securities Law in force; and the Issuer has signed the Listing Agreement with the ASE, which 
determines the rights and obligations of the two parties in relation to listing of securities. Then 
                                                 
5
 Full code of the “Code of Ethics” is available at http://exchange.jo/en/code-ethics. 
6
 Islam is the formal religion of Jordan where more than 90% of the population follow the Islamic religion. 
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the Issuer must fill out an application with the relevant documents including the following: (1) 
A report issued by the Company's board of directors that contains the following: a summary 
about the Company's foundation, its major objectives and other objectives, as well as its 
relationship with other companies, be they mother, subsidiary or affiliate (if any); a 
description of the securities issued by the Company and those that the Company wishes to 
have listed; the board of directors' evaluation, supported by figures and statistics, of the 
Company's performance, the level at which it stands and accomplishments achieved, for 
comparison with the set plan of action; significant occurrences in the Company or those 
impacting it between the date of its establishment and the date of submission of the listing 
request; the names of the large owners of securities issued by the Company and the number of 
securities owned by each of them where such constitutes 5% or more of the issued securities; 
the Company's future plan for the next three years; names of the members of its board of 
directors, and names and positions of the top executive personnel, any securities owned by 
any of them or any of their relatives, and the membership of any of them in any board of 
directors of other companies; a list of the names of the Company's shareholders, the number 
of shares owned by each of them, and the percentage of non-Jordanian shareholding in the 
Company. (2) The Company's Articles of Association, Charter and Prospectus (if any). (3) 
The Company's Annual Report for the last fiscal year (if any), which includes the board of 
directors' report, the Company's financial statements and the Company auditors' report. (4) 
Transitory financial statements reviewed by the Company's auditor covering the period from 
the end of the fiscal year preceding the date of the listing application till the end of the last 
quarter preceding the date of the listing application (if any). (5) Any other information that the 
ASE deems necessary to make its listing decision. Also, the Issuing Company whose 
securities are approved for listing by the ASE shall declare its annual and interim fiscal data 
and a summary of the board of directors' report that was submitted for the purpose of listing. 
The Company shall make the declaration at least three days prior to the start of trading and 
include the following: Balance Sheet Statement, Income Statement, Cash Flow Statement, 
Stockholders’ Equity Statement, and any necessary notes or clarifications to said statements. 
When it is approved for listing, the relevant securities will be listed in the Second Market.  
 
After it is listed in the Second Market, relevant securities can qualify for listing in the First 
Market if it meets the following conditions: It must be listed for a full year, at least on the 
Second Market; the Company's Net Shareholders' Equity must not be less than 100% of the 
paid-in capital; the Company must make net pre-tax profits for at least two fiscal years out of 
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the last three years preceding the transfer of listing; the Company's Free Float to the 
subscribed shares ratio by the end of its fiscal year must not be less than 5% if its paid-in 
capital is 50 million JD or more and 10% if its paid-in capital is less than 50 million JD; the 
number of Company shareholders must not be less than 100 by the end of its fiscal year; the 
minimum days of trading in the Company shares must not be less than 20% of overall trading 
days over the last twelve months; and at least 10% of the Free Float shares must have been 
traded-in during the same period.  
 
Alternatively, securities listed in the First Market will be transferred to the Second Market if 
the following apply: the Net Shareholders' Equity decreased to less than 75% of the paid-in 
capital; the Company accounts show losses in the last three fiscal years; the Company's Free 
Float ratio shares drop to less than 5% when its paid-in capital is 50 million JD or more and 
10% when its paid-in capital is less than 50 million JD by the end of its fiscal year; the 
number of Company shareholders drops to less than 75 by the end of its fiscal year; the days 
of trading in Company shares over the last twelve months drop to less than the 20% of overall 
trading days; the percentage of traded Free Float during the last twelve months drops to less 
than 10% by the end of its fiscal year. The transfer between the two markets can occur once a 
year when the companies provide their financial statements. Capital-increase shares will be 
listed once the issuing procedures are completed, and the issued shares are distributed to their 
owners. As a result of this distinction between the two markets, there should be a significant 
difference between the firms listed within each market. We would expect that firms listed on 
the first market will be relatively profitable firms with shares that are frequently traded. On 
the other hand, firms listed on the second market will be less liquid and less profitable. 
 
Listed shares will be suspended in all cases determined by the JSC as follows: issuance of a 
decision by the general assembly of a company approving a reduction in the Company's 
capital, as of the date of notification of the ASE of the decision to reduce the capital, until the 
procedures of capital reduction are over and the letters of approval by the concerned official 
authorities are issued, except for companies which do so by purchasing shares issued by them 
from the market; merger of companies as of the date of notification of the ASE of the decision 
of merger which is approved by the Minister of Industry and Trade, and any contingency that 
substantially affects the sound trading in securities or the financial position of the Company, 
until the procedures of disclosure to the community of traders are completed. If suspension is 
for a period of no more than two days, this shall be by virtue of a decision from the CEO; if it 
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is for more than two days, this shall be by virtue of a resolution by the Board of Directors, 
upon the request of the Board of Directors of the listed Company with a clarification of the 
reasons for said request. This shall be by virtue of a resolution by the Board of Directors and 
for the period it deems appropriate. In cases of interruption of normal business of the 
Company for a period exceeding three months without clarification of the reasons for said 
interruption this shall be by virtue of a resolution by the Board of Directors and for the period 
it deems appropriate, issuance of a General Assembly resolution to have a voluntary 
liquidation of the Company, submittal of a statement of action before a competent court for 
the compulsory liquidation of the Company, on the date of the General Assembly meeting of 
the company, and if so required under the legislation in force, upon a justified cause by the 
Issuer, or in any of the cases deemed necessary by the ASE to protect investor interests. 
Suspended securities can be re-listed once the reasons for suspension cease to exist, by virtue 
of a decision issued by the same party which issued the decision of suspension. 
 
Listed shares will be de-listed if the Company’s legal status changes, or in the event a final 
decision is passed to liquidate and wind-up the company, or by a decision to liquidate the 
Company by board of directors of the Company, and if its listed shares have been suspended 
for more than two years. 
 
The ASE has attempted to ensure that firms provide both regulators and investors with 
sufficient information to ensure that the market is well informed and that there is sufficient 
transparency regarding the firm’s performance and prospects. Listed Companies on the ASE 
should provide the ASE with the following: the Company's annual report which includes the 
board report, the financial statements and the auditors' reports, within three months of the end 
of its financial year; semi-annual reports with a comparison with the same period of the 
previous fiscal year within one month of its semi-financial year; any decisions or information 
which might affect the share price; the agenda of its general assembly meetings and the 
decisions passed by this general assembly; a report indicating the Company's Free Float 
shares and how they have been calculated, to be provided at the same time the Company 
provides its annual report; and any other information or statements considered necessary by 
the ASE. If the company is classified in the First Market it must provide the ASE with 
quarterly reports reviewed by its auditors and compared with the same period of the previous 
financial year besides the annual and semi-annual reports. 
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In any case of breaches of this law made by the securities issuer, the ASE has the right to 
impose one or more of the following sanctions: A warning; a fine of not less than 100.00 and 
not more than 5,000.00 JD; transferring the listed shares from the First to the Second Market; 
securities suspension; and securities de-listing
7
. 
 
1.1.6. Securities trading in the ASE 
 
The “Trading Directives” explain and regulate the securities trading in the ASE. Trading in 
securities takes place through contracts and between brokers for their own accounts or for 
their clients’ accounts. All of those contracts must be recorded and documented either 
manually or electronically. All of the transactions and the uses of clients’ funds must be in 
compliance with the rules and regulations in the ASE; a client’s funds will only be used for 
his/her account and the broker is not allowed to use those funds for any other client. 
 
With each agreement, the broker should include the following information: the name and the 
address of the client and the broker him/herself; a description of the service that the broker 
will provide to their client; an illustration of the commissions that the client will be charged; 
and any type of authorization which allows the broker to act on behalf of the client. In all 
cases the agreement must not exempt or restrict the broker’s responsibility as stated by law. 
 
The broker must have authorization from his/her clients including written, telephone, or e-
mail authorization. The broker must be able to prove that he/she has this authorization at any 
time, including the name of the client, the type of security, type of transaction, number of 
securities, the time and the date of the transaction, and valid authority. All of this information 
must be documented since it will be subject to ASE monitoring and control. 
 
The broker must inform his/her clients about all executed and unexecuted transactions 
immediately or as the contract between the broker and the client states. The broker must 
inform his/her clients if the broker was part of the transaction or as stated by the contract. The 
broker is also not allowed to execute any transaction on a specific security for his/her own 
benefit or for clients whose investments he/she manages if the broker has already attempted a 
                                                 
7
 Full code of the “Listing Securities Directives” is available at http://exchange.jo/en/listing-securities-directives. 
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financial consultancy related to that specific security until this financial consultancy is 
published for at least one day. 
 
The broker is prohibited from undertaking any transaction or financial consultancy based on 
insider information. It is also prohibited to give any misleading information about the price or 
quantity of the security which might affect the supply and demand of that security. The ASE 
officers have the right to cancel any buying or selling orders on any security if such orders 
were meant to hamper trading in that security. The ASE’s CEO or any other authorised 
employee has the right to adjust the closing price if it has been discovered that the price when 
the last transaction occurred was meant to manipulate the price of that specific security. Also 
The ASE’s CEO or any other authorised employee has the right to cancel any order (1) if the 
broker made a mistake by sending a wrong order as long as the broker contacted the ASE 
within 10 minutes and before the market closed and if the other party involved in this 
transaction agrees to cancel; (2) if there is any technical failure. 
 
All transactions in the ASE take place according to the time and the phases of trading which 
are set by the ASE board of directors, every day except weekends
8
 and public holidays. The 
ASE must inform the brokers immediately about any changes in the timetable of the trading 
sessions as a result of any extraordinary event. Securities trading occurs through the various 
pricing groups and on the basis of one security and its multiples unless stated otherwise. The 
ASE board of directors set the minimum quantity of securities that the broker can display in 
the buying and selling orders. The ASE board of directors also set the minimum time that may 
elapse for the placing of buying and selling orders, before the broker is able to change or 
cancel those placed orders. 
 
Securities traded in the ASE can be priced in JD or any other currency. Securities priced in JD 
must be priced in multiples of ten Fils
9
. The ASE board of directors will determine the 
monetary multiples of the securities that are traded in other currencies. The ASE board of 
directors define the percentage limit of the price increases and decreases for any security 
compared to that security’s reference price. The ASE board of directors have the right to 
exclude some block transactions from the upper and lower price limit in the following cases: 
if the government or any public institution is a party to the block transactions; if the market 
                                                 
8
 Weekend in Jordan is on Friday and Saturday. 
9
 1 Fils = 0.001 JD. 
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capitalization of the block transactions is not less than the minimum limit set by the board of 
directors; and in any other case where the ASE board of directors is convinced that the parties 
involved in the transaction are both satisfied with the price of this block transaction
10
. 
 
As a result, Jordanian firms face a comprehensive set of regulations concerning the listing of 
their shares on the ASE. These regulations are designed to ensure that market participants are 
provided with the fullest possible information, and that manipulation of the price by the firm 
or by other investors, is curtailed. It still remains that in comparison to stock markets in the 
developed economies, the ASE is a relatively illiquid market, and is characterised by 
restricted free float and the presence of significant blockholder ownership. 
 
Table 1.3 summarize the new stock issued in ASE including Initial Public Offering (IPO) and 
Secondary Public Offering (SEO) for the period between 2001 and 2012. 
 
Table 1.3 new issued stocks in ASE between 2001 and 2012 
 Number of IPO Number of SEO IPO and SEO Average Size of Issue (JD) 
2001 0 3 3 3,500,000 
2002 0 4 4 2,662,344 
2003 3 2 5 5,425,459 
2004 26 45 71 11,013,109 
2005 13 82 95 6,139,208 
2006 26 94 120 13,333,333 
2007 18 55 73 10,958,904 
2008 17 50 67 12,904,753 
2009 10 37 47 6,382,978 
2010 5 33 38 7,894,736 
2011 2 22 24 8,627,367 
2012 0 8 8 6,261,609 
Source: Amman stock exchange annual reports for several years. 
 
From Table 1.3 we can notice some interesting observations about the number and the 
average size of the new stock issuing; in the last 12 years the new issuing can be grouped into 
three groups, at the earlier stage from 2001 to 2003 both the number and the average size of 
those issues were small, this can be explained as at that time ASE has just finished the reform 
process, where the amount of information for the investors on the previous years was limited, 
which make the ability of the firms to raise funds more difficult due to a higher information 
asymmetry. Then, from the year 2004 to the year 2008 we can notice that the number and the 
average size of the new stock issuing have been increased significantly, as at that stage ASE 
                                                 
10
 Full code of the “Trading Directives” is available at http://exchange.jo/en/trading-directives. 
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has been able to provide the market with better database which reduce the information 
asymmetry and helped the firms to raise more funds from stock issuing. This database also 
helped the investors to obtain more information about those firms that they are willing to buy 
their stock. The final stage is between 2009 and 2012 where the new issuing has been 
decreased in both number and average size of issuing, as this decreases can be explained by 
the effect of the financial crisis; where it is become more difficult to the firm to obtain 
external funds. Table A1 in appendix A shows more details information about the SEO for the 
Jordanian firms during the period from 2000 to 2012. 
 
1.2. Methodology 
 
The data available for empirical analysis can take different forms; if the unit (individual, 
company, country, etc.) under investigation is analyzed over different periods of time (days, 
weeks, months, quarters, or years) this data analysis is called time series data analysis. If the 
analysis takes place at a certain point in time for more than one unit (individual, company, 
country, etc.) then it is called cross-sectional data analysis. However, if we investigate more 
than one unit (individual, company, country, etc.) over different periods of time (days, weeks, 
months, quarters, or years) this is called panel data analysis or longitudinal analysis. 
 
1.2.1. The advantages of using panel data 
 
Using panel data analyses has several advantages; among others, Hsiao (1986) mentions some 
advantages of using panel data over both time series and cross-sectional analysis: (1) it 
increases the efficiency of the econometrics estimation by giving the researcher a larger 
number of data points (observations) which will help to increase the degree of freedom and 
also reduce the collinearity between the explanatory variables; (2) it allows the researchers to 
analyze certain hypotheses and questions they could not analyze with time series and cross-
sectional analysis; (3) unlike cross-sectional data, panel data make it much easier to 
investigate the dynamic change; and (4) it allows researchers to test and construct more 
complicated models. Baltagi (2001) lists six advantages of panel data analysis compared to 
time series and cross-sectional analysis: (1) it controls for heterogeneity; (2) panel data are 
more efficient, more informative,  have more degrees of freedom, and have less collinearity; 
(3) panel data are better for studying the dynamic adjustment; (4) they are better than time 
series and cross-sectional data for measuring and identifying certain kinds of effects; (5) they 
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allow the study and examination of more complicated models; and (6) they are usually 
gathered in micro units such as individuals, firms, and countries, which helps to eliminate the 
biases of aggregation. Brooks (2008) mentions three advantages of panel data: (1) panel data 
allow researchers to address and tackle more complex problems compared to cross-sectional 
or time series data analysis; (2) panel data allow for dynamic change, which is more difficult 
with time series alone since it requires a long run of data; by using panel data, which combine 
time series and cross-sectional data, the degree of freedom will increase and enhance the 
power of the test; another benefit of this combination of time series and cross-sectional data is 
to reduce the multicollinearity between the variables, which can be more obvious in time 
series analysis alone; and (3) the appropriate panel model can help to remove the effect of 
omitted variables bias from the regression results. Gujarati (2003) mentions six advantages of 
panel data: (1) panel data estimation techniques can take into consideration the heterogeneity 
in the units under investigation by allowing for those units’ specification; (2) panel data 
combine time series and cross-sectional data, which will increase the efficiency, reduce the 
collinearity, increase the degree of freedom, and make the data more informative; (3) studying 
the dynamic change with panel data is better; (4) compared to cross-sectional data, panel data 
are better for measuring and detecting the effects of research variables; (5) panel data allow 
researchers to study more complicated models compared to what is possible with time series 
and cross-sectional data; and (6) panel data help to minimize the bias that might occur with 
large, aggregated amounts of data for several units under investigation. Many others have 
identified very similar advantages of panel data, such as Fress (2004). 
 
1.2.2. How panel data work 
 
The methodology that will be used in this research is panel data analysis, including three 
alternative panel data models: pooling ordinary least squares model, fixed-effect model, and 
random effect model. We will apply those three models available under the panel data 
analysis, and then check which one of them is the most appropriate, using it as the research 
model. First, we will explain the panel data analysis in the forms of pooling ordinary least 
squares model, fixed-effect model, and random effect model; then we will explain the test that 
we will use in order to decide which one of them is the most appropriate. 
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1.2.2.1. Pooling ordinary least squares model 
The simplest form of panel data model is the pooling ordinary least squares model. This 
model can be written as follows: 
 
Yit = α + βk Xit + uit        (1.1) 
i = 1, 2, …, N.  t = 1, 2, …, T.  k = 1, 2, …, K. 
The error term uit ~ NIID (0, σ
2
) 
 
Where i is the unit under investigation identifier, t is the time identifier, k is the parameter 
identifier, N is the maximum number of unit under investigation, T is the maximum number 
of period, and K is the maximum number of parameter. 
 
Under the pooling ordinary least squares model all the data from all units will be pooled 
together (listed on top of each other), with the assumption that the constant terms including 
the intercept α and the slope coefficients βk are the same over time for all units. 
 
1.2.2.2. Fixed-effect model 
The fixed-effect model, which is also called the least square dummy variable (LSDV), can be 
considered a generalized form of the pooling ordinary least squares model (Hsiao 1986). In 
this model we take into account the individual effect of each unit by allowing for intercept α 
to vary for each unit but not over time, while we do not allow the slope coefficients βk to vary 
and we still assume they are constant; by allowing the intercept α to vary for each unit it can 
capture the special effects of the unit under investigation such as learning curve, managerial 
philosophy, management skills, etc. This model can be written as follows: 
 
Yit = αi + βk Xit + uit        (1.2a) 
i = 1, 2, …, N.  t = 1, 2, …, T.  k = 1, 2, …, K. 
The error term uit ~ NIID (0, σ
2
) 
 
Note how the intercept term is written as αi compared to α in the pooling ordinary least 
squares model (equation 1.1) in order to capture the special effect of the unit under 
investigation over the whole period of investigation. The fixed-effect model can also allow 
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the intercept term to vary over time as well as cross-sectionally. This model can be written as 
follows: 
 
Yit = αit + βk Xit + uit        (1.2b) 
i = 1, 2, …, N.  t = 1, 2, …, T.  k = 1, 2, …, K. 
The error term uit ~ NIID (0, σ
2
) 
 
Note how the intercept term is written as αit compared to α in the pooling ordinary least 
squares model (equation 1.1) and αi in the fixed-effect model (equation 1.2a) in order to 
capture the special effect of the unit under investigation, as well as the time effect. 
 
Panel data can also be used where we assume that all constant terms including the intercept 
term α and the slope coefficients βk vary over units, or if all constant terms vary over units 
and time together. Those models can be written as follows: 
 
Yit = αi + βki Xit + uit        (1.2c) 
i = 1, 2, …, N.  t = 1, 2, …, T.  k = 1, 2, …, K. 
The error term uit ~ NIID (0, σ
2
) 
 
Yit = αit + βkit Xit + uit        (1.2d) 
i = 1, 2, …, N.  t = 1, 2, …, T.  k = 1, 2, …, K. 
The error term uit ~ NIID (0, σ
2
) 
 
According to Hsiao (1986), models (1.2a) and (1.2b) are widely used in analyzing panel data 
while models (1.2c) and (1.2d) are used in variable coefficient models. Variable coefficient 
models are used when the data under investigation need to be analyzed when the hypotheses 
about the coefficients are not constant over the analysed time period while the research 
variables still have a proper relationship. In this case we need to use a variable coefficient 
model that accounts for inter-individual heterogeneity, inter-period heterogeneity, or both, by 
allowing the parameters to vary cross-sectionally, over time or both. 
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1.2.2.3. The random-effect model 
In the previous models the intercept term α was treated as a fixed constant; however, in the 
random effect model (sometimes called error components model) the intercept term α will be 
considered a random variable. This model can be written as follows: 
 
Yit = αi + βk Xit + uit        (1.3) 
i = 1, 2, …, N.  t = 1, 2, …, T.  k = 1, 2, …, K. 
The error term uit ~ NIID (0, σ
2
) 
 
Where the intercept term α is now a random variable rather than being assumed to be fixed. 
The random intercept term αi for a given unit is given as; 
αi = α + εi         (1.4) 
        i = 1, 2, …, N. 
 
Where εi is a random error term εi ~ NIID (0, σ
2
) 
 
By substituting (1.4) in (1.3) and rearranging; 
Yit = α + βk Xit + uit + εi        (1.5) 
i = 1, 2, …, N.  t = 1, 2, …, T.  k = 1, 2, …, K. 
uit ~ NIID (0, σ
2), εi ~ NIID (0, σ
2
) 
E(εiuit) = 0, E(εiεj) = 0  (i ≠ j) 
E(uituis) = E(uitujt) = E(uitujs) = 0 (i ≠ j, t ≠ s) 
 
1.2.3. Pooling ordinary least squares model, fixed-effect model, or random effect model 
 
Having introduced the three panel models - pooling ordinary least squares model, fixed-effect 
model and random-effect model - we need to determine which one of them we should use to 
analyze our data; in other words, which provides the most accurate or most appropriate 
results? In order to answer this question, further tests and analyses should be conducted. The 
first test we can use is the Likelihood ratio test which is used to compare between the pooling 
ordinary least squares model and fixed-effect model; the second test is the Hausman test 
which is used to compare between the fixed-effect model and the random effect model. 
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1.2.3.1. Likelihood ratio test 
The likelihood ratio test is a statistical test used to compare between two models in order to 
decide which one of them is more appropriate. By comparing the likelihood function of two 
models where one of them is restricted and the other one is not restricted, the likelihood test 
can tell which one of them is the more fitting model. The likelihood ratio can be calculated as; 
 
λ = 
                                              
                                                
 
λ = –2 [ln LR – ln LU]        (1.6) 
Where LR is the likelihood function for the restricted model and LU is the likelihood function 
for the unrestricted model. 
 
The natural logarithm of the likelihood function L for a regression model such as 
Yi = αi + βkXi + ui will be as follows: 
ln L =  – 
 
 
 σ2 – 
 
 
 ln (2π) – 
 
   
 Σ (Yi – αi – βkXi)
2
 
 
The results of the likelihood ratio test follow the χ2 distribution with degrees of freedom equal 
to the number of restrictions. If the result of the likelihood ratio test is significant, the 
restricted model is the fit model; otherwise the unrestricted model is the fit model. 
 
1.2.3.2. Hausman test 
The Hausman test is a statistical test used to compare between two models in order to decide 
which one of them is preferable. This test can be used to compare between the fixed-effect 
model and the random effect model. The Hausman test is conducted to determine whether the 
intercept term α and the explanatory variables Xi are independent. The basic assumption of 
the random effect model is that the intercept term is a random variable which is not correlated 
with the other explanatory variables. So, if the Hausman test shows a significant result, that 
means the intercept term is correlated with one or more explanatory variables and it is not a 
random variable as the random effect model assumed. Therefore, the fixed-effect model is the 
appropriate model; otherwise, if the Hausman test shows an insignificant result the random 
effect will be the appropriate model. As with the likelihood ratio test, the Hausman test results 
follow the χ2 distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of explanatory 
variables. 
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1.2.4. Dynamic panel model (Generalized Method of Moments model or GMM model) 
 
Occasionally the panel data model will include the lagged dependent variable Yit-1 as an 
independent variable along with the other explanatory variables Xit. This regression model, 
which includes the lagged dependent variable as one of the independent variables, is called 
the dynamic model. This model can be written as follows: 
 
Yit = αi + βk Xit + γYit-1 + uit       (1.7) 
i = 1, 2, …, N.  t = 1, 2, …, T.  k = 1, 2, …, K. 
uit ~ NIID (0, σ
2
) 
 
Running this kind of model (i.e. the dynamic model) using the previous techniques, including 
pooling ordinary least squares model, fixed-effect model and random effect model or what are 
called static models, will be biased since the explanatory variables which should be 
exogenous and uncorrelated are now no longer uncorrelated. As the lagged dependent variable 
becomes one of the independent variables there will be a correlation between this lagged 
dependent variable and the rest of the explanatory variables. To avoid this bias problem, the 
dynamic model should be run using another technique. This dynamic model can be run by 
using the Generalized Method of Moments model (GMM model). 
 
The GMM model uses the estimators rather than parametric assumptions, thus making this 
model more robust for the process of generating data compared to static panel data models. 
The estimation process in the GMM model is based on an assumption about the equation 
disturbance; it is assumed that this disturbance is uncorrelated with a group of instrumental 
variables. It selects parameters that make the correlation between those instrumental variables 
and the equation’s disturbance as close as possible to zero. In this way, the GMM model will 
make the estimation robust against heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, or both. 
 
1.3. Research Motivation 
 
Many researchers have investigated the firm’s decision to hold cash, the vast majority 
applying their research on developed countries. Very few researchers have studied the cash 
holding issue in developing country by grouping several countries together. By grouping 
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many developing countries into one group, this process is likely to ignore any special 
characteristics that could be related to those countries. 
 
By covering the literature about cash holding decisions, we have discovered some important 
issues; (1) most of the research has been conducted on developed countries with only a 
minimal focus on developing countries. Even when developing countries have been 
investigated, a disparate group of countries have often been aggregated together. (2) When 
several researchers studied the effect of cash flow generated by the firm, they found that this 
factor has a dual effect; in some cases it has a negative relationship with cash holding as this 
cash flow can be considered as a source of liquidity, implying that firms do not need to hold a 
higher level of cash. When they find a positive relationship, their explanation of this positive 
relationship is that firms which generate more cash flow are more profitable and therefore 
depend on their internal source of financing by holding more cash. (3) Investigating the cash 
holding value has considered many factors such as the level of investor protection and the 
strength of the corporate governance system, but there is no research that considers the most 
recent issue of the financial crisis. (4) Many researchers investigated the determinants of cash 
holding and the value of cash holding but there was no such focus on how cash holding could 
affect firms’ decisions regarding their capital structure, investments, or other corporate issues. 
 
After identifying these gaps in the literature, we are going to study the following issues; (1) 
what are the determinants of the cash holding decision in a developing country such as Jordan 
by considering whether those determinants are different from other developed or developing 
countries due to any speciality of the market in Jordan. (2) Provide a clearer view about how 
firm’s profitability and firm’s ability to generate cash flow internally affects the cash holding 
decision, by using two separate variables to measure profitability and operational cash flow 
rather than only one variable as used in the literature. (3) Investigate the value of cash holding 
in a developing country where investor protection is weak and the corporate governance 
system is poor, and then extend the study to consider the possible effect of the financial crisis 
on the value of cash. (4) Investigate the determinants of capital structure not only by 
considering the traditional variables such as firm size, profitability, tangibility, etc but by 
including the liquidity variable as the total liquidity, and then consider a deeper analysis using 
cash and non cash liquidity, also studying the speed of debt ratio adjustment using a dynamic 
model. 
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Jordan has been chosen as the research sample for two reasons; firstly, besides being a 
developing country where market conditions are different from developed countries, where 
most the cash holding researches have been carried. Jordan has an extra issue which is the 
effect of religion. Jordan is an Islamic country, and the rules of Islam are expected to have an 
effect on the cash holding and the capital structure decisions; since interest is forbidden in 
Islam we expect that it will affect the capital structure decision by making firms depend less 
on long-term debt which involves the payment of interest, and depend more on internal 
sources of fund such as cash or even equity financing. Secondly, observing Jordanian firms 
either by analysing their annual reports or the board of directors’ reports showed that there is 
no clear understanding of how these firms and their managers made the cash holding 
decisions and how the managers need to understand how to manage the cash based on their 
firm characteristics, the characteristics and the condition of the market, the value associated 
with holding this cash, and how this cash will affect other corporate decisions. 
 
To summarise, many researchers have investigated cash holding decisions, most being 
conducted on developed countries, and only a very few on developing countries where many 
countries has been grouped together into one sample. This is likely to mean ignoring the 
characteristics of some countries, especially when their sample size is small compared with 
other countries. This research focuses on one developing country in order to better understand 
whether the special situation regarding Islamic rules affect the cash holding decision. It also 
aims to understand how profitability and operating cash flow separately affect cash holding 
decisions, as this issue has never been studied before. The existing research has included only 
one variable for the cash flow, and based on the results they achieved they explain it either as 
profitability or as the ability to generate cash internally. Another aim of this research is to 
understand whether corporate governance, agency problems, and investor protection affect the 
value of cash held by Jordanian firms in the same way as firms in both developed and 
developing countries, and then to investigate whether other factors such as the financial crisis 
has any effect on the value of cash holding as this issue has not been investigated when other 
researchers studied the value of cash holding. Finally, this research investigates how cash 
holding might affect the firm’s capital structure decision by decomposing the liquidity 
variable into cash and non-cash liquidity, and then analyses how cash liquidity affects the 
firm’s debt ratios.   
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1.4. Contribution 
 
This research aims to provide an analysis of the cash holding decision that is of particular 
relevance to researchers and financial managers with an interest in developing countries. 
There has been a surge in interest in this topic in developed countries, driven in part by the 
recent financial crisis and the resulting importance for firms to retain cash at a time when their 
ability to raise funds from the external markets has become very limited, especially for the 
smaller, less well known firms. Specifically, the research aims to investigate how firms might 
manage the cash available to the firm in the most cost effective and efficient way; by 
determining the factors that affect the cash-holding decisions, financial managers will be able 
to understand, based on the characteristics of their firms, what is the right amount of cash to 
hold, when they should accumulate cash and when they should not. If their firms have a high 
cash dividend policy then they need to hold more cash, but if their firms have more liquid 
assets substituted then they do not need to hold higher levels of cash as this cash represents an 
opportunity cost for their firms, it also showed that using separate measurement for 
profitability and operating cash flow give more clear understanding on how those two 
characteristics determine firm’s cash holding decision rather than just use measurement for 
cash flow alone. 
 
It also provides financial managers with ideas on how shareholders evaluate the cash that is 
held by the firm, and how this value might increase or decrease; this should help the financial 
managers to work in such a way as to improve the value of cash or to reduce the cash level to 
the minimum level if that cash has a low valuation from the point of view of their 
shareholders. Finally, this research shows how cash-holding can affect the debt ratio by 
studying how cash liquidity as a special type of liquidity affect the debt ratios to help the 
financial managers plan their capital structure decisions. 
 
This research also aims to add to the financial literature by investigating cash-holding 
decisions in a developing country such as Jordan; although no other researchers have focus 
their studied on Jordan, some researchers have included Jordan in their samples when 
studying developing countries, but these samples are extremely small and as a result we 
believe that this size of sample does not represent the situation for firms in Jordan. For 
example, Chen and Mahajan (2010) included only 4 firms with 11 firm-year observations, 
while Dittmar et al. (2003) included only one firm. As those samples are very small and 
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cannot be used to generalize results about Jordan, we believe it is important to investigate 
cash-holding decisions in Jordan using a larger sample which will reflect any special 
characteristic about Jordan such as the effect of Islamic rules to help us to have a better 
understanding on how Jordanian firms deal with cash and whether cash-holding decisions in 
Jordan are different from other countries, including both developed and developing countries. 
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Chapter 2: The determinants of corporate cash-holding decisions: Evidence 
from the Jordanian capital market 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
There has been considerable interest in, and attention to, the reasons and motives for why 
firms might want to hold liquid assets, and in particular cash. This is principally driven by the 
fact that shareholders could hold these liquid assets themselves, whereas it is assumed that 
firms raise capital from the external capital markets to invest in productive assets. In 1936 
Keynes introduced three motives for why firms might want to hold liquid assets. Those three 
motives are the transaction motive, the precautionary motive, and the speculative motive. In 
simple terms, the transaction motive means that firms hold liquid assets in order to conduct 
their daily operations; also, this balance of cash will reduce the cost involved in the process of 
selling other kinds of assets. The precautionary motive means that firms hold liquid assets in 
order to meet any future financing needs, while the speculative motive means that firms hold 
liquid assets to achieve some interest income by investing in short-term interest-bearing 
assets; this liquidity can also be used to invest in future high-income projects. 
 
Since Keynes, a number of other works have focused on the transaction motive and the 
precautionary motive. Baumal (1952), Tobin (1956), Tobin (1958), William and Frazer 
(1964) and others have studied the transaction motive while Whalen (1965), Miller and Orr 
(1966), Frenkel and Jovanovic (1980) and others have studied both the transaction motive and 
the precautionary motive. Whalen (1966), Sprenkly (1967), Han and Qiu (2007), Boileau and 
Moyen (2009) and others have focused more on the precautionary motive. 
 
In the late 90s, researchers started to focus on other elements of cash-holding, including the 
determinants of cash-holding. They started to investigate the specific reasons and variables 
for holding cash, and how those variables will affect the corporate cash-holding decision. 
Several variables were considered by different authors, such as the firm’s size, firm’s cash 
flow, firm’s profitability, firm’s growth, and other related variables. 
 
From those variables investigated by previous researchers, we pick up the following: firm’s 
size, firm’s cash flow, firm’s growth opportunities, firm’s profitability, firm’s leverage, firm’s 
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cash dividend, and firm’s liquid assets substitutes. These variables have been chosen because 
they have been important in explaining the level of cash held by firms. Also, these variables 
have been selected by many of the researchers in the literature as important variables to 
explain the firm’s decision on cash-holding. 
 
Many of the financial theories present explanations for why firms hold cash, and how certain 
situations or certain variables will affect the corporate cash-holding decisions. The pecking 
order theory suggests that, to obtain funds, firms usually follow a specific order, starting with 
the internal sources of funds such as cash balances that have been accumulated over time; 
then they will obtain any necessary extra funds from the external sources funds which include 
debt and equity financing. Firms will then progress with the debt financing since it is cheaper 
and also because it has the tax shield benefit; then, as the final source of financing, they can 
use the equity to finance their projects. 
 
The trade-off theory suggests that firms base their decision on holding cash on the trade-off 
between the cost and the benefits of holding cash; the cost of holding cash is the opportunity 
cost of holding that cash with no return, or with very low return associated with the cost of 
losing purchasing power due to inflation; the benefits of holding cash include the reduction in 
transaction costs, and keeping a certain level of cash as a precautionary source of funding to 
meet future investment needs. By this trade-off between the cost and the benefits of cash-
holding, firms can derive the optimal cash level to hold. On the other hand, financial 
hierarchy theory suggests that there is no optimal level of cash to hold, based on the argument 
that cash can be considered as negative debt, since that cash will be used to pay off the debt; it 
then follows that since there is no optimal amount of debt, there is no optimal amount of cash 
that firms should hold. 
 
In situations with high levels of information asymmetry between a firm’s managers and 
outside investors, the firm might need to hold a higher level of cash because, when it needs to 
obtain funds from external sources, the information asymmetry will make it difficult to do so 
since the outside investors do not have as much information about the firm as the firm’s 
managers do. Those investors may think that the securities the firm is trying to sell are 
overpriced, because they assume that the firm would not sell them if they were underpriced. 
So, even if they buy those securities, they will buy them at a discount, which will make the 
cost of external funds more expensive for the firm. 
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The agency problem occurs due to the separation between the ownership and management. 
Managers work as agents on behalf of the shareholders, and the primary goal of those 
managers should be to work for the best interests of the shareholders and to maximize the 
shareholders’ wealth. On the other hand, those managers might put their own interest above 
the shareholders’ interest and try to obtain personal benefits which will affect the shareholders 
negatively. Shareholders incur agency costs associated with the monitoring costs involved in 
ensuring that managers are maximising shareholders’ wealth, or the costs associated with 
providing managers with the motivation and remuneration to act in the interests of 
shareholders. As part of this agency problem, a free cash flow problem might also arise. This 
occurs when the firm has free cash flow, which is not required for undertaking the 
investments that the firm has identified, and this therefore creates an associated agency 
problem. The firms’ managers might use this free cash flow inefficiently, and in particular 
might try to expand the assets under the firm’s control, which in turn will increase the 
managers’ remuneration. Alternatively, they may spend it on personal benefits or perks that 
benefit themselves, but are effectively paid for by the shareholders. Both of these will 
negatively affect the shareholders and is likely to lead to a decrease in their wealth. The same 
argument on free cash flow can be applied to the cash and liquid assets that are available to 
the firm. 
 
According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), firms should not hold cash since cash has high 
opportunity costs; cash will not generate any return for the firm, and even if the firm uses cash 
equivalents (marketable securities) to obtain some return, this return will still be too low 
compared to the return on the other investments or financial assets available. So, why do 
firms in Jordan or other markets around the world continue to hold relatively large amounts of 
cash or cash equivalents? 
 
The aim of this chapter is to determine the variables and the factors that are important in 
firms’ holding cash and cash equivalents, and to ascertain whether firms in developing 
markets such as the Amman stock exchange have the same reasons to hold cash as the firms 
in developed markets. It is also aims to contribute by studying the firm’s profitability and 
operational cash flow as separate variables to identify how these two variables affect the cash 
holding decisions. By studying and investigating these issues it will help the firm’s managers 
to hold the right amount of cash based on the characteristics of their firms. As discussed in the 
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previous chapter, the poorly developed debt market and the influence of Islamic finance 
provide an interesting framework in which the cash holding decision can be analysed, and 
therefore allows us to identify the extent to which this framework impacts on the firm’s cash 
decision.  
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the literature on this 
topic, while section 2.3 explains the data and methodology. Section 2.4 provides the results 
and analysis, while section 2.5 presents the conclusion. 
 
2.2. Literature review 
 
2.2.1. Motives for cash-holding 
 
Keynes (1936) defines three motives for holding money: (1) transaction demand; (2) 
precautionary demand; and (3) speculative demand. He then combined the first two demands 
and called it the transaction demand for money. These demands are interest-elastic. Keynes 
explained how the interest rate is the main reason that will reduce the willingness to hold 
cash. Liquidity preference depends on three motives: the transaction motive, which represents 
businesses’ and people’s demand for liquidity in business and personal transaction exchange; 
the precautionary motive, which is the demand for liquidity to be able to finance future needs; 
and the speculative motive, which is the demand for liquidity to generate some interest 
income. 
 
Management of cash-holding by firms started in the early 1950s, when Baumol (1952) 
introduced a model for managing cash and physical inventory of assets. Baumol was trying to 
analyse cash-holding as a purpose of the transaction motive, since holding cash plays a 
significant role in minimizing transaction costs for corporate firms; his work was based on the 
model of managing inventory by Whitin (1952). He found that firms hold cash because they 
can use that cash at the right time in exchange for other types of assets in order to minimize 
the transaction cost (Baumol 1952). 
 
After Baumol’s work, economists and other researchers conducted many studies on managing 
the physical inventory of assets; however, they did not place similar focus on firms’ 
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management of cash-holding, and the model introduced by Baumol was used as the starting 
point and the main model to analyse the cost of cash transaction. 
 
Tobin (1956) tried to support the argument that the source of cash demanded by firms is based 
on the need for transactions to match the time between receiving the cash and spending it. 
This transaction motive is considered independent of the interest rate, and if there is any 
relationship it will be uncertain or inelastic. This argument is based on Hanson (1949) who 
argued that the transactions balance will not become interest-elastic until it exceeds a certain 
level and becomes high enough. He guesses that holding cash balances will significantly 
depend on the interest rate. Tobin argues for the transaction motive on the basis of a simple 
example: if someone receives a certain amount of money at the beginning of each month, then 
the amount of cash that person will hold will vary between that amount and zero at the end of 
the month, with an average value of ½ of that amount. If that person decides to use other 
types of assets that can generate a return and then switches back to cash when it is needed, 
this process will generate some return but at the same time will involve a cost. A higher 
investment in cash will reduce both the return and the cost, but the final decision on the 
combination of cash and other types of assets will depend on both return and cost; so, when 
the return (interest) on the other types of assets reaches a certain level and becomes relatively 
high, a smaller amount of cash will be held. 
 
This argument was developed further by Tobin (1958), who states that there are two main 
reasons for households, firms or governments to hold cash. The first is the transaction reason: 
since there is no match between the money expended and received in the short run, economic 
units need to have a cash balance to meet this need for money when the expenditures exceed 
the received money. The interest rate also supports the transaction reason since the interest 
received on cash invested in short-term earning assets can offset the transaction cost. The 
second reason is the investment reason: unlike the previous reason, here we deal with the long 
run, and cash will be held if firms have an expectation that the value of other assets will fall. 
Tobin also examined the sources of liquidity preference and found that there are two sources 
of liquidity preference. The first is inelasticity of interest rate expectations, where the investor 
will choose between cash and other types of assets (assets that generate interest income such 
as consols) by comparing the yield from those consols, including both interest income and 
capital gain, with zero; this is the return on cash, and they can then invest everything in the 
one with the higher yield. The other source of the liquidity preference is uncertainty about the 
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future interest rate; when the future interest rate is uncertain, the risk of investing in consols 
will be higher since it will affect the capital gain and loss for this investment, and the decision 
of investing in cash or consols will depend on the risk and return.  
 
William and Frazer (1964) studied the effect of firm size on the financial structure using a 
linear regression on a sample of manufacturing corporations which have 5 million dollars of 
assets or more based on quarterly financial reports for the period 1956-1961. These data were 
collected from the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). The main results showed that the larger firms depended less on 
bank loans, held more non-cash liquid assets such as government securities, and had lower 
cash balances. They also found that, when the size of the firm increases, it will decrease the 
demand for cash as a precautionary action. Finally, there is a trend towards understanding 
why the precautionary motive has become stronger in money demand analyses. 
 
Whalen (1965) conducted an empirical study to determine whether the assumptions of the 
Baumol-Tobin traditional cash management theory provide a better explanation of firm 
behaviour in managing cash; he used a cross-sectional study of non-financial firms, 
connecting the cash balance with the sales volume for different firm sizes. The first test 
assumed that all firms within the same industry are homogeneous but different in the size of 
operation. The results show that the Baumol-Tobin approach does not hold since they only 
deal with the transactions motive in their analysis. The second test supports the view that an 
increase in the operation size of the firm means that all the assets as well as the cash are likely 
to increase more than the increase in the sales amount. These results did not show a fair 
relationship between cash balance and sales; thus, this relationship remains ambiguous 
because the Baumol-Tobin approach ignores precautionary and liquidity preference motives 
for holding cash, and only uses the transaction motive to understand cash-holding. So, when a 
firm’s operations size increases, the transaction motive for holding cash might be offset by the 
liquidity preference motive. 
 
Miller and Orr (1966) analyse how to find a policy for optimal cash management. They 
depend on the Baumol (1952) model and note that the decision-maker has two kinds of assets 
to hold; the first kind is the assets that can generate income such as bonds, while the second 
kind is assets without returns such as cash. Transfers between these two kind of assets are 
allowed but with specific cost in both directions. The idea is to invest in the earning asset type 
33 
 
and transfer it to the non-earning type when it is needed. The size of the transaction will affect 
the firm significantly, since if the size is large the process of transfer will not be regular; the 
average balance of cash in each period will be high and the firm will lose the income from the 
earning assets. If the amount of the transfer between the two kinds of assets is small, the 
income lost from the idle fund will be lower, but the transaction cost will be higher and will 
erode the earnings. Their results show that the demand for money as a transaction motive 
remains unresolved because the existing cross-sectional studies did not present significant 
results about the economies of scale of cash-holding for different firm size classes, and also 
because the model used is most applicable only for the large firms. 
 
Whalen (1966) considers the precautionary motive for cash-holding. He starts from Keynes’ 
(1936) definition of precautionary cash balances, since Keynes states that the reason to hold 
precautionary cash balances is “to provide for contingencies requiring sudden expenditure and 
for unforeseen opportunities of advantageous purchases, and also to hold an asset of which 
the value is fixed in terms of money to meet a subsequent liability in terms of money.” He 
adds to that definition, saying that they are also held to meet unexpected receipts: when the 
firms’ future expenditures and receipts are not certain, and the firm might face a situation 
where the expenditure exceeds the receipts, then it is recommended that firms hold a certain 
amount of cash to meet that shortage in liquidity. The main problem that firms face is to 
determine the optimal level of cash to be held as a precautionary cash balance. Whalen 
mentions three factors that affect the optimal precautionary cash balance: (1) the cost of 
illiquidity; this means the seriousness of the situation when firms underestimate the need for 
holding cash and the consequences of this shortage of cash balance. This cost will be very 
high if the shortage of cash leads to potential insolvency or bankruptcy. This cost will be 
reduced if the firm has available credit to use, and this will still depend on whether the source 
of credit is cheap and reliable. (2) The opportunity cost of holding precautionary cash 
balances; cash by itself does not generate any income, so holding cash rather than investing in 
other types of assets which generate income represents an opportunity cost for the firm, and 
this cost will increase as the amount held for precautionary cash balance increases. (3) The 
average volume and variability of receipts and disbursements; for any given period of time in 
which the firm has expected expenditures and receipts, the difference between those two 
amounts represents the net need for precautionary cash balance; this need has a probability 
distribution which assumes that it has a zero mean and a standard deviation determined by 
both the average volume and the pattern of the firm’s expenditures and receipts. As this 
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standard deviation increases, higher precautionary cash balances will be required to protect 
against a lack of cash on hand. The total cost of precautionary cash balance is equal to the cost 
of illiquidity plus the opportunity cost of precautionary cash balance. 
 
Sprenkle (1967) tries to explain why, for some firms, uncertainty has a negative relationship 
with the precautionary demand for liquidity, as this statement seems to be implausible. 
Sprenkle found that large firms tend to require less money for precautionary demand with 
uncertainty; this finding does not match what the precautionary demand for cash suggests, 
since firms should hold more cash in case of uncertainty to meet any unexpected need for 
cash. Large firms tend to hold short-term securities rather than simply holding cash in order to 
reduce the opportunity cost of just holding the cash, and are still able to meet their liquidity 
needs. Sprenkle explains this by stating that uncertainty causes firms to over-invest in short-
term securities, at the same time lowering the average amount of their deposits. 
 
The inventory approach, which is the basis of the Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) 
approaches to studying cash-holding, ignores the fact that there may be an interdependent 
relationship between the variables of money demand function. Barro and Santomero (1970) 
study this issue and conclude that transaction costs will not stay the same when other factors 
are changing, but they did not find the solution to this problem (Karni 1973). 
 
Since the Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) approaches did not provide any empirical 
evidence, Karni (1973) studies the interrelation between the variables that affect the cost of 
transaction by studying the sensitivity of the cash held by firms with respect to their income. 
He found that this relationship depended on both the size of the transaction and how the 
income might change. He also studies the sensitivity of the cash held by firms with respect to 
the interest rate and how the interest rate will be changed according to the size of the 
transaction, and he puts greater focus on the change of the transaction size and whether that 
will affect the rate of wages (which is a measure of the value of time). Results show interest 
elasticity has smaller absolute value for the change than real interest change, and that will 
affect both the opportunity cost of holding cash and the real income, while the expected 
change in inflation rate will affect the opportunity cost but not the real income. For the rate of 
wages, results show that there is no similar effect on cash withdrawal cost related to change in 
hours worked or property income. 
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Frenkel and Jovanovic (1980) analyse both the precautionary and the transaction motives for 
cash-holding by developing a stochastic model based on the works of Baumol (1952), Tobin 
(1956), and Miller and Orr (1966). They derived the optimal level of cash-holding in relation 
to several factors, which are the interest rate, average rate of net disbursement, the cost of 
adjusting firms’ portfolio and the variance of the stochastic process governing net 
disbursements. They then used a traditional approach and the steady-state distribution to 
analyse the cash-holding in order to find the optimal inventory of cash under the steady-state 
approach. They do this by considering two types of cost; the first one is forgone earnings on 
inventory holdings and the second one is the adjustment cost of inventories when it reaches an 
undesirable lower bound. The first type of cost can be reduced by investing a smaller portion 
in cash and a higher portion in interest-bearing assets, while the second type of cost can be 
reduced by holding sufficient cash and liquid assets. The optimal level of cash and liquid 
assets can be obtained by reducing those two types of cost together. The result showed that 
there is a significant difference between the two approaches. 
 
Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that, when firms have modest investment requirements, this 
can limit the dividend to shareholders, and they should invest those funds in high liquid assets 
to provide financial slack. This statement is consistent with the precautionary motive for cash-
holding as, by holding more highly liquid assets in order to meet investment requirements, 
firms try to provide financial slack and reduce the chance of uncertainty risk. 
 
Jensen (1986) notes that, when a firm finances its projects using internal sources, it will avoid 
the chance of the funds’ unavailability, or the cost of external financing; pecking order theory 
suggests that firms should start with internal sources of financing, then debt-financing and 
finally equity-financing. The main reason for this is that the internal source of financing is the 
cheapest source, while both debt- and equity-financing involve costs; for debt-financing, 
bankruptcy costs will arise, and for equity-financing, the asymmetry of information between 
investors and managers means that investors are unable to discern the correct value of the new 
issue, and will believe that firms issue equity only when it is overvalued. Although both debt- 
and equity-financing involve costs, debt-financing will still be cheaper than equity-financing 
because of the tax shield of the debt-financing, and because debt-financing has lower 
information costs associated with it. 
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For mature and well-known firms, financial structure is irrelevant to their investment 
decisions; for other firms, however, financial factors have a substantial effect on that external 
capital financing. External capital financing is not the best replacement for internal sources of 
financing, especially in the short term. When there is an asymmetry of information between 
management and investors, the external sources of financing to meet any opportunity to invest 
will become very costly and, in the worst situation, will become impossible. That will make 
the opportunity cost of internal financing significantly lower than the cost of issuing new 
stocks or bonds. (Fazzari 1988) 
 
Whited (1992) mentions that, when a small firm has a low balance of cash or liquid assets, it 
will face limited access to borrowing on the debt markets since it does not have the necessary 
collateral to support its borrowing. When a firm has liquidity restrictions, this will make the 
investment’s marginal opportunity cost for investing today higher than if it delays it until a 
future time. Also, when firms need to exchange their capital goods for cash, they will incur a 
loss. These results were based on the sample of firms listed on both NYSE and AMEX during 
the period 1972-1986, but since the model used in the study needs the lagged value for some 
variables and the change in the value for other variables, the actual data used are for the 
period 1975-1986. The total number of manufacturing firms used in the research sample was 
1,362 and, after excluding firms with missing data, firms with inconsistent data, or firms 
involved in mergers, the total number of firms remaining was 325; those other firms have 
been excluded from the sample to maintain the consistency in the variables over time. 
 
Fazzari and Peterson (1993) argue that firms that try to maintain a certain level of fixed 
investment will find it costly to change the level of fixed investment. Those firms can provide 
liquidity by changing their working capital, which may lead to negative working capital, 
especially when the external source of funding is expensive. 
 
Dittmar et al. (2003) study a sample of more than 11,000 firms from 45 countries using 
Pooled Cross-Country Regression. They found that firms hold significantly more cash in 
cases of shareholders having less protection. This amount is about the twice the amount held 
by other firms when shareholders have more protection; the other reasons that are mentioned 
in the literature for holding cash, such as investment opportunities and asymmetric 
information, are less important in those countries where the protection for shareholders is 
lower. They found that, in countries where shareholders have less protection, firms hold more 
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cash even when it is easier to access funds, since shareholders cannot force managers to 
disgorge the cash balances, as the agency cost theory suggests. 
 
Han and Qiu (2007) study the precautionary motive for holding cash by analysing how cash 
flow volatility affects the decision on holding cash, based on firms’ financial constraints on a 
large sample of publicly traded firms during the period 1997-2002. They found that cash-
holding by financially constrained firms increases as the volatility of cash flow increases, but 
for unconstrained firms this relationship becomes unsystematic. Their paper provides an 
analysis of Keynes’ (1936) precautionary motive for holding cash and liquid assets, exploring 
the implications of cash flow volatility for firm investments, and they show that the financial 
constraint could affect the relationship between cash flow volatility on one side and cash 
holdings and investments on the other side. The model they used assumed no hedging for 
future cash flow, as introducing hedging will decrease the incentive for precautionary cash-
holding since hedging and precautionary motive can be seen as substitutes for each other. The 
optimal ratio between the hedging and precautionary motive will be determined when the 
marginal benefit of hedging is the same as the marginal benefit from the precautionary 
motive. This optimal ratio will also depend on the correlation between future investments and 
future cash flows. 
 
Boileau and Moyen (2009) found that the precautionary motive for holding cash increases 
because of various taxes that will increase the costs for the firm and make the risk higher, 
which causes firms to hold more cash. Also, when a firm faces liquidity constraints, this will 
increase the risk for the firm and cause it to hold more cash. 
 
2.2.2. Determinants of cash-holding 
 
After looking at the motives for cash-holding which can be considered as the main reasons or 
the drivers for holding cash, we can consider those motives as the starting point for 
understanding why firms need to hold cash in the first place. Now we can move on to the 
question of which determinants of cash-holding can be considered as the more specific 
reasons for firms’ actual need to hold cash. 
 
Kim et al. (1998) used a sample of 915 industrial firms that were able to yield at least 10 years 
of data during the studied 20-year period from 1975 to 1994 to investigate empirical and 
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theoretical reasons why firms hold liquid assets. They developed a model to optimize the 
level of liquid assets that should be held by firms, after considering certain criteria, which are 
the low return from the liquid assets and the benefit of having a cheap source of funds for 
future investment, especially when the cost of financing is high. They studied the effect of the 
cost of external financing, cash flow uncertainty, current and future investment opportunity, 
and other control variables on the corporate liquidity by studying variables such as firm size, 
growth opportunity as market-to-book ratio, cash flow, variability in cash flow, return spread 
between physical assets and risk-free asset, average cash cycle, cash cycle variability, debt 
ratio, and bankruptcy predictor. The main findings of their research are as follows. When the 
cost of financing from external sources is high, firms invest more in liquid assets. If the future 
cash flows have high variance, firms also invest more in liquid assets. Firms hold more liquid 
assets if the expected return from the future investment is high (growth opportunities), but the 
level of cash held will decrease when the rate of return on physical assets is relatively 
different from the rate of return on liquid assets. Market-to-book ratios (growth opportunities) 
have a positive relationship with the amount of liquid assets, while size of the firm has a 
negative relationship with liquid assets held by firms. When the earnings fluctuate (variability 
in cash flow) and the return on physical assets is low compared to the return on liquid assets, 
the firm will hold more liquid assets. Finally, they found that liquidity has a positive 
relationship with the measure of future economic conditions. 
 
Schnure (1998) investigated new facts regarding firms’ cash-holding by looking into the real 
characteristics of the firm based on the firm’s size level. Then he looked at the motives for 
cash-holding decisions. Based on cross-sectional regressions using the data from 1995 for 
non-financial firms listed on COMPUSTAT, he found that the cash-holding decision depends 
on the firm size, the industry in which the firm operates, and the firm’s ability to borrow from 
the bonds market. Small firms tend to hold a higher ratio of cash to total assets, while firms 
with factors that indicate a strong or large size, such as having access to financial markets, 
low volatility of cash flow and economy of scale, tend to hold a lower ratio of cash to total 
assets. Firms that issue bonds without ratings hold more cash, and there is a positive 
relationship between cash held by firms and proxies for agency problems (especially in the 
small firms with a high ratio of cash) and ability to issue stocks, and a negative relationship 
with acquisitions expenditures. 
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Opler et al. (1999) examine the determinants and implications of holding liquid assets, 
including cash and marketable securities, by applying time series and cross-sectional tests 
using publicly traded firms from the US, excluding financial firms, during the period from 
1971 to 1994. They found that firms hold a high ratio of cash when they have good 
opportunities for growth and when their cash flow is more risky. On the other hand, a firm 
holds a low ratio of cash when the size of the firm is big, especially when the credit rating for 
that firm is high and it is able to access capital markets. Firms also have a tendency to hold 
more cash when they do well and achieve more than what the static trade-off model predicts. 
Finally they found that dividend to shareholders, spending, and capital expenditures are 
affected by the excess cash in the short run. In order to maximize the shareholders’ wealth, 
managers should hold cash at a level that will make the marginal costs and benefits from 
holding that cash equal. Holding cash has costs of low returns and tax disadvantages, while 
the benefits from holding cash include reducing the transaction cost; furthermore, cash 
represents a cheaper source of funds to finance future investment when the cost of financing 
is high or unavailable. The point of view regarding the benefits and costs of cash-holding 
differs between shareholders and managers, since managers like to hold more cash as a 
precaution and to reduce the risks that the firm may face; the problem, however, is that 
managers tend to hold too much cash, thus prioritising the precautionary motive over the 
shareholders’ wealth-maximizing goal. In other words, managers prefer safety over the 
wealth-maximizing interests of the shareholders, as the agency theory suggests. 
 
Colquitt et al. (1999) study the differences across property-liability insurer firms’ cash-
holding. All transactions in the property-liability insurer firms occur in cash. All premiums 
and claims are received and paid by cash; on that basis, the cash amount held by insurers is 
critical for both the operations and the financial stability of those firms. They studied 1,400 
property-liability insurers firms collected from the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC) for the period 1993-1995. They found that insurance firms that have 
access to the capital market tend to hold less cash, and firms with a high ratio of leverage also 
tend to hold less cash, but firms tend to hold more cash when the variance of cash flow is high 
since that is associated with higher uncertainty about the need of cash. Stock insurers hold 
more cash relative to cash held by mutual insurers. Finally they found that insurers who have 
high percentages of liquid assets tend to hold less cash than insurers who have a high 
percentage of non-liquid assets because insurers with high non-liquid assets need to have 
more cash to enhance their liquidity positions. 
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Faulkender (2002) studied the cash position of small firms and how this will be affected by 
financial distress, information asymmetry, agency costs, and taxes. He used the data from the 
1993 National Survey of Small Business Finance conducted by the Federal Reserve. 2,808 
corporations from the survey included, non-farm businesses for profit corporations with fewer 
than 500 employees have been used in this research after excluding S-Corporations, since 
taxes are calculated for this type of corporation as personal tax rates, not as corporate tax 
rates. He found that, when leverage increases, small firms hold more cash as a preventative 
action, and firms with greater asymmetric information tend to hold more cash if they 
anticipate needing cash in the future comparing to other firms with less asymmetric 
information. Older firms hold more cash although they should have better access to the capital 
market, firm size has a negative relationship with cash-holding, taxes have no impact on cash-
holding, and firms which have access to credit hold less cash. Higher costs of financial 
distress cause firms to hold more cash. 
 
Omet and Maghyereh (2003) studied the determinants of cash-holding for Kuwaiti firms 
during the period between 1996 and 2000 on a sample of 30 firms, using panel data analysis. 
They found that firm size, growth opportunities and profitability have no effect on cash-
holding decisions while leverage has a negative relationship with a firm’s cash-holding. 
 
Ferreira and Vilela (2004) investigated the determinants of cash balances using firms in 
different EMU countries including Germany, France, Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Finland, 
Belgium, Austria, Ireland, Luxemburg, Greece and Portugal from 1987 to 2000, and found 
that the level of cash held by firms is positively affected by both cash flow and investment 
opportunities, and negatively affected by leverage, firm size and liquid asset substitutes. 
These results contradict the free cash flow theory since the result shows a negative 
relationship between cash-holding and investment opportunity set, which also suggests that 
agency conflict does not play a major role in determining cash-holding, but the results are 
consistent with both the pecking order and trade-off theories since the decision on holding 
cash by the firm is a trade-off decision between both costs and benefits of holding cash. Thus, 
the pecking order and trade-off theories can explain the cash-holding determinants in EMU 
countries. They also found that a significant negative relationship exists between the level of 
cash held by firms and bank debt, while there is a negative relationship between the 
development level of the financial markets and the cash level. 
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Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) used publicly traded UK firms to determine the reasons why firms 
hold cash, using data from 1984 to 1999 and employing a cross-sectional model and a panel 
data model. Their sample includes all the firms available on the Datastream database; all 
financial firms have been excluded, as have firms with missing years of observations and any 
firms with less than five continuous years of observations. Focusing on managerial 
ownership, including the structure of the board and company controllers, they found that a 
significant relationship exists between cash-holding and managerial ownership. This 
relationship is a non-monotonic relation, since they found that the relationship is negative 
when the ownership level is low but the relationship will be reversed and become positive 
with a high level of ownership. They also discovered that many factors are important in 
determining cash-holding, such as the following: bank debt, which shows a significant 
negative impact on cash-holding since, when firms have access to banks, they do not need to 
hold a lot of cash; leverage has a negative relationship as well for the same reason; growth 
opportunities have a positive impact on the cash-holding decision since firms need to hold 
cash to be able to finance any growth opportunity; liquid assets have a negative impact on 
holding cash since they can be considered a cash substitute; and cash flow has a positive 
impact on holding cash since firms that generate a large amount of cash tend to hold more 
cash since this kind of firm prefers internal over external sources of financing. There is no 
strong evidence that larger firms hold less cash. They also suggest that, considering the 
heterogeneity and endogeneity are essential in analysing firms’ cash-holding, since shocks 
that affect cash-holding are very likely to affect the firm-specific characteristics such as equity 
market value, and also as the determinants affect the cash level, it is possible that cash will 
affect any of its determinants. 
 
Pedro and Pedro (2004) study the determinants of cash holdings on a sample of 860 small and 
medium-sized firms in Spain during the period from 1997 to 2001, using both cross-sectional 
and panel data analysis. They argue that the problems of the market that affect firms include 
the following: asymmetric information, agency problem, financial difficulties, financial 
constraints and others, all of which affect the decision on cash-holding and become more 
serious for small and medium-sized firms, since the asymmetric information problem 
becomes worse. Also, the ownership structure in the small and medium-sized firms makes the 
agency problem more serious as well. There are also other problems such as financial 
difficulties, financial constraints and relatively higher transaction costs. They found that the 
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following factors will affect the decision on cash-holding. The first factor is growth 
opportunities. When a firm has more opportunities it tends to hold more cash to meet these 
investments. The second factor is the firm size. A large firm holds less cash based on the 
economies of scale for the firm transactions. On the other hand, small and medium-sized 
firms hold more cash not only because of the economies of scale issue but also because of the 
higher level of asymmetric information, greater agency problems, more financial difficulties, 
and more financial constraints relative to large size firm. The third factor is the relationship 
with financial institutions. When a firm has a good relationship with banks or other lenders, 
that will reduce both asymmetric information and the agency problem since the firm needs to 
disclose more; this causes the firm to hold less cash since it will allow the firm to access funds 
more easily and at lower cost. The fourth factor is the probability of financial distress, and 
there are two views on this factor. Some studies, such as those by Ferreira and Vilela (2004) 
and Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), suggest that it will cause firms to hold more cash, while others 
suggest that it will cause firms to hold less cash, such as Kim et al. (1998). The fifth factor is 
leverage; higher leverage will cause a reduction in cash levels because the cost of funds will 
be higher with a high level of leverage. The sixth factor is debt maturity structure; firms with 
short-term debt tend to hold more cash since the risk for renewal is higher. The seventh factor 
is cash flows generated by the firm; when a firm is able to generate more cash flow, it will 
tend to hold less cash. The last factor is liquidity; when the firm has other substitutes for 
liquid assets it tends to hold less cash. 
 
Almeida et al. (2004) based their study on a sample of manufacturing firms during the period 
from 1971 to 2000, which consists of 29,954 firm-years observations. They investigated the 
impact of financial constraints on firm policies. Their main finding was that, in financially 
constrained firms, there is a positive relationship between cash-holding and cash flow. 
Financially constrained firms need to protect against future investment needs, and corporate 
liquidity is important in this case. On the other hand, for financially unconstrained firms the 
relationship between cash-holding and cash flow is not systematic. 
 
Kytönen (2005) focuses upon the determinants of liquid assets held by corporations, using 67 
Finnish firms listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange in 2003. By using cross-sectional 
regressions, he found that a significant relationship exists between liquid assets-holding and 
the extent of internal financial reporting. He also found that there are many factors 
determining the decision of liquid asset-holding in Finnish firms, such as the following: the 
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size of the firm has a positive relationship with cash-holding and, although this result does not 
match the view that large firms tend to hold less cash, his explanation was that “there is no 
evidence of the economies of scale in the demand for liquid assets.”; growth opportunities 
have a positive relationship with cash-holding as firms try to hold cash to protect themselves 
from financial distress probability; opportunity costs have a negative relationship with cash-
holding as, when the return on assets (as measurement of the opportunity cost) is higher, this 
will send positive news to the market about the borrowing firm’s creditworthiness and will 
reduce the agency cost and the information asymmetry, thus making access to external 
sources of funding cheaper for the firm; cash flows have a positive relationship with cash-
holding, and this result is consistent with the pecking order theory since more profitable firms 
that generate more cash flow tend to depend on the internal source of financing so they will 
hold more cash;  efficiency of working capital management has a negative impact on cash-
holding as this working capital can be used to provide a cash substitute; leverage has a 
positive relationship with cash-holding - he did not give any reason for this result but 
mentioned that it is consistent with Opler et al. (1999) who explain that “highly leveraged 
firms find it difficult and expensive to raise additional funds.”; dividend policy has a positive 
impact on cash-holding because firms that pay dividends hold more cash to avoid any 
shortfall of cash. 
 
Niskanen and Niskanen (2007) examine the determinants of cash holdings on a sample of 
small and medium-sized Finnish firms based on a private survey which includes all firms in 
the mid-west of Finland except small service industry firms during the period from 1994 to 
1997; the capital market there is based on banks and it is connected to a small number of 
banks or groups of banks that operate in the country. This system allows the banks to monitor 
the firms more closely, play an active role in firms’ administration and own large amounts of 
firm capital. They found a significant impact of both managerial ownerships and lending 
relationships on cash-holding. They found a cubic relationship between cash-holding and 
managerial ownership for larger firms in their sample or for the firms that have borrowing 
relationships with two or more banks. For the relationship with the lender, they found that 
when the firm has a long-term borrowing relationship or when it has access to more than one 
bank it will hold less cash. Also, they found that when firms are large the level of cash-
holding will be greater, when firms face financial constraints they will hold more cash, and 
when the ratio of debt to assets increases, the cash-holding will increase as well. They were 
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unable to check whether growth opportunities can affect the cash-holding decision because 
the data needed to measure this variable were not available for their sample. 
 
Ramezani and Soenen (2007) investigate whether the cash-holding can be affected by the 
strategic growth opportunities (real option) for the firm. The data for this research have been 
taken from COMPUSTAT files for 11 years, between 1990 and 2000. The data include all 
firms except financials, utilities, governmental and unclassifiable firms, and firms with total 
assets, net sales and common equity of a total value of less than 1 million US dollars. For 
firms with missing data, those data have been replaced by the industry average; after all these 
exclusions and adjustments the final number of firms included in the sample was 4,251. They 
found that if firms have this opportunity it is more likely that they will hold more cash relative 
to other firms that do not have valuable growth opportunities. They also mention that holding 
cash will reduce the transaction cost in both directions, as well as reduce the financial distress 
cost. On the other hand, it involves an opportunity cost since the return on cash or high liquid 
assets is the lowest compared to other types of assets. They also confirm that size has a 
negative relationship with cash-holding since small firms tend to hold more cash in order to 
be able to finance their more valuable growth options. 
 
Baum et al. (2008) investigate the relationship between uncertainty and the optimal level of 
cash-holding. They use quarterly data taken from COMPUSTAT for 700 non-financial US 
firms for the period from 1993 to 2002. They check two additional factors in the decision on 
cash-holding, which are uncertainty in the macroeconomic conditions and the idiosyncratic 
risk, to explain their role in the cash-holding decision. They formalize a model assuming that 
firms hold cash in order to maximize their value and reduce the cash flow shock. This model 
depends on several factors as follows: expected return on investments; expected return on 
loans; the finite bounds of the distribution of firms’ cash flow to capture any shock in cash 
flow distribution and to capture the degree of uncertainty that firms might face; the possibility 
of the firm obtaining loans; and the firm’s initial resources which is what the firm had 
originally and will distribute on either capital investment or cash-holding. They parameterized 
optimal cash holdings by firms and used the empirical data after splitting their sample into 4 
groups to consider the differences between categories of firms. They found strong evidence 
that macroeconomic uncertainty is associated with the optimal level of liquidity, and when 
idiosyncratic uncertainty increases firms will increase the level of cash and liquid assets that 
they hold. In general they found that, when the situations and conditions around the firms are 
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ambiguous, firms tend to hold a higher ratio of liquid assets. The sensitivity of this decision 
on how much cash or liquid assets a firm should hold depends on firm characteristics such as 
firm size and leverage, how easy it is to predict the macroeconomic environment, and the 
level of idiosyncratic risk. 
 
Duchin (2010) notices that, besides the increase in the cash ratio held by firms, during the 
period from 1990 to 2006 stand-alone firms held almost double the cash ratio held by 
diversified firms. By studying a sample of industrial firms from North America, he obtained 
data from both COMPUSTAT annual file and COMPUSTAT segment file; after excluding 
financial firms, utilities firms, and firms with missing data, he adjusted all the data to dollars. He 
suggests that diversification will make the cash flow smoother since firms’ divisions are not 
perfectly positively related. This means that diversified firms will hold a lower cash ratio as 
precautionary cash. And that ratio will decline as the correlation between the divisions 
declines. His finding suggests that it is not the number of divisions that will make the cash 
ratio lower; rather, it is the lower investment opportunity correlation between the divisions. 
Also, when the correlation between cash flow and investment opportunities is high, the cash 
ratio will be low; furthermore, the cash ratio will be even lower when we take into 
consideration the financial gap (which is the correlation between investment opportunities and 
cash flows). His result is consistent with the precautionary motive for holding cash introduced 
by Keynes (1936), which suggests that firms will hold more cash to protect their current 
investment from liquidation when the external financing cost is high. This paper focuses on 
the operation risk of the investment, and how it will affect the decision on cash-holding taking 
into consideration both the internal capital market and firm diversification. The result was 
consistent with that of Modigliani and Miller (1958) who found that, in financially 
constrained firms, the correlation between the cash flow and investment opportunities is 
important. Also, it is consistent with Almeida et al. (2004) who found that cash flow and 
cash-holding are correlated only in financially constrained firms. He also found that an 
increase of one standard deviation in the firm’s cross-divisional correlation will lead to an 
increase of 4.4% of firm average cash-holding and 9.1% in the median. He studies the 
interaction between a firm’s cash-holding and the internal capital market and found that firms 
hold less cash when they have plenty of cash to transfer, and cash transfer has a positive 
relationship with the diversification in opportunity investment between the divisions. He 
found that the relationship between diversification and cash-holding becomes stronger in 
firms with greater corporate governance, since diversification reduces the need for high cash 
46 
 
balance; furthermore, when it is accompanied with good governance which will transfer funds 
to the more productive divisions in the firm, this will make the relationship stronger. 
Regarding the firm value, there was no evidence of whether diversification will affect the firm 
value either by creating or destroying that value. 
 
Chen and Mahajan (2010) investigate cash-holding by firms in 15 European Union countries 
and 31 non-European countries during the period 1994-2004. They found that the introduction 
of the euro and establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) decreased the 
level of cash-holding by the firms in European countries. In European countries, cash and 
debt are more substitutable in terms of financing than in non-European countries, and 
corporate governance variables such as creditor rights, anti-director rights, and closely-held 
shares are very important factors in determining corporate liquidity and should be taken into 
consideration when studying corporate liquidity for international firms. For European 
countries, they found that firms hold more cash when there are more investment opportunities 
in the future, and the size of the firm has a positive relationship with cash-holding. They 
suggest that this result is due to the presence of economy of scale, and cash flow has a 
positive relationship with cash-holding as firms that generate more income tend to hold and 
accumulate more cash for the precautionary motive. There is a negative relationship between 
cash-holding and net working capital as it can be used as a cash substitute. Capital 
expenditures have a positive relationship with cash-holding since firms tend to hold more 
cash in the event of growth opportunities. Leverage has a negative relationship with cash-
holding because access to more debt can be considered a substitute source of cash. Finally, 
firms that pay cash dividends tend to hold more cash in order to meet this financial obligation. 
 
Looking at the literature on cash holding we can see that there are two main areas for the 
analysis of cash-holding; the first area is the motives for cash-holding, and the second area is 
the determinants of cash-holding. In terms of the first area, the motives for cash-holding can 
be seen as the drivers of the decision on cash-holding. The literature mentions several motives 
for cash-holding. The first is the transaction motive, when firms hold cash in order to reduce 
the transaction cost of transferring between cash and other types of assets or investment in 
both directions. The second is the precautionary motive; according to this motive, firms tend 
to hold cash to be able to meet any future need for cash or liquidity in order to finance their 
future projects or to meet either the expected or unexpected need for cash. The third is the 
speculative motive, when firms hold cash to take advantage of this liquidity; for example 
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firms can obtain a discount on the purchasing of raw material. The fourth is the agency cost/ 
asymmetric information motive, when firms need to hold cash due to the asymmetric 
information between investors and managers of the firm that makes the external financing 
costly or even unavailable. 
 
The second area is the determinants of cash-holding, which consider the specific reasons for 
cash-holding decisions. Many empirical papers consider the determinants of cash-holding; 
those papers cover countries from around the world in different time periods and consider 
several variables that could affect the corporate decision on holding cash. Many of these 
variables were common between those papers such as firm’s size, cash flow, growth 
opportunities, cash dividend to share holders, and liquid assets substitute. Some papers 
mention other variables over the previous variables such as profitability, cash cycle, and 
bankruptcy expectation. The effects of those variables were almost the same but had some 
opposite effects in some papers due to the characteristics of the different samples. 
 
2.2.3. Research hypotheses 
 
Large-sized firms are more able to access financial markets to obtain external sources of 
financing and also have the advantage of economies of scale; compared to small-sized firms 
they have less asymmetric information, and therefore will not need to hold as much cash as 
smaller firms. Larger Jordanian firms are more likely to be able to obtain more debt and 
equity financing from external sources, which means they tend to hold less cash as compared 
to smaller sized firms. 
H1: there is a negative relationship between a firm’s size and a firm’s cash-holding. 
 
Firms that are able to generate more cash from their operations tend to hold smaller amounts 
of cash, since those firms are less likely to suffer from cash shortages. The increased reliance 
on internally generated cash flow in Jordan means that firms able to generate sufficient cash 
flow from their operations provides these firms with a source of funds which allows them to 
reduce the level of cash they need to hold, and therefore reduces the opportunity cost 
associated with cash holding. 
H2: there is a negative relationship between a firm’s cash flow and a firm’s cash-holding. 
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Firms that have future opportunities for growth are more willing to accumulate cash as a 
precautionary action to ensure that they have cash available. Firms will also be willing to 
accumulate cash in order to be able to invest in those projects or investment opportunities that 
will be available in the future, and therefore will not feel pressured by investors to return the 
cash to shareholders. Firms in Jordan expecting growth in the future will be more willing to 
hold cash to meet those growth expectations especially in light of the fact that debt financing 
is less preferred as it includes the payment of interest, which is forbidden according to Islamic 
rules. 
H3: there is a positive relationship between a firm’s growth opportunity and a firm’s cash-
holding. 
 
Pecking order theory suggests that more profitable firms tend to depend more on the internal 
sources of financing. Therefore, profitable firms tend to hold more cash as an internal source 
of financing, and will be less dependent on external funding. Since debt financing is less 
preferred in Jordan due to the influence of the Islamic rules, firms will depend more on equity 
financing than on debt financing, and since equity financing is more expensive than internal 
financing, profitable firms in Jordan are expected to hold more cash to reduce their 
dependency on expensive equity financing. 
H4: there is a positive relationship between a firm’s profitability and a firm’s cash-holding. 
 
Firms with higher debt ratios are more able to access debt markets, which means those firms 
tend to hold less cash since they can obtain the funding they need from the debt market. 
However, we note that it is also possible that firms with a high debt ratio have used up their 
debt capacity and can no longer borrow, in which case such firms would be more likely to 
hold cash. In the case of Jordan, although debt financing is less preferred, some firms may 
choose not to follow the Islamic rules and obtain a cheaper source of financing by benefitting 
from the tax saving. These firms will tend to hold less cash as they have other sources of 
funding. 
H5: there is a negative relationship between a firm’s leverage and a firm’s cash-holding. 
 
Firms that pay cash dividends need to have a sufficient amount of cash to meet these financial 
obligations, which means that, whenever the firm decides to pay a cash dividend, it needs to 
hold more cash to meet the financial obligation. Since investors prefer a fairly stable flow of 
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dividends over time, holding cash will ensure that firms can continue to make dividend 
payments even when faced with temporary falls in earnings.  
H6: there is a positive relationship between a firm’s cash dividend and a firm’s cash-holding. 
 
Firms that have other sources of liquidity do not need to hold high levels of cash; those other 
sources of liquidity can be used as a substitute to enable the firm to obtain the funding that it 
needs. So, as long as firms have other sources of liquidity, they do not need to hold a large 
amount of cash.  
H7: there is a negative relationship between a firm’s liquid assets substitute and a firm’s 
cash-holding. 
 
2.3. Data and Methodology 
 
2.3.1. Research sample 
 
To find the determinants of corporate cash-holding decisions, a sample of publicly traded 
corporate firms from the Amman stock exchange will be used. This sample will include all of 
the firms listed on the Amman stock exchange, with the exception of financial firms, for the 
period between 2000 and 2011 based upon the firms’ annual data. The reason for excluding 
the financial firms from the sample is that financial firms must hold a certain level of cash as 
part of their business, so this will affect the result of this research. Any new firms will be 
excluded from the sample, and any firm that does not have a full set of observations for the 
studied period will be excluded as well. The reason for excluding the new firms which have 
missing observations for the first year or first few years is that those new firms have a high 
level of cash generated from the selling of their stock to the public through the initial public 
offering (IPO), or from the cash that firms obtain from their owners, or as loans from banks or 
other financial institutions. That cash is not yet fuelling the firms’ operations, so including 
those firms might affect the results of this study. On the other hand, firms with missing 
observations in the last year or the last few years represent firms that are either going out of 
business or have already done so and have started the liquidation process; thus, either there 
will be no cash since it has been paid to the creditors or the other stakeholders who have any 
claim on the firms’ assets, or there will be a certain level of cash generated from selling the 
firms’ assets as part of the liquidation process. In both cases the level of cash for the firms 
with missing observations in the last year or the last few years is misleading, since it does not 
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come from the firms’ operations, and if we include those firms the result of the study might be 
affected. Some of the researchers that we discussed earlier excluded firms with missing data, 
such as Ozkan and Ozkan (2004). 
 
From the 247 firms listed on the Amman stock exchange in 2011, after excluding financial 
firms which amount to 109, and firms with missing observations either at the beginning or at 
the end of the study period which amount to 58, we are able to retain 80 firms with 12 years’ 
data for each firm; this means that 960 observations are available for the empirical test. 
Although this number of observations is less than the number of observations in many of the 
studies discussed in the literature review section, those studies were conducted on more 
developed markets such as the US market, which was also established much earlier than the 
Amman stock exchange. Some of the studies were conducted on samples drawn from more 
than one country. So, in view of the small size of the Amman stock exchange and since it is a 
relatively new market, this number of observations is the best we can get. On the other hand, 
some researchers used a smaller sample than ours to study the determinants of cash-holding. 
For example, Kytönen (2005) used 67 Finnish firms for only one year (2003); in another 
study which has considered a country in the same region as Jordan (i.e. another middle-
eastern country) Omet and Maghyereh (2003) used a sample of 30 Kuwaiti firms during the 
period 1996-2000. 
 
2.3.2. Research variables 
 
In this research all possible variables that affect cash-holding decisions will be included. After 
reviewing the literature on the cash-holding decision and the literature on the determinants of 
cash-holding, a number of variables that affect the cash-holding decision have been identified. 
From those variables we included the following: firm’s size, cash flow, growth opportunities, 
profitability, leverage, dividend, and liquid assets substitute; these variables are the most 
important variables affecting the decision on cash-holding as those variables have been used 
by the vast majority of researchers in their studies about the determinants of cash holding. The 
other reason for choosing those variables is that the other variables that have been mentioned 
in the literature cannot be measured because of the unavailability of the data. One of these 
variables is the cash cycle; when we calculated the values of this variable we found that this 
variable is unreliable as it has a significant number of abnormal values at both ends of the 
distribution. Retaining those outliers in the estimations will affect the results of the study, and 
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since those outliers represent a large part of the data removing them will affect the sample 
size significantly. Other variables, such as the variability in the cash flow, have not been 
included; this particular variable needs to be calculated as the standard deviation of the cash 
flow using observations for several years to get one standard deviation, which means we will 
need many observations per firm. As our sample size is not very large, we could not include 
this variable as it would have reduced the sample size. Other variable we could not include is 
the effect of corporate governance on cash holding decisions as the index of corporate 
governance in not available for Jordanian firms and the components needed to measure this 
variable are also not available. 
 
The dependent variable in this research is the cash ratio (CASH), which is measured as cash 
plus cash equivalents to total assets. Based on the literature that has been covered, almost all 
of the researchers used cash plus marketable securities to total assets as the measurement of 
the cash ratio, such as Kim et al. (1998), Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) and others. On the other 
hand, Opler et al. (1999) and Ferreire and Vilela (2004) used cash plus marketable securities 
to net assets (net assets is total assets minus cash and marketable securities), while Pedro and 
Pedro (2004) used both methods to measure the cash ratio. As the literature review section 
showed, using different ways to measure the dependent variable did not appear to affect the 
results. 
 
The independent variables of this research are measured as follows: 
The firm’s size (SIZE), measured by its total assets, will be calculated as the natural logarithm 
of the total assets at the book value of each firm. It is expected that cash-holding will have a 
negative relationship with firm size, since large size firms have a greater ability to access 
financial markets to increase their capital, which means they do not need to hold a large 
amount of cash. Also, large firms have lower marginal transaction costs since they can obtain 
benefits from the economies of scale, and with larger size the asymmetric information is 
likely to be reduced, which will make the external sources of funds cheaper and more 
accessible. The vast majority of the researchers who include this independent variable, such 
as Opler et al. (1999), Ferreire and Vilela (2004), Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) and others, used 
the natural logarithm of the total assets at the book value as the measurement of the firm size. 
Kim et al. (1998) used the natural logarithm of the total assets at the market value. Kytonen 
(2005) used the net sales as measurement of the firm size, while Pedro and Pedro (2004) used 
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the natural logarithm of the sales and the natural logarithm of the total assets at the book value 
as two alternative ways to measure the firm size. 
 
Cash flow (CF) will be measured as earnings plus taxes, interest and depreciation expense 
divided by total assets. There is expected to be a negative relationship between a firm’s cash 
flow and its cash-holding because when the firm is able to generate cash flow from its own 
operations it will tend to hold a lower amount of cash or cash equivalents. Different ways 
have been used in the literature to measure this variable; one way is to take the earnings 
before depreciation, interest, and taxes to total sales, as done by Kim et al. (1998) and 
Kytonen (2005). Chen and Mahajan (2010) calculated it as earnings before depreciation, 
interest and taxes to total assets. Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) and Pedro and Pedro (2004)
11
 used 
the pre-tax profit plus depreciation to total assets. Opler et al. (1999) and Ferreire and Vilela 
(2004) used earnings after tax plus depreciation to net assets. 
 
Growth opportunities (GO) (market-to-book value) will be measured as the ratio of book 
value of total assets, minus the book value of equity, plus the market value of equity to book 
value of assets. When the firm expects to have future projects and investment opportunities or 
when it expects to have a chance of growth, it will need to finance those growth opportunities. 
So, it is expected that it will hold more cash, especially when it is difficult to get outside 
financing or when the cost of external financing from outside sources is expensive due to 
asymmetric information between the investors and firms’ managers. The relationship between 
cash-holding and growth opportunities is expected to be positive. Many of the researchers 
used the market-to-book value of the firm assets, such as Kim et al. (1998), Opler et al. 
(1999), Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) and others. Niskanon and Niskanon (2007) and Pedro and 
Pedro (2004)
12
 used the growth in sales, while Colquitt et al. (1999) used the average growth 
rate in assets in the last three years. 
 
Profitability (P) will be measured as return on assets (ROA). When the firm is more 
profitable, pecking order theory suggests that firms will depend more on the internal sources 
of financing than on the external sources of financing. So, more profitable firms tend to 
accumulate more cash in order to use this cash as an internal source of financing. So, the 
relationship between firms’ profitability and cash-holding is expected to be positive. Although 
                                                 
11
 They also calculate it as earnings before depreciation, interest, and taxes to sales. 
12
 They also calculate it as depreciation to total assets. 
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this is a very important variable to explain cash-holding decisions, most researchers did not 
include it as separate variable in their studies; they used the cash flow as an indication of 
profitability. Omet and Maghyereh (2003) studied this variable and used return on assets 
(ROA) as a measurement of profitability. 
 
Leverage (LEV) will be measured as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. If the firm has 
a high leverage, that might mean it has good relations with banks and other financial 
institutions, and it can thus obtain more funds from loans; this means that such firms do not 
need to hold a large amount of cash since they are able to access external sources of 
financing. The relationship between cash-holding and leverage is expected to be negative. All 
of the literature that we covered used the total liabilities to total assets to measure the leverage 
or the debt ratio, except the research by Pedro and Pedro (2004) which used total liabilities to 
total equities as the debt ratio. 
 
Dividend payout ratio (DIV) will be measured as total cash dividend to total assets. When a 
firm decides to pay a cash dividend to its shareholders, it needs to hold more cash to be able 
to meet this financial obligation, which means that the relationship between the dividend 
payout ratio and cash-holding is expected to be positive. Opler et al. (1999), Ferreira and 
Vilela (2004) and Chen and Mahajan (2010) used a dummy variable to measure the payment 
of a dividend, rather than the size of the dividend. Kytonen (2005) measured it as the ratio of 
dividend to earnings. 
 
Liquid assets substitutes (LIQ) will be measured as net working capital minus cash to total 
assets. When firms have substitutes for cash, they hold less cash, since they have other 
sources of liquidity. The relationship between liquid asset substitutes and cash-holding is 
expected to be negative.  All of the literature that we covered was consistent in its use of net 
working capital minus cash to total assets to measure this variable. 
 
2.3.3. Methodology 
 
The methodology used in this research is panel data analysis, including three alternative panel 
data models: pooling ordinary least squares model, fixed-effect model, and random effect 
model. Panel data analysis has many advantages which we have already mentioned in chapter 
1. The ordinary least squares model can be obtained by finding an approximate straight line 
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which best represents the line of the data set, where the sum of square destination between 
each observation and that line is at the minimum. The fixed-effect model is designed in such a 
way as to take into consideration the changes within each entity (in our case each firm). Each 
entity has its own characteristics; those characteristics might affect the predictor variables and 
could lead to bias in the results, so we need to control for those characteristics. The model 
will give a dummy variable for each entity to capture those characteristics. The fixed-effect 
model assumes that the constant (which varies over time and cross-sectionally) of the model 
and the entity’s error term are not correlated. The same technique can be applied to the time to 
capture the characteristics related to the time as well as the entity. The random effect model is 
similar to the fixed-effect model except that the constant is a random value which varies 
cross-sectionally but is constant over time. 
 
We will apply these three models in the panel data analysis, and will then check which one of 
them is the most appropriate for use as the research model. The first test is the likelihood ratio 
test; this test will be used to compare between the ordinary least squares model and the fixed-
effect model. As we mentioned in chapter 1, this test compares between two models: 
restricted and unrestricted models; by calculating the log-likelihood function and comparing 
those values under chi-square distribution, we can decide which model is better - if the value 
is significant then we should use the fixed-effect model rather than the ordinary least squares 
model. The second test is the Hausman test, which compares the efficiency of the two models. 
The null hypothesis under the Hausman test is that the coefficients estimated by the random 
effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the fixed-effect estimator. If we obtain 
significant values under chi-square distribution, it means that the fixed-effect model is more 
efficient than the random effects model. 
 
2.3.4. Research models 
 
The models of this research will be as follows: 
 
Pooled Ordinary Least Square 
 
CASHit = α + β1 SIZEit + β2 CFit + β3 GOit + β4 Pit + β5 LEVit + β6 DIVit + β7 LIQit + μit  (2.1) 
The error term uit ~ NIID (0, σ
2
) 
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Fixed-Effect Model 
 
CASHit = αit + β1 SIZEit + β2 CFit + β3 GOit + β4 Pit + β5 LEVit + β6 DIVit + β7 LIQit + μit (2.2) 
The error term uit ~ NIID (0, σ
2
) 
 
Random Effect Model 
 
CASHit = αi + β1 SIZEit + β2 CFit + β3 GOit + β4 Pit + β5 LEVit + β6 DIVit + β7 LIQit + μit  (2.3) 
The error term uit ~ NIID (0, σ
2
) 
αi = α + εi 
i = 1, 2, …, N. 
Where εi is a random error term εi ~ NIID (0, σ
2
) 
 
Where: 
CASHit  : Cash ratio. 
SIZE  : Firm size. 
CF   : Cash flow. 
GO   : Growth opportunities. 
P   : Profitability (earning after tax). 
LEV  : Leverage. 
DIV  : Dividend payout ratio. 
LIQ   : Liquid asset substitutes. 
μ   : Unobservable individual specific effect. 
β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, β6, β7  :variables betas. 
 
Finally, to summarize this section, table 2.1 shows the research variables. It also shows the 
expected sign of each of those variables, how we measured them, and an explanation of our 
expectations about the likely relationships. 
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Table 2.1 
Research variables summary 
 
(CASH) cash ratio, (SIZE) firm’s size, (CF) firm’s cash flow, (GO) growth opportunities, (P) Profitability, 
(LEV) leverage, (DIV) dividend payout ratio, (LIQ) liquid assets substitutes. 
Variable Measurement 
Expected 
Sign 
Explanation 
CASH 
                     
            
 NA Dependant Variable 
SIZE                  – 
Larger size firm has better access to financial 
markets, economics of scale Advantage, and 
less asymmetric information 
CF 
                       
             
            
 
– 
Firms that generate higher cash flow are less 
likely to have the problem of cash shortage. 
GO 
                  
                 
 + 
For precautionary reason, firms that have more 
growth opportunities are more willing to 
accumulate cash. 
P     
                 
            
 + 
Profitable firms tend to depend more on the 
internal sources of financing (Pecking order 
theory). 
LEV 
                 
            
 – 
Firms with higher debt ratio indicate that those 
firms are more ability to access debt market to 
obtain the needed fund. 
DIV 
             
            
 + 
Firms that paying cash dividend need to hold 
more cash to meet that financial obligation. 
LIQ 
                       
            
 – 
When firms have other sources of liquidity, 
then they do not need to hold a large amount 
of cash. 
Source: Financial theories and literature. 
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2.4. Results and Analysis 
 
2.4.1. Descriptive analysis 
 
Firstly, we will present the descriptive analysis of the research variables. Table 2.2 shows 
descriptive statistics of the research variables. From table 2.2, we can make a number of 
observations. The mean of the cash ratio for the research sample is 9.38%, which is about one 
tenth of the total assets. Both standard deviation and maximum value are relatively high at 
11.62% and 81.19% respectively, which means that cash ratio varies considerably between 
firms in Jordan. While this variation might be a concern, removing the outliers will reduce the 
sample size which already is not large. Also, retaining those observations will reflect the real 
situation in Jordon which we believe is better to help us understand the motivation for 
Jordanian firms to hold cash. Firms included in this sample generate cash flows ranging 
between -57% and 53% of their total assets, with an average value of about 8%. Firms in this 
sample have an average debt-to-assets ratio of 32%, which is not too high. The average liquid 
assets substitutes for the firms in this sample are about 12%, which means that firms in this 
sample have about one eighth of their assets in non-cash working capital, which can be used 
as liquid assets substitutes. For more details, we can consult table 2.3 which shows the 
descriptive statistics for the research variables year by year, for the year 2000 to the year 
2011. From table 2.3 we can see that the research variables are stable over the research period 
and we can see only small changes as cash ratio is relatively higher in the last few years; this 
may be due to the effects of the financial crisis, when firms started to accumulate more cash. 
Debt ratio has also increased in the last few years, and this will be explained in more detail in 
the fourth chapter, which is concerned with the debt ratio. Cash flow, profitability, and cash 
dividend have decreased in the last few years as firms’ profits have declined, possibly because 
of the financial crisis. 
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Table 2.2 
Descriptive statistics whole sample 
The dependent variable is (CASH) cash ratio which is assets and cash equivalent divided by total assets, the 
independent variables are; (SIZE) firm’s size which is the natural logarithm of the total assets, (CF) firm’s cash 
flow which is earnings plus taxes, interest, and depreciation expense divided by total assets, (GO) growth 
opportunities which is the ratio of book value of total assets, minus the book value of equity, plus the market 
value of equity divided by book value of assets, (P) firm’s profitability which is the return on assets ROA, (LEV) 
leverage which is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, (DIV) dividend payout ratio which is total cash 
dividend to total assets, (LIQ) liquid assets substitutes will which is net working capital minus cash divided by 
total assets. For the period from 2000 to 2011. 
 
 CASH SIZE CF GO P LEV DIV LIQ 
Mean 9.38% 16.90 8.19% 149.10% 2.71% 32.47% 2.80% 11.73% 
Median 4.88% 16.62 7.78% 133.05% 3.25% 28.93% 0.00% 10.51% 
Maximum 81.19% 22.29 52.80% 619.79% 43.30% 94.47% 35.22% 78.02% 
Minimum 0.00% 10.20 -57.28% -67.21% -60.01% 0.44% 0.00% -71.66% 
Std. Dev. 11.62% 1.66 10.43% 82.24% 9.70% 21.03% 4.15% 20.85% 
Observations 960 960 960 960 960 960 960 960 
Source: Calculated by the researcher based on companies’ guides available in Amman stock exchange website 
for several years. 
Table 2.3 
Descriptive statistics year by year 
The dependent variable is (CASH) cash ratio which is assets and cash equivalent divided by total assets, the 
independent variables are; (SIZE) firm’s size which is the natural logarithm of the total assets, (CF) firm’s cash 
flow which is earnings plus taxes, interest, and depreciation expense divided by total assets, (GO) growth 
opportunities which is the ratio of book value of total assets, minus the book value of equity, plus the market 
value of equity divided by book value of assets, (P) firm’s profitability which is the return on assets ROA, (LEV) 
leverage which is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, (DIV) dividend payout ratio which is total cash 
dividend to total assets, (LIQ) liquid assets substitutes will which is net working capital minus cash divided by 
total assets. For the period from 2000 to 2011 year by year. 
 
 
CASH SIZE CF GO P LEV DIV LIQ 
2
0
0
0
 
Mean% 9.70% 16.34 8.74% 111.04% 1.95% 31.64% 2.28% 11.32% 
Median% 2.86% 16.11 8.51% 100.00% 2.30% 29.11% 0.00% 8.65% 
Max% 81.19% 20.08 31.13% 350.94% 27.43% 91.58% 13.94% 67.20% 
Min% 0.00% 14.31 -13.67% 15.73% -20.67% 0.60% 0.00% -39.83% 
SD% 14.93% 1.30 9.48% 59.46% 9.23% 20.11% 3.36% 19.86% 
2
0
0
1
 
Mean% 8.94% 16.37 9.63% 111.23% 2.83% 31.23% 3.00% 12.11% 
Median% 4.13% 16.18 8.97% 100.51% 3.56% 29.49% 0.00% 8.03% 
Max% 48.50% 20.18 31.65% 307.86% 22.76% 91.86% 18.48% 64.26% 
Min% 0.00% 14.06 -38.77% 8.88% -46.16% 1.82% 0.00% -39.02% 
SD% 12.13% 1.31 9.90% 55.55% 9.58% 19.53% 4.33% 20.57% 
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Table 2.3 Continued 
  CASH SIZE CF GO P LEV DIV LIQ 
2
0
0
2
 
Mean% 10.21% 16.37 9.71% 119.60% 3.43% 31.33% 2.82% 13.01% 
Median% 3.35% 16.20 8.86% 108.87% 2.98% 28.10% 0.00% 9.50% 
Max% 51.78% 20.14 31.52% 328.33% 22.21% 91.99% 17.83% 68.20% 
Min% 0.00% 13.97 -14.64% 0.66% -18.91% 2.31% 0.00% -28.69% 
SD% 13.14% 1.32 8.19% 58.61% 7.36% 21.24% 3.85% 20.27% 
2
0
0
3
 
Mean% 8.89% 16.40 9.30% 145.27% 3.42% 31.43% 2.64% 13.99% 
Median% 4.22% 16.27 8.94% 132.90% 3.34% 26.95% 0.00% 10.79% 
Max% 52.03% 20.15 33.57% 462.16% 25.15% 92.14% 18.11% 67.73% 
Min% 0.00% 14.03 -25.21% 33.54% -37.94% 1.69% 0.00% -46.90% 
SD% 11.03% 1.32 8.26% 72.28% 8.27% 20.69% 3.72% 21.28% 
2
0
0
4
 
Mean% 7.79% 16.56 11.37% 166.58% 5.66% 33.53% 3.41% 14.47% 
Median% 3.92% 16.39 9.46% 153.54% 5.27% 25.24% 1.57% 15.30% 
Max% 38.91% 20.00 38.45% 444.44% 28.00% 93.77% 22.02% 67.88% 
Min% 0.00% 14.25 -3.36% 20.98% -11.22% 0.89% 0.00% -65.03% 
SD% 9.61% 1.31 8.37% 74.42% 6.82% 24.00% 4.64% 23.24% 
2
0
0
5
 
Mean% 9.19% 16.67 10.87% 184.69% 5.87% 28.69% 3.07% 15.17% 
Median% 4.87% 16.53 9.40% 171.66% 5.07% 26.73% 0.00% 12.28% 
Max% 39.92% 20.12 41.60% 488.74% 34.12% 91.97% 35.22% 61.64% 
Min% 0.00% 14.06 -32.41% 25.43% -32.52% 0.00% 0.00% -52.37% 
SD% 10.44% 1.35 10.39% 79.52% 9.47% 19.21% 5.43% 20.60% 
2
0
0
6
 
Mean% 9.11% 16.71 7.62% 163.76% 2.51% 30.15% 3.16% 12.66% 
Median% 5.83% 16.62 7.30% 142.98% 3.40% 27.50% 2.31% 11.96% 
Max% 48.51% 20.21 33.19% 612.98% 29.47% 91.85% 16.86% 68.77% 
Min% 0.00% 14.05 -24.09% 65.93% -26.01% 1.71% 0.00% -31.53% 
SD% 9.80% 1.37 9.28% 82.00% 8.34% 18.77% 4.03% 19.22% 
2
0
0
7
 
Mean% 8.46% 16.79 8.90% 177.58% 3.90% 31.91% 3.09% 12.29% 
Median% 4.59% 16.71 9.30% 154.84% 4.88% 30.32% 1.67% 9.45% 
Max% 50.70% 20.31 36.93% 619.79% 29.38% 91.69% 19.12% 76.04% 
Min% 0.00% 14.01 -27.29% 55.84% -30.85% 0.77% 0.00% -30.79% 
SD% 10.01% 1.40 10.17% 92.49% 9.18% 18.86% 4.18% 19.51% 
2
0
0
8
 
Mean% 9.42% 16.89 6.69% 164.77% 1.80% 34.85% 2.59% 10.45% 
Median% 4.90% 16.74 7.49% 136.27% 3.34% 32.28% 0.00% 9.26% 
Max% 51.99% 20.59 52.46% 460.54% 43.30% 90.20% 24.09% 63.98% 
Min% 0.00% 13.83 -57.28% 35.92% -60.01% 1.35% 0.00% -32.06% 
SD% 11.82% 1.46 13.81% 88.22% 12.74% 21.62% 4.39% 19.38% 
2
0
0
9
 
Mean% 9.73% 16.87 5.24% 157.45% 0.84% 34.42% 2.40% 10.32% 
Median% 5.33% 16.79 6.51% 134.30% 2.32% 32.42% 0.00% 10.42% 
Max% 66.35% 20.60 39.20% 437.16% 36.02% 108.14% 19.24% 78.02% 
Min% 0.00% 13.76 -35.78% 15.36% -43.69% 0.44% 0.00% -36.78% 
SD% 11.86% 1.49 11.20% 92.15% 10.97% 22.90% 3.76% 20.36% 
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Table 2.3 Continued 
  CASH SIZE CF GO P LEV DIV LIQ 
2
0
1
0
 
Mean% 10.76% 16.86 5.72% 151.51% 0.76% 34.61% 2.75% 8.82% 
Median% 7.11% 16.69 6.19% 127.74% 2.02% 32.71% 0.82% 9.42% 
Max% 63.73% 20.73 37.98% 451.28% 35.51% 94.47% 18.34% 75.91% 
Min% 0.00% 13.35 -21.81% -2.59% -26.85% 1.25% 0.00% -49.38% 
SD% 11.54% 1.54 10.18% 92.55% 9.93% 22.38% 4.08% 21.18% 
2
0
1
1
 
Mean% 10.33% 16.80 4.31% 135.95% -0.72% 36.28% 2.35% 5.96% 
Median% 7.04% 16.70 4.88% 123.50% 0.96% 32.47% 0.00% 7.75% 
Max% 64.63% 20.92 38.76% 463.15% 31.47% 91.53% 15.12% 72.92% 
Min% 0.00% 13.22 -31.12% -67.21% -32.99% 0.47% 0.00% -71.66% 
SD% 11.72% 1.54 12.00% 83.85% 11.53% 22.39% 3.43% 22.82% 
Source: Calculated by the researcher based on companies’ guides available in Amman stock exchange website 
for several years. 
 
Secondly, table 2.4 shows the correlation matrix for the research variables. From this table we 
can see that most of the correlation coefficients between the research variables are low but 
there are still some relatively high correlations between some of those variables. Those 
correlation coefficients can be explained as follows. Cash ratio is correlated with growth 
opportunities as those growing firms tend to hold more cash to finance their rapid growth; 
cash ratio is also correlated to the profitability as the pecking order theory suggests that more 
profitable firms tend to depend more on their internal sources to finance themselves. Cash 
ratio is also correlated with dividend as the more cash the firm has, the more able and willing 
it is to pay dividends to its shareholders. 
 
Size of the firm is correlated with leverage as larger firms are more able to access debt at a 
cheaper cost. Cash flow is correlated with the growth opportunities, profitability, and 
dividend for the same reasons as those between cash ratio and those variables. Growth 
opportunities are correlated with profitability and dividend, as growing firms are more 
profitable and are thus able to pay more dividends. Profitability is correlated with dividend as 
more profitable firms are more able and willing to pay dividends. Finally, leverage is 
negatively related to liquid assets substitutes as the firm can use those liquid assets substitutes 
as an alternative source of borrowing. 
 
Although some variables have relatively high correlations with one another, the model did not 
suffer from multicollinearity. Brooks (2008) suggests that when the correlation coefficient 
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between the variables is high, it could indicate near multicollinearity. This near 
multicollinearity will make the standard error of the variables high which will make those 
variables insignificant. Another problem with multicollinearity is that the regression model 
will become very sensitive to any changes in the independent variables and adding or 
removing any variable will affect the model sharply. So, the coefficient and the significance 
of the other variable will be changed if we add or drop any variable to or from the model. 
That will make the parameter estimates very wide and lead to inappropriate conclusions. To 
check whether our model suffers from near multicollinearity or not, we run the model several 
times, dropping one variable each time and checking whether the other variables’ coefficients, 
signs, or significance show any large changes (for more details, see section 2.4.4. Robustness 
test). 
 
Having carried out this process, we found that no significant change had occurred to the other 
variables in the model when one variable at a time was dropped from the original model. This 
suggests that our model does not suffer from near multicollinearity even though we have high 
correlations between some of the explanatory variables. Should the multicollinearity remain 
present, Brooks suggests a number of solutions to the problem. The first solution is to ignore 
it, especially if the variables’ coefficients have the correct sign and magnitude value. The 
second solution is to drop one of the collinear variables; unfortunately, sometimes the 
variables with high correlations are important for explaining the dependant variable, so we 
cannot drop any of them. The third solution is to transform the highly correlated variables into 
a ratio; this may be unacceptable, especially if the theory suggests that the relationship should 
be of a certain nature that does not include the variable as ratio. 
 
For our model, all the independent variables are important for explaining the cash ratio; all of 
them are ratios, and the most important point is that the variables’ coefficients have the 
correct sign as suggested by the theory, which means that the model does not appear to suffer 
from multicollinearity. For all of the previous reasons we chose the first solution proposed by 
Brooks (2008) and simply carried on with the current situation, especially since the results 
from the robustness test in section 2.4.4 showed that dropping the explanatory variables one 
by one or using a different way of measuring them did not affect the sign or the significance 
of the other explanatory variables. 
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Table 2.4 
Correlation matrix for the research variables 
The dependent variable is (CASH) cash ratio which is assets and cash equivalent divided by total assets. The 
independent variables; (SIZE) firm’s size which is the natural logarithm of the total assets, (CF) firm’s cash flow 
which is earnings plus taxes, interest, and depreciation expense divided by total assets, (GO) growth 
opportunities which is the ratio of book value of total assets, minus the book value of equity, plus the market 
value of equity divided by book value of assets, (P) firm’s profitability which is the return on assets ROA, (LEV) 
leverage which is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, (DIV) dividend payout ratio which is total cash 
dividend to total assets, (LIQ) liquid assets substitutes will which is net working capital minus cash divided by 
total assets. For the period from 2000 to 2011. 
 
 
CASH SIZE CF GO P LEV DIV LIQ 
CASH 1.0000        
SIZE 0.0531 1.0000       
CF 0.2960 0.2996 1.0000      
GO 0.3282 0.2226 0.4881 1.0000     
P 0.3357 0.2789 0.9456 0.5253 1.0000    
LEV -0.2804 0.3550 -0.2186 -0.2373 -0.2926 1.0000   
DIV 0.4821 0.2120 0.6114 0.5417 0.6142 -0.2693 1.0000  
LIQ 0.0630 -0.2834 0.1108 0.1114 0.2047 -0.4783 0.1259 1.0000 
Source: Calculated by the researcher based on companies’ guides available in Amman stock exchange website 
for several years. 
 
2.4.2. Model analysis 
 
The estimated results for the research models are presented in table 2.5 which shows the 
resulting outputs for the three models: the pooling ordinary least squares model, the fixed-
effect model, and the random effects model. We will start with an overview of the analysis of 
those three models and will then determine which model is the most appropriate to use, using 
the likelihood ratio test to compare between the pooling ordinary least squares model and the 
fixed-effect model, and the Hausman test to compare between the fixed-effect model and the 
random effects model. 
 
From table 2.5 we can observe the following points. Firstly, under the three models cash flow 
(CF), profitability (P), leverage (LEV), cash dividend (DIV), and liquid assets substitutes 
(LIQ) are significant while size (SIZE) and growth opportunities (GO) are not significant. 
Secondly, all of the significant variables are consistent regardless of the variables’ signs; in 
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more detail, cash flow (CF), leverage (LEV), and liquid assets substitutes (LIQ) have a 
negative relationship with cash ratio. Profitability (P) and cash dividend (DIV) have a positive 
relationship with cash ratio. Thirdly, those signs are consistent with what the theories suggest 
and many of the other researchers found, as we will discuss later. Finally, all of the models 
are significant overall at the 1% level, as the results of the F statistics show. 
 
Now we need to apply the likelihood ratio test and the Hausman test to determine which 
model we should use. Starting with the likelihood ratio test, table 2.6 shows the output results 
of that test. From table 2.6 we find that the fixed-effect model is preferable to the pooling 
ordinary least squares model as the results showed significant values for this test; this means 
that the fixed-effect model (restricted model) is preferred to the ordinary least squares model 
(unrestricted model), as we explained earlier in chapter 1. Furthermore, table 2.7 shows the 
output results of the Hausman test. From table 2.7 we find that the fixed-effect model is 
preferable to the random effects model, as we explained in chapter 1. The Hausman test is 
testing whether the intercept term is correlated with one or more of the explanatory variables; 
if the result of this test is significant, it means that this intercept term is correlated with one or 
more of the explanatory variables, which clashes with the assumption of the random effect 
model that the intercept term is not correlated with any of the explanatory variables. So, if the 
Hausman test shows a significant value, the fixed-effect model is the preferred model. 
 
To conclude, three panel models have been used to investigate the determinants of cash-
holding. Those three models were consistent in their results. To determine which of the three 
models is most suitable, the likelihood ratio test and the Hausman test have been applied. The 
results suggest that the fixed-effect model is preferable. Thereby, the fixed-effect model will 
be adopted as the research model. 
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Table 2.5 
Regression results (pooling ordinary least squares model, fixed-effect model, and random effects model) 
 
CASHit = αit + β1 SIZEit + β2 CFit + β3 GOit + β4 Pit + β5 LEVit + β6 DIVit + β7 LIQit + μit. The dependent variable 
is cash ratio (CASH), which is the ratio of cash plus cash equivalents divided by the total assets. The 
independent variables; (SIZE) firm’s size which is the natural logarithm of the total assets, (CF) firm’s cash flow 
which is earnings plus taxes, interest, and depreciation expense divided by total assets, (GO) growth 
opportunities which is the ratio of book value of total assets, minus the book value of equity, plus the market 
value of equity divided by book value of assets, (P) firm’s profitability which is the return on assets ROA, (LEV) 
leverage which is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, (DIV) dividend payout ratio which is total cash 
dividend to total assets, (LIQ) liquid assets substitutes will which is net working capital minus cash divided by 
total assets. The numbers in brackets are t-values, ***, **, * indicate coefficients are significant at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels respectively. t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity using White's (1980) correction. For 
the period from 2000 to 2011. 
 
 Pooling OLS Fixed-effects Random effects 
α0 
0.1325** 
(2.5579) 
0.2131 
(1.2252) 
0.1869*** 
(2.0390) 
β1 (SIZE) 
-0.0020 
(-0.6455) 
0.0000 
(-0.0014) 
-0.0004 
(-0.0755) 
β2 (CF) 
-0.2993*** 
(-3.2077) 
-0.3385* 
(-1.8616) 
-0.3770*** 
(-3.0294) 
β3 (GO) 
0.0098 
(1.5150) 
-0.0103 
(-1.4665) 
-0.0062 
(-0.9715) 
β4 (P) 
0.3171*** 
(2.9160) 
0.4847*** 
(2.6083) 
0.4796*** 
(3.5787) 
β5 (LEV) 
-0.0892*** 
(-4.8894) 
-0.2338*** 
(-7.9642) 
-0.1810*** 
(-7.6708) 
β6 (DIV) 
1.1790*** 
(8.9646) 
0.6786*** 
(5.4955) 
0.8514*** 
(6.9855) 
β7 (LIQ) 
-0.0667*** 
(-3.4224) 
-0.2705*** 
(-8.2467) 
-0.2049*** 
(-7.5971) 
Adjusted R square 26.77% 54.97% 20.73% 
F statistic 51.0906*** 13.0678*** 36.8307*** 
Number of observations 960 960 960 
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Table 2.6 
Likelihood ratio test 
 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section and period fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 8.3384 -79,862 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 544.9865 79 0.0000 
Period F 0.9810 -11,862 0.4619 
Period Chi-square 11.9435 11 0.3679 
Cross-Section/Period F 7.6226 -90,862 0.0000 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 562.0652 90 0.0000 
     
     
 
Table 2.7 
Hausman Test 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section and period random effects  
     
     Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 65.4704 7 0.0000 
     
     
 
Having found our research model, we can now start on the main analysis. Looking back to 
Table 2.5 we can observe that the model is significant at the 1% level with an F statistic of 
11.14. The adjusted R squared is higher than the other two models, with a value of 55% which 
means that the set of explanatory variables can explain 55% of the dependent variable.  
 
As for the research variables, firm size has no significant effect on cash-holding for Jordanian 
firms. This result may seem unusual, since larger firms should have greater access to external 
sources of financing and would be expected to be able to obtain those funds at a cheaper cost, 
as the theory suggested, which means that those larger firms tend to hold less cash. Also, 
some of the literature showed a negative relationship between firm size and cash-holding, but 
Jordanian firms did not show this relationship; the most likely reason is that, for Jordanian 
firms, size has no significant role when firms attempt to obtain funds from external sources as 
the mechanism of raising capital in the Jordanian capital market is not affected directly by the 
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firms’ size, and small or large firms can easily access the capital market to obtain the funds 
needed for their business regardless of their size. Table 1.3 summarize IPO and SEO for 
Jordanian firms between 2001 and 2012 and Table A1 in appendix A shows the secondary 
public offering (SEO) for the Jordanian firms during the period from 2000 to 2012, which 
shows that both smaller and larger firms can obtain external funds, in many cases more than 
once. 
 
Omet and Maghyereh (2003) obtained the same result, finding that size has an insignificant 
positive relationship with the cash ratio. Kim et al. (1998) report that “the coefficient 
estimates on firm size are always negative, but are never significant”. Ozkan and Ozkan 
(2004) and Pedro and Pedro (2004) also found that the relationship between cash-holding and 
size is not significant. Opler et al. (1999), Coloquitt et al. (1999), Ferreire and Vilela (2004), 
and Niskanen and Niskanen (2007) found a significant negative relationship between cash-
holding and firm size while Kytonen (2005) and Chen and Mahajan (2010) found that this 
relationship is significantly positive. 
 
Cash flow has a significant negative coefficient, which means that the relationship between 
cash-holding and a firm’s cash flow is negative. This result is expected because, when firms 
are able to generate more cash from their operational activities, they may tend to hold less 
cash since they have a higher chance of preventing cash shortages; firms’ ability to generate 
cash from their operations can be considered as a cash substitute. This result also matches 
those of Kim et al. (1998) and Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) who found a significant negative 
relationship between cash-holding and a firm’s cash flow. Other researchers such as Opler et 
al. (1999), Ferreire and Vilela (2004) and Pedro and Pedro (2004) found that this relationship 
is positive; their explanation for the positive relationship is that firms with high cash flow are 
more profitable, so they will accumulate this cash flow to use it as an internal source of 
financing. In our research model we studied the effect of firms’ profitability as a separate 
variable and found a positive relationship with cash-holding, as we will see later. 
 
Growth opportunities are not significant in explaining cash-holding by Jordanian firms. The 
explanation of this result is similar to that of the effect of the firm’s size among the Jordanian 
firms, as the Jordanian market is a small market, especially if we compare it to more 
developed markets such as the US or UK markets; the size of any potential growth will be 
small as well, as most of the firms are small firms and their type of business does not need a 
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very large amount of capital or funds, which means that financing their growth opportunities 
will not need a large amount of funds. These funds might be available inside the firm or can 
be obtained from external sources; as we mentioned earlier when we explained the firm size 
variable, any firm in Jordan can obtain external funds easily from the capital market. This 
means that, even when there is a growth opportunity for the firm, this growth can be financed 
by the cash or the cash substitute which is available inside the firm or can be obtained from 
outside sources since it is expected to be a relatively small amount. This result matches that of 
Niskanen and Niskanen (2007) who found no significant relationship between cash-holding 
and a firm’s growth opportunities. Similarly, Omet and Maghyereh (2003) found that there 
was no significant effect of future growth opportunities on Kuwaiti firms’ decision to hold 
cash. On the other hand, the vast majority of researchers who studied the effect of the growth 
opportunity on firms’ cash-holding found this relationship to be significantly positive, such as 
Kim et al. (1998), Opler et al. (1999), Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) and others; to achieve more 
growth, firms need to have more funds to finance those opportunities, so many firms tend to 
hold a larger amount of funds to meet those financing needs, especially if it is difficult for 
them to obtain external funds, which may be expensive or take a long time to arrange. 
 
Firm profitability is significantly positive for Jordanian firms. This positive relationship can 
be explained by the pecking order theory because, as a firm becomes more profitable, it will 
depend more on internal sources of financing rather than external sources; thus, it tends to 
hold and accumulate more cash to use that cash and funding as its internal source of 
financing. Omet and Maghyereh (2003) found that there is a positive significant relationship 
between cash-holding and firm profitability measured by the return on assets. Opler et al. 
(1999), Ferreire and Vilela (2004), Pedro and Pedro (2004) and others found a positive 
relationship between profitability and cash-holding; they used a firm’s cash flow as a 
measurement of firm profitability since firms that can generate sufficient amounts of cash 
flow from their operations can be considered profitable firms. 
 
Leverage has a significant negative coefficient. The explanation for this negative relationship 
is that, when the firm has the ability to obtain more debt, it does not need to hold a high level 
of cash; this result was also confirmed by the literature since the other researchers, such as 
Kim et al. (1998), Opler et al. (1999), Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), and others, who studied this 
variable obtained a negative relationship with cash-holding. In contrast, Pedro and Pedro 
(2004), Kytonen (2005) and Niskanen and Niskanen (2007) found the relationship between 
68 
 
leverage and cash-holding to be positive. The explanation for this positive relationship is that, 
as firms have more leverage, it becomes more difficult and costly to obtain more cash from 
external sources, so those firms tend to accumulate cash to use it as source of financing; 
another explanation is that firms with higher leverage ratios hold more cash to reduce the 
default risk. 
 
The dividend payout ratio has a significant positive relationship with cash-holding. The 
explanation for this positive relationship between dividend payout and cash-holding is that, 
when firms need to pay a cash dividend to their shareholders, they need to hold more cash to 
avoid any cash shortage. Another explanation for the positive relationship between dividend 
payout and cash-holding is based on the agency theory; management may want to keep the 
cash inside the firm to use it for their best interests, so they might cut the cash dividend. On 
the other hand, they cannot keep accumulating cash for ever, especially when there are no 
more good projects in which to become involved (projects with a positive NPV). So, with a 
high level of cash-holding, firm managers will start to use some of cash as cash dividends to 
shareholders, which explains the positive relationship between dividend payout and cash-
holding. Other researchers also found this kind of relationship between cash-holding and cash 
dividends, such as Opler et al. (1999), Kytonen (2005) and Chen and Mahajan (2010).  
 
Liquid assets substitutes have a negative relationship with cash. This negative relationship 
occurs because, when the firm has any substitutes for cash, it tends to hold less cash since 
firms that have liquid assets substitutes can use these assets to cover any shortage in cash 
when necessary. So, if the firm has a sufficient amount of liquid assets substitutes, it does not 
need to hold too much cash since these liquid assets substitutes can be used as a backup for 
cash needs. This result is also confirmed in the literature. All of the researchers who included 
this variable found the relationship between cash-holding and liquid assets substitutes is 
negative, except for Niskanen and Niskanen (2007) who found this relationship to be positive. 
They explain this by stating that their sample of liquid assets is not seen as cash substitute. 
 
An important issue we should consider is the endogeneity. Endogeneity issue occurs when 
there is a correlation between the error term and independent variables. The existence of the 
endogeneity will lead to a bias in the variables coefficients, this issue can be fixed by using 
two-stage least square model or by introducing instrumental variables to the model. 
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Testing for endogeneity in our model showed that there is no correlation between the error 
term and the independent variables, as Sargan test is 50.29 significant at 1% level which 
means there is no correlation between the error term and the independent variables. 
 
2.4.3. Hypotheses analysis 
 
The first hypothesis is H1: there is a negative relationship between a firm’s size and a firm’s 
cash-holding. The results show that this relationship is not significant. We expect this 
relationship to be negative since larger firms find it easier to access capital markets to obtain 
funds and they do not need to hold high levels of cash; larger firms are also more able to 
obtain economies of scale and experience less asymmetric information. This result is not 
unusual, as other researchers also found this relationship not to be significant, as we discussed 
earlier. 
 
The second hypothesis is H2: there is a negative relationship between a firm’s cash flow and a 
firm’s cash-holding. The research model shows a negative relationship between cash flow and 
a firm’s cash-holding; the coefficient was -0.27, a result that matches other researchers’ 
findings. Firms that can generate cash from their own operations do not need to hold too 
much cash, since this generated cash flow can be considered as a cash substitute. On this 
basis, we can accept H2. 
 
The third hypothesis is H3: there is a positive relationship between a firm’s growth 
opportunity and a firm’s cash-holding. Firms with growth opportunities tend to hold more 
cash to be able to finance those projects, especially if the external sources of financing are 
unavailable or expensive. The research model shows that the relationship between growth 
opportunity and firm’s cash-holding is not significant. This result did not match the majority 
of the literature but other researchers also found this relationship is not significant. Based on 
our model result, growth opportunities cannot explain firms’ cash-holding decisions. 
 
The fourth hypothesis is H4: there is a positive relationship between a firm’s profitability and 
a firm’s cash-holding. The result shows a strong positive relationship between profitability 
and a firm’s cash-holding. This is line with what the pecking order theory suggests, as more 
profitable firms tend to accumulate cash to use this cash as an internal source of financing. 
According to the result we can accept H4. 
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The fifth hypothesis is H5: there is a negative relationship between a firm’s leverage and a 
firm’s cash-holding. Higher leverage indicates that firms are more able to obtain debt 
financing, which means that those firms do not need to hold high levels of cash. We can 
accept this hypothesis since the result shows that there is a negative relationship between a 
firm’s leverage and a firm’s cash-holding, which is highly significant. 
 
The sixth hypothesis is H6: there is a positive relationship between a firm’s cash dividend and 
a firm’s cash-holding. According to the result from the model used in this research we can 
accept H6, since the result showed a strong positive relationship between a firm’s cash 
dividend and a firm’s cash-holding. 
 
The seventh hypothesis is H7: there is a negative relationship between a firm’s liquid assets 
substitute and a firm’s cash-holding. Firms with substitute liquid assets do not need to hold 
too much cash, as those substitute liquid assets can guard against cash shortages. H7 can be 
accepted based on the result from the research model, which shows a significant negative 
relationship. 
 
2.4.4. Robustness test 
 
This section will provide a robustness test to confirm the previous results and to address any 
potential concerns about our model. To check the robustness of our results we will use 
different measurements of the research variables taken from the literature, as some researchers 
used different ways to measure those variables. We also include the dependent variable to 
check whether the results will still be consistent with what we found in our original model. 
Then we will drop the research variables one by one to check whether the results are still 
consistent or whether this process will affect the model results, especially since we found high 
correlations between some of the research variables. 
 
Starting with our dependent variable, the cash ratio (CASH), we will provide alternative 
measurements to determine whether the results will be changed or not. Table 2.8 presents the 
results of the dependent variable (CASH1) robustness test. In the first column A1 we present 
the original model results where we compute the cash ratio as cash plus cash equivalents to 
total assets. Then, in column A2, we used cash plus cash equivalents to sales as the first 
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alternative way to measure the cash ratio, which we denote as (CASH2). Finally, column A3 
presents the other alternative way to measure the cash ratio (CASH3) as cash plus cash 
equivalents to net assets, where net assets is the total assets minus cash and cash equivalents. 
Comparing the results in columns A2 and A3 with the results in column A1, we can see 
clearly that they are highly consistent. All the variables that were significant under the 
original model are still significant in the two alternative models; furthermore, they still have 
the same sign, which means the relationship did not change. Results from table 2.8 suggest 
that using different ways to calculate the cash ratio did not affect the results of our model, and 
we can conclude that the dependant variable passes the robustness test. 
 
Now we will move to the independent variables. We will apply the robustness test on those 
variables as we did for the dependent variable. The first variable is the firm’s size (SIZE). In 
the original model we measured the size of the firm as the natural logarithm of the total assets 
book value (SIZE1). Two other alternatives to measure firm’s size will be used; (SIZE2) is the 
natural logarithm of the total assets market value, and (SIZE3) is the natural logarithm of the 
firm’s sales. Then, we try to run the original model without including the firm’s size. Table 
2.9 presents the results of the robustness tests related to the size of the firm. Column B1 
shows the results from the original model, while columns B2 and B3 show the results for the 
two alternative models. Column B4 presents the results of the model when we dropped the 
firm’s size. Comparing the results in columns B2, B3 and B4 with the benchmark model in 
column B1 we can see clearly that the results are totally consistent. All the other variables still 
have the original signs, and the variables that were significant are still significant. 
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Table 2.8 
Robustness test of the regression results (cash ratio (the dependent variable)) 
CASHit = αit + β1 SIZEit + β2 CFit + β3 GOit + β4 Pit + β5 LEVit + β6 DIVit + β7 LIQit + μit. The dependent variable 
is cash ratio, which is the ratio of cash plus cash equivalents divided by the total assets (CASH1) in column A1, 
cash plus cash equivalents to sales (CASH2) in column A2, cash plus cash equivalents to net assets, where net 
assets is the total assets minus cash and cash equivalents (CASH3) in column A3. The independent variables; 
(SIZE) firm’s size which is the natural logarithm of the total assets, (CF) firm’s cash flow which is earnings plus 
taxes, interest, and depreciation expense divided by total assets, (GO) growth opportunities which is the ratio of 
book value of total assets, minus the book value of equity, plus the market value of equity divided by book value 
of assets, (P) firm’s profitability which is the return on assets ROA, (LEV) leverage which is the ratio of total 
liabilities to total assets, (DIV) dividend payout ratio which is total cash dividend to total assets, (LIQ) liquid 
assets substitutes will which is net working capital minus cash divided by total assets. The numbers in brackets 
are t-values, ***, **, * indicate coefficients are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. t-
statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity using White's (1980) correction. 
 
 A1 A2 A3 
α 
0.2131 
(1.2252) 
1.3518 
(0.8014) 
1.0068** 
(1.9829) 
β1 (SIZE) 
0.0000 
(-0.0014) 
-0.0158 
(-0.1517) 
-0.0395 
(-1.3628) 
β2 (CF) 
-0.3385* 
(-1.8616) 
-5.3391*** 
(-3.0824) 
-1.4226** 
(-1.9785) 
β3 (GO) 
-0.0103 
(-1.4665) 
0.0085 
(0.1142) 
0.0001 
(0.0039) 
β4 (P) 
0.4847*** 
(2.6083) 
4.8776*** 
(3.0080) 
1.6443** 
(2.2704) 
β5 (LEV) 
-0.2338*** 
(-7.9642) 
-1.2661*** 
(-4.2657) 
-0.3616*** 
(-6.0287) 
β6 (DIV) 
0.6787*** 
(5.4955) 
2.7133* 
(1.6623) 
1.2417*** 
(3.9721) 
β7 (LIQ) 
-0.2705*** 
(-8.2467) 
-1.2776*** 
(-4.3474) 
-0.5246*** 
(-6.7292) 
Adjusted R square 54.97% 24.54% 38.87% 
F statistic 13.0678*** 4.2154*** 7.2855*** 
Number of observations 960 960 960 
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Table 2.9 
Robustness test of the regression results (firm’s size) 
CASHit = αit + β1 SIZEit + β2 CFit + β3 GOit + β4 Pit + β5 LEVit + β6 DIVit + β7 LIQit + μit. The dependent variable 
is cash ratio (CASH), which is the ratio of cash plus cash equivalents divided by the total assets. The 
independent variables; (SIZE1) firm’s size which is the natural logarithm of the total assets, (SIZE2) is the natural 
logarithm of the total assets market value, (SIZE3) is the natural logarithm of the firm’s sales, (CF) firm’s cash 
flow which is earning after tax plus depreciation expense divided by total assets, (GO) growth opportunities 
which is the ratio of book value of total assets, minus the book value of equity, plus the market value of equity 
divided by book value of assets, (P) firm’s profitability which is the return on assets ROA, (LEV) leverage 
which is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, (DIV) dividend payout ratio which is total cash dividend to 
total assets, (LIQ) liquid assets substitutes will which is net working capital minus cash divided by total assets. 
The numbers in brackets are t-values, ***, **, * indicate coefficients are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels respectively. t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity using White's (1980) correction. 
 
 B1 B2 B3 B4 
α 
0.2131 
(1.2252) 
0.3125** 
(2.4810) 
0.2328** 
(2.2724) 
0.2129*** 
(12.3717) 
β1 (SIZE1) 
0.0000 
(-0.0014)    
β1 (SIZE2) 
 
-0.0063 
(-0.8055)   
β1 (SIZE3) 
  
-0.0013 
(-0.1964)  
β2 (CF) 
-0.3385* 
(-1.8616) 
-0.3696** 
(-2.0518) 
-0.3341** 
(-2.0336) 
-0.3384** 
(-2.0383) 
β3 (GO) 
-0.0103 
(-1.4665) 
-0.0069 
(-0.7088) 
-0.0104 
(-1.5311) 
-0.0103 
(-1.4528) 
β4 (P) 
0.4847*** 
(2.6083) 
0.5268*** 
(2.8426) 
0.4840*** 
(2.9156) 
0.4847*** 
(2.9128) 
β5 (LEV) 
-0.2338*** 
(-7.9642) 
-0.2262*** 
(-7.7365) 
-0.2323*** 
(-7.9754) 
-0.2338*** 
(-7.9616) 
β6 (DIV) 
0.6787*** 
(5.4955) 
0.6777*** 
(5.5124) 
0.6800*** 
(5.5346) 
0.6787*** 
(5.5001) 
β7 (LIQ) 
-0.2705*** 
(-8.2467) 
-0.2691*** 
(-8.0969) 
-0.2693*** 
(-8.1778) 
-0.2705*** 
(-11.0793)*** 
Adjusted R square 54.97% 55.02% 54.97% 55.02% 
F statistic 13.0678*** 13.0925*** 13.0697*** 13.2192*** 
Number of observations 960 960 960 960 
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The second independent variable is the firm’s cash flow (FC). We will check one alternative 
measurement of cash flow as earnings after taxes plus depreciation (CF2).  Then, we will run 
the model without cash flow. Results for the firm’s cash flow alternatives are totally 
consistent with our original reference model, since all variables that were significant are still 
significant and have the same sign. The full results are presented in table 2.10. Column C1 
shows the results for the original model, column C2 shows the alternative measurement for 
firm’s cash flow (FC2), and column C3 shows the results for the model where we drop the 
firm’s cash flow. 
 
Robustness tests for growth opportunities (GO) also showed that using alternative 
measurement of a firm’s growth opportunities (GO2) as salest / salest-1 or even dropping it 
does not change the results at all; other variables did not exhibit any change in the signs or 
even the significance. The full results are presented in table 2.11. Column D1 shows the 
results for the original model, column D2 shows the alternative measurement for a firm’s 
growth opportunities (GO2), and column D3 shows the results for the model where we drop 
the firm’s growth opportunities. 
 
For firm profitability (P) we will use earnings to sales as an alternative measurement for 
profitability (P2). Also, we will try to drop the profitability from the model to determine 
whether this will affect the results of the model. From table 2.12 we can see clearly that both 
the sign and the significance of the research variables are still consistent. The results are 
presented in table 2.12 where column E2 shows the alternative measurement of profitability 
and column E3 shows the results when we drop profitability. 
 
For leverage (LEV), we used debt-to-equity ratio (LEV2) as an alternative way of measuring 
leverage. We also tried the model when we dropped the leverage, just as we did with the 
previous variables. Again, results are consistent with the original model except for a minor 
change in the model: when we dropped the leverage, the firm’s size become weakly 
significant at the 10% level; on the other hand, the size of the coefficient is very small (it is 
only -0.0191 which means that the relationship is very weak since the coefficient is very close 
to zero. So, even if it has weak significance, this is very small, and the rest of the variables are 
still the same in terms of their signs and significance. Results are presented in table 2.13. 
Column F1 shows the results for the original model, column F2 shows the results for the 
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alternative measurement for firm’s leverage (LEV2), and column F3 shows the results for the 
model where we drop the firm’s leverage. 
 
As for dividends (DIV), using a dummy variable as an alternative measurement (DIV2) and 
dropping the dividends from the model provided very similar results as the original model 
except for cash flow, which become insignificant under the model when we dropped the 
dividend variable; although the cash flow variable has become insignificant, it is very close to 
being significant, with a p-value of 0.1068 which is very close to the significance limit, and it 
still has a negative sign. Table 2.14 shows the detailed results. Column G1 shows the results 
for the original model, column G2 shows the results for the alternative measurement for cash 
dividend (DIV2), and column G3 shows the results for the model where we drop the cash 
dividend. 
 
Finally, for liquid assets substitutes (LIQ), we only apply the model where we dropped the 
liquid assets substitutes, since the literature did not provide an alternative way of measuring 
liquid assets substitutes. Again, the results are totally consistent with our original model; all 
variables have the same sign and the variables that were significant are still significant. 
Results are presented in table 2.15. Column H1 shows the results for the original model, and 
column H2 shows the results for the model where we drop the liquid assets substitutes. 
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Table 2.10 
Robustness test of the regression results (cash flow) 
CASHit = αit + β1 SIZEit + β2 CFit + β3 GOit + β4 Pit + β5 LEVit + β6 DIVit + β7 LIQit + μit. The dependent variable 
is cash ratio (CASH), which is the ratio of cash plus cash equivalents divided by the total assets. The 
independent variables; (SIZE) firm’s size which is the natural logarithm of the total assets, (CF1) firm’s cash 
flow which is earning plus tax, interest and depreciation expense divided by total assets, (CF2) earnings after 
taxes plus depreciation divided by total assets, (GO) growth opportunities which is the ratio of book value of 
total assets, minus the book value of equity, plus the market value of equity divided by book value of assets, (P) 
firm’s profitability which is the return on assets ROA, (LEV) leverage which is the ratio of total liabilities to 
total assets, (DIV) dividend payout ratio which is total cash dividend to total assets, (LIQ) liquid assets 
substitutes will which is net working capital minus cash divided by total assets. The numbers in brackets are t-
values, ***, **, * indicate coefficients are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. t-statistics are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity using White's (1980) correction. 
 
 C1 C2 C3 
α 
0.2131 
(1.2252) 
0.1575 
(1.1862) 
0.1213 
(0.7803) 
β1 (SIZE) 
0.0000 
(-0.0014) 
0.0025 
(0.3103) 
0.0049 
(0.5202) 
β2 (CF1) 
-0.3385* 
(-1.8616)   
β2 (CF2) 
 
-0.3050* 
(-1.8983)  
β3 (GO) 
-0.0103 
(-1.4665) 
-0.0008 
(-1.0506) 
-0.0102 
(-1.4431) 
β4 (P) 
0.4847*** 
(2.6083) 
0.4287*** 
(2.6551) 
0.1513*** 
(3.7159) 
β5 (LEV) 
-0.2338*** 
(-7.9642) 
-0.2525*** 
(-9.8197) 
-0.2569*** 
(-8.8912) 
β6 (DIV) 
0.6787*** 
(5.4955) 
0.6258*** 
(5.8023) 
0.6355*** 
(5.1068) 
β7 (LIQ) 
-0.2705*** 
(-8.2467) 
-0.2688*** 
(-11.1753) 
-0.2709*** 
(-8.2200) 
R square 54.97% 54.85% 54.67% 
F statistic 13.0678*** 13.0094*** 13.0485*** 
Number of observations 960 960 960 
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Table 2.11 
Robustness test of the regression results (growth opportunities) 
CASHit = αit + β1 SIZEit + β2 CFit + β3 GOit + β4 Pit + β5 LEVit + β6 DIVit + β7 LIQit + μit. The dependent variable 
is cash ratio (CASH), which is the ratio of cash plus cash equivalents divided by the total assets. The 
independent variables; (SIZE) firm’s size which is the natural logarithm of the total assets, (CF) firm’s cash flow 
which is earning plus tax, interest and depreciation expense divided by total assets, (GO1) growth opportunities 
which is the ratio of book value of total assets, minus the book value of equity, plus the market value of equity 
divided by book value of assets, (GO2) as salest / salest-1, (P) firm’s profitability which is the return on assets 
ROA, (LEV) leverage which is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, (DIV) dividend payout ratio which is 
total cash dividend to total assets, (LIQ) liquid assets substitutes will which is net working capital minus cash 
divided by total assets. The numbers in brackets are t-values, ***, **, * indicate coefficients are significant at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity using White's (1980) 
correction. 
 
 D1 D2 D3 
α 
0.2131 
(1.2252) 
0.1902 
(1.4233) 
0.1903 
(1.0568) 
β1 (SIZE) 
0.0000 
(-0.0014) 
0.0006 
(0.0716) 
0.0005 
(0.0451) 
β2 (CF) 
-0.3385* 
(-1.8616) 
-0.3405*** 
(-2.5952) 
-0.3364* 
(-1.8610) 
β3 (GO1) 
-0.0103 
(-1.4665) 
  
β3 (GO2) 
 
-0.0008 
(-1.1246) 
 
β4 (P) 
0.4847*** 
(2.6083) 
0.4676*** 
(3.4498) 
0.4628** 
(2.4749) 
β5 (LEV) 
-0.2338*** 
(-7.9642) 
-0.2331*** 
(-8.5979) 
-0.2327*** 
(-7.9195) 
β6 (DIV) 
0.6787*** 
(5.4955) 
0.6521*** 
(6.0061) 
0.6564*** 
(5.4791) 
β7 (LIQ) 
-0.2705*** 
(-8.2467) 
-0.2704*** 
(-11.2739) 
-0.3159*** 
(-8.1795) 
R square 54.97% 54.84% 54.83% 
F statistic 13.0678*** 13.0057*** 13.1240*** 
Number of observations 960 960 960 
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Table 2.12 
Robustness test of the regression results (profitability) 
CASHit = αit + β1 SIZEit + β2 CFit + β3 GOit + β4 Pit + β5 LEVit + β6 DIVit + β7 LIQit + μit. The dependent variable 
is cash ratio (CASH), which is the ratio of cash plus cash equivalents to sales. The independent variables; (SIZE) 
firm’s size which is the natural logarithm of the total assets, (CF) firm’s cash flow which is earning plus tax, 
interest and depreciation expense divided by total assets, (GO) growth opportunities which is the ratio of book 
value of total assets, minus the book value of equity, plus the market value of equity divided by book value of 
assets, (P1) firm’s profitability which is the return on assets ROA, (P2) earnings to sales, (LEV) leverage which is 
the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, (DIV) dividend payout ratio which is total cash dividend to total assets, 
(LIQ) liquid assets substitutes will which is net working capital minus cash divided by total assets. The numbers 
in brackets are t-values, ***, **, * indicate coefficients are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively. t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity using White's (1980) correction. 
 
 E1 E2 E3 
α 
1.3518 
(0.8014) 
-0.1053 
(-0.0890) 
-0.1982 
(-0.1643) 
β1 (SIZE) 
-0.0158 
(-0.1517) 
0.0670 
(0.9311) 
0.0691 
(0.9412) 
β2 (CF) 
-5.3391*** 
(-3.0824) 
-1.5790*** 
(-3.9693) 
-0.8657** 
(-2.2372) 
β3 (GO) 
0.0085 
(0.1142) 
0.0335 
(0.6744) 
0.0246 
(0.4849) 
β4 (P1) 
4.8776*** 
(3.0080)   
β4 (P2) 
 
0.1957*** 
(5.9691)  
β5 (LEV) 
-1.2661*** 
(-4.2657) 
-1.6448*** 
(-7.0396) 
-1.6358*** 
(-6.8645) 
β6 (DIV) 
2.7133* 
(1.6623) 
2.7089*** 
(2.6673) 
2.4985** 
(2.4137) 
β7 (LIQ) 
-1.2776*** 
(-4.3474) 
-1.2744*** 
(-5.7068) 
-1.2453*** 
(-5.4693) 
R square 24.54% 26.32% 23.36% 
F statistic 4.2154*** 4.5314*** 4.0452*** 
Number of observations 960 960 960 
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Table 2.13 
Robustness test of the regression results (leverage) 
CASHit = αit + β1 SIZEit + β2 CFit + β3 GOit + β4 Pit + β5 LEVit + β6 DIVit + β7 LIQit + μit. The dependent variable 
is cash ratio (CASH), which is the ratio of cash plus cash equivalents divided by the total assets. The 
independent variables; (SIZE) firm’s size which is the natural logarithm of the total assets, (CF) firm’s cash flow 
which is earning plus tax, interest and depreciation expense divided by total assets, (GO) growth opportunities 
which is the ratio of book value of total assets, minus the book value of equity, plus the market value of equity 
divided by book value of assets, (P) firm’s profitability which is the return on assets ROA, (LEV1) leverage 
which is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, (LEV2) debt to equity ratio, (DIV) dividend payout ratio which 
is total cash dividend to total assets, (LIQ) liquid assets substitutes will which is net working capital minus cash 
divided by total assets. The numbers in brackets are t-values, ***, **, * indicate coefficients are significant at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity using White's (1980) 
correction. 
 
 F1 F2 F3 
α 
0.2131 
(1.2252) 
0.3527* 
(1.9251) 
0.4550** 
(2.5704) 
β1 (SIZE) 
0.0000 
(-0.0014) 
-0.0124 
(-1.1481) 
-0.0191* 
(-1.8280) 
β2 (CF) 
-0.3385* 
(-1.8616) 
-0.6780*** 
(-3.6457) 
-0.7120*** 
(-3.9033) 
β3 (GO) 
-0.0103 
(-1.4665) 
-0.0101 
(-1.3235) 
-0.0093 
(-1.2123) 
β4 (P) 
0.4847*** 
(2.6083) 
0.8828*** 
(4.6602) 
0.9301*** 
(5.0142) 
β5 (LEV1) 
-0.2338*** 
(-7.9642)   
β5 (LEV2) 
 
-0.0081*** 
(-2.5968)  
β6 (DIV) 
0.6787*** 
(5.4955) 
0.8070*** 
(6.2514) 
0.8188*** 
(6.3355) 
β7 (LIQ) 
-0.2705*** 
(-8.2467) 
-0.1761*** 
(-6.1755) 
-0.1681*** 
(-5.8784) 
R square 54.97% 51.51% 51.13% 
F statistic 13.0678*** 11.5017*** 11.4514*** 
Number of observations 960 960 960 
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Table 2.14 
Robustness test of the regression results (dividend payout) 
CASHit = αit + β1 SIZEit + β2 CFit + β3 GOit + β4 Pit + β5 LEVit + β6 DIVit + β7 LIQit + μit. The dependent variable 
is cash ratio (CASH), which is the ratio of cash plus cash equivalents divided by the total assets. The 
independent variables; (SIZE) firm’s size which is the natural logarithm of the total assets, (CF) firm’s cash flow 
which is earning plus tax, interest and depreciation expense divided by total assets, (GO) growth opportunities 
which is the ratio of book value of total assets, minus the book value of equity, plus the market value of equity 
divided by book value of assets, (P) firm’s profitability which is the return on assets ROA, (LEV) leverage 
which is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, (DIV1) dividend payout ratio which is total cash dividend to 
total assets, (DIV2) dummy variable 1 if firm pay dividend 0 otherwise, (LIQ) liquid assets substitutes will which 
is net working capital minus cash divided by total assets. The numbers in brackets are t-values, ***, **, * 
indicate coefficients are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. t-statistics are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity using White's (1980) correction. 
 
 G1 G2 G3 
α 
0.2131 
(1.2252) 
0.2475* 
(1.8103) 
0.2307* 
(1.6858) 
β1 (SIZE) 
0.0000 
(-0.0014) 
-0.0017 
(-0.2104) 
-0.0002 
(-0.0251) 
β2 (CF) 
-0.3385* 
(-1.8616) 
-0.2567* 
(-1.9251) 
-0.2135 
(-1.6146) 
β3 (GO) 
-0.0103 
(-1.4665) 
-0.0068 
(-1.2546) 
-0.0068 
(-1.2475) 
β4 (P) 
0.4847*** 
(2.6083) 
0.4570*** 
(3.3019) 
0.4383*** 
(3.1651) 
β5 (LEV) 
-0.2338*** 
(-7.9642) 
-0.2495*** 
(-9.0354) 
-0.2589*** 
(-9.4650) 
β6 (DIV1) 
0.6787*** 
(5.4955)   
β6 (DIV2) 
 
0.0173** 
(2.2433)  
β7 (LIQ) 
-0.2705*** 
(-8.2467) 
-0.2804*** 
(-11.5154) 
-0.2824*** 
(-11.5781) 
R square 54.97% 53.21% 53.00% 
F statistic 13.0678*** 12.2451*** 12.2629*** 
Number of observations 960 960 960 
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Table 2.15 
Robustness test of the regression results (liquid assets substitutes) 
CASHit = αit + β1 SIZEit + β2 CFit + β3 GOit + β4 Pit + β5 LEVit + β6 DIVit + β7 LIQit + μit. The dependent variable 
is cash ratio (CASH), which is the ratio of cash plus cash equivalents divided by the total assets. The 
independent variables; (SIZE) firm’s size which is the natural logarithm of the total assets, (CF) firm’s cash flow 
which is earning plus tax, interest and depreciation expense divided by total assets, (GO) growth opportunities 
which is the ratio of book value of total assets, minus the book value of equity, plus the market value of equity 
divided by book value of assets, (P) firm’s profitability which is the return on assets ROA, (LEV) leverage 
which is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, (DIV) dividend payout ratio which is total cash dividend to 
total assets, (LIQ) liquid assets substitutes will which is net working capital minus cash divided by total assets. 
The numbers in brackets are t-values, ***, **, * indicate coefficients are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels respectively. t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity using White's (1980) correction. 
 
 H1 H2 
α 
0.2131 
(1.2252) 
0.2922 
(1.5880) 
β1 (SIZE) 
0.0000 
(-0.0014) 
-0.0097 
(-0.8765) 
β2 (CF) 
-0.3385* 
(-1.8616) 
-0.3484* 
(-1.8609) 
β3 (GO) 
-0.0103 
(-1.4665) 
-0.0097 
(-1.2451) 
β4 (P) 
0.4847*** 
(2.6083) 
0.4273** 
(2.2680) 
β5 (LEV) 
-0.2338*** 
(-7.9642) 
-0.0824*** 
(-3.0502) 
β6 (DIV) 
0.6787*** 
(5.4955) 
0.7770*** 
(5.4459) 
β7 (LIQ) 
-0.2705*** 
(-8.2467)  
R square 54.97% 48.36% 
F statistic 13.0678*** 10.3567*** 
Number of observations 960 960 
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2.5. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we examine the determinants of corporate cash and cash equivalents using 
publicly traded Jordanian firms during the period between 2000 and 2011. Financial firms 
have been excluded from the sample since such firms should hold a certain level of cash as 
part of their business. New firms have also been excluded from the sample, and any firm with 
missing data at the end of analysis period has also been excluded since such firms are either 
new firms that have not yet become engaged in business or they have financial problems, in 
the case of missing data at the end of the analysis period. The final number of firms remaining 
is 80, with 12 years’ data for each firm, giving us 960 observations. 
 
The analysis in this chapter is based upon firms’ annual financial statements by checking how 
firm’s size, firm’s cash flow, growth opportunities, profitability, leverage, cash dividend, and 
liquid assets substitute can affect the decision on corporate cash-holding. Balanced panel data 
analysis has been used in this chapter; we apply three panel data models: the pooling ordinary 
least squares model, the fixed-effect model, and the random effect model. According to the 
likelihood ratio test and the Hausman test, the preferred model among the three models used 
in this chapter is the fixed-effect model. The results of this chapter showed that firm’s size 
and growth opportunities have no significant effect on corporate cash-holding decisions. 
Firm’s cash flow, leverage, and liquid assets substitute have a significant negative effect on 
corporate cash-holding, while firm’s profitability and firm’s cash dividend have a significant 
positive relationship with corporate cash-holding. The F statistic for the model was significant 
at the 1% level and R square is about 55%. 
 
In this chapter we used two separate variables to measure cash flow and profitability. 
Researchers who studied cash-holding determinants used only the cash flow variable, and 
whenever they obtained a negative sign they explained it by stating that those firms who are 
able to generate more cash from operations will hold less cash. On the other hand, when they 
obtained a positive sign they explained it with reference to pecking order theory, which states 
that firms that generate more cash flow are more profitable firms and they will hold more cash 
as an internal source of financing. In this chapter we used separate measurements for cash 
flow and profitability to gain a clear and better understanding of how those two variables 
affect cash-holding decisions. 
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Several tests have been applied to check the model’s robustness; those tests involve using 
different ways of measuring the research variables, including the dependant variable. They 
also involved dropping the variables from the model one by one. The results of those tests 
were highly consistent. 
 
From these results we can conclude that profitable firms and firms that pay cash dividends 
tend to hold more cash. Firms which generate higher cash flow, have higher debt ratio, and 
have more liquid assets substitutes can reduce the opportunity cost of holding cash by holding 
smaller amounts of cash. 
 
The results of this research show that firms in developing markets such as the Amman Stock 
Exchange have the same reasons to hold cash as firms in developed markets, as the results of 
this research match the results obtained from developed markets, as we found earlier. 
 
The results of this chapter provide us with both theoretical and practical implications; 
although the financial market in Jordan is developing and is a small market with special issues 
related to an Islamic context, the results that have been obtained are consistent with both the 
theories and the literature in both developed and developing markets. It is also important to 
measure firm’s profitability as a separate variable from the cash flow variable as previous 
studies found a dual effect of cash flow effect on cash holding, but when the two issues (i.e. 
profitability and cash flow generated internally) are studied as two separate variables the 
relationship becomes clearer. On the practical side, the results from this chapter will help 
financial managers to manage the cash they hold based on their firm characteristics and 
conditions in the Jordanian market, those results can also be implied on any other country 
with similar market conditions where Islamic regulations and rules are also applied. 
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Chapter 3: Cash-holding’s contribution to the corporate firm value: 
Amman stock exchange 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The contribution made by a firm’s holding of cash to its value started to become an important 
topic in the early 2000s. Many researchers tried to understand how the level of cash or the 
change in that level will contribute to the overall value of the corporate firm. They used 
different models of firm valuation to control for the other variables that would be expected to 
affect that value, in order to understand how cash and the change in cash level will affect the 
value of the firm. 
 
Two theories can explain how cash can be evaluated. The first one is the pecking order 
theory, which suggests that, in the presence of an adverse selection problem, the cost of 
external financing is higher than the cost of internal financing, which will increase the 
marginal value of each pound held in cash. 
 
The pecking order theory is concerned with the source of long-term financing. According to 
this theory, financial managers should follow a specific order to obtain long-term financing. 
This order suggests that financial managers should use the internal cash that is generated by 
the firm; next, they can use debt-financing and, as the final source, they can use equity-
financing. 
 
The adverse selection problem is a problem associated with the asymmetric information 
between the insiders (firms’ managers) and the outsiders (investors). This problem renders the 
investors uncertain about the performance of the firm and its managers. The adverse selection 
problem is one where the outside investors have difficulty in recognising the value of the new 
stock being issued. Outside investors assume that the firm will only issue new stock if that 
stock is currently overvalued in the market. If that stock is undervalued, then outside investors 
assume that the managers will not issue new stock, since that would imply a transfer of wealth 
from the existing shareholders to the new shareholders. So, if the adverse selection problem 
exists when the firm needs to obtain funds from external sources, the firm is likely to face a 
problem in obtaining enough funds. Firstly, investors are uncertain about the firm, its 
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performance, and the value of the firm’s assets. Secondly, even if the firm has good expected 
performance and has a high value of assets, the process of raising the necessary funds will 
take some time and might be costly, which may be a problem for the firm if it needs liquidity. 
 
The second theory that can explain the value of the cash in the corporate firm is the free cash 
flow theory, which predicts that excess cash-holding associated with high information 
asymmetry will generate moral hazard problems. This will lead to a decrease in the marginal 
value of each pound held in cash. 
 
The free cash flow theory notes that the cash that will be available for the firm after the 
payment of all taxes and after allocation to all positive net present value projects and 
investments is called free cash flow. When the firm has a large amount of free cash flow 
available to it, there is a likelihood that this cash might be used by the managers inefficiently, 
either on acquisitions or personal benefits. Investors expect the free cash flow to be used in 
this way because of the double incentive on the part of the managers to behave in this way. 
First, acquiring other firms and growing the assets of the firm will increase the remuneration 
that managers receive, because there is a close relation between firm size and remuneration. 
Second, spending the firm’s resources on themselves benefits the managers, but their personal 
shareholding will be small and therefore they bear only a very small proportion of the cost. 
 
The moral hazard problem is a problem related to the asymmetric information between the 
insiders (firms’ managers) and the outsiders (investors). A moral hazard problem may occur 
when one party has more information than the other parties, which will make the party with 
better information act in way that is not appropriate from the point of view of the other 
parties. This problem becomes more obvious when one of the parties is not at any risk. 
 
Several researchers have investigated and examined the determinants of cash-holding, 
including Kim et al. (1998), Opler et al. (1999), Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) and others. Having 
understood how the firms’ characteristics affect and determine the cash-holding, we can now 
move on to another important question: What is the value of the cash that is held by firms? 
 
In a perfect market with no transaction costs, where there are no costs of raising funds from 
external sources, no taxes, etc, investing in liquid assets can be considered as investing in zero 
net present value projects. Since firms can raise the necessary funds at any time in the future 
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without any delay or extra cost, they can switch between funds and investments without 
additional cost. In this case, the value that shareholders will place on each pound invested in 
cash will be one pound. In real life, markets are imperfect; there are transaction costs, taxes, 
inflation, etc, meaning that the argument that cash is a zero net present value project is not 
always true. Myers and Majluf (1984) argued that, when external financing is costly and firms 
can invest in positive net present value projects, and if they hold liquid assets that enable them 
to invest without needing recourse to external sources of funding, then each dollar invested in 
liquid assets may have a value of more than one dollar from the shareholders’ point of view. 
On the other hand, Jensen (1986) argued that shareholders may prefer cash dividends if there 
is a chance that a firm’s managers might use those liquid assets inefficiently, as the free cash 
flow theory suggests. This argument has been supported by Harford (1999), who found that 
cash-rich firms tend to make acquisitions that will decrease the value of the firm. This causes 
the shareholders to evaluate liquid assets at a discount to their book value. Another argument 
has been introduced by Jensen and Meckling (1976) in regard to equity-holders and debt-
holders; since equity is a call option on the firm value, equity-holders will prefer riskier 
investments. Liquid assets are risk-free investments, so equity-holders will give a discounted 
value for each dollar invested in cash. 
 
Agency theory explains the relationship between the firm’s owners (shareholders) and the 
firm’s controllers (managers). The agency theory suggests that controllers might work in their 
own interest rather than the shareholders’ interest, putting the personal interest of the 
controllers over the interest of the shareholders creates what we call the agency problem. 
Although this problem undoubtedly exists, a good corporate governance system can reduce it 
significantly, and such a system will make the controllers work in the interest of the 
shareholders, which is to maximize the wealth of those shareholders. On the other hand, when 
the corporate governance system is weak or poor, the controllers will try to obtain maximum 
private benefits, even if this is at the expense of the shareholders. When the corporate 
governance system is weak or poor, controllers attempt to hold more cash to use for their 
private benefits, since liquid assets can be exchanged for private benefits at lower cost than 
other types of assets, as Myers and Rajan (1998) argued. So, according to the pervious 
arguments, if the corporate governance system is weak or poor, we expect shareholders to 
evaluate the cash-holding at discount value, and this will make a small or negative 
contribution to their wealth since this cash can be used by controllers for their private interest 
rather than maximizing the wealth of the shareholders. In contrast, when the corporate 
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governance system is strong and efficient, the controllers cannot put their private benefits 
over the shareholders’ benefits; therefore, the value of the cash-holding will be at a premium, 
and it may make a positive contribution to the firm value, since that cash will be invested in 
ways that benefit the shareholders and maximize the value of the firm and the wealth of the 
shareholders. For example, Pinkowitz et al. (2006) found that, in countries with poor investor 
protection, each dollar of liquid assets is worth $0.33 while, in countries with good investor 
protection, this value is $0.91, and the difference between those two values is highly 
significant. This implies that shareholders value the cash or liquid assets held by firms more 
highly where the corporate governance system is strong because they can be confident that 
these assets are unlikely to be wasted. 
 
An argument by Faulkender and Wang (2006) suggests that an additional dollar of cash can 
be used in accumulating internal sources of financing, distributed to shareholders either as 
cash dividends or stock repurchases, or used to pay firms’ debts or other liabilities. For the 
firms that used cash as an internal source of financing, especially when those firms have low 
levels of internal funds or when the external funding is difficult or expensive due to the 
asymmetric information available to investors, shareholders will place a marginal value of 
more than one dollar for each dollar invested as liquid assets. On the other hand, distributing 
cash as dividends to the shareholders might reduce the marginal value of each dollar since 
shareholders have to pay taxes on their dividend incomes. In the same way, using the cash to 
pay the firms’ debts or other liabilities will be to the benefit of the debt-holder and not to the 
benefit of the equity-holder. 
 
Holding liquid assets in the form of cash or highly liquid assets such as marketable securities 
represents an opportunity cost to corporate firms and, although corporate firms recognize the 
high opportunity cost of cash-holding, they still hold liquid assets and cash. The main reasons 
for corporate firms to hold liquid assets are the transactions and the precautionary motives. 
There are several determinants of cash-holding, as we mentioned in the previous chapter. This 
chapter will investigate the value of the cash held by the corporate firms and how this cash 
and the change of cash level will affect the firm value. 
 
The aims of this chapter are to determine the value of the cash assets held by corporate firms, 
how this cash is contributing to the firm value, and how the change in cash-holding will affect 
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the value of the firm. Then we will try to assess whether the cash held by firms can make or 
destroy the firm value. 
 
In this chapter we will try to answer the following questions: 
How do the cash level and the change in the cash level affect the value of the firm? 
How does the change in cash level affect the value of cash? 
How does the change in debt level affect the value of cash? 
How does the cash dividend affect the value of the firm? 
 
The main goal of financial managers is to maximize the shareholders’ wealth. This can be 
done by maximizing the firm value. There are several factors that affect the value of the firm; 
one of these factors is cash, but how can cash affect the value of the firm? Does cash increase 
the value of the firm or will it decrease that value? 
 
The rest of this chapter will continue as follows: section 3.2 will discuss the literature review, 
section 3.3 will describe the sample and discuss the methodology, section 3.4 will set out the 
results and analysis and, finally, the conclusion will be presented in section 3.5. 
 
3.2. Literature review 
 
Fama and French (1998) introduced a model for firm valuation; the purpose of their model 
was to analyse how taxation on dividends and debt will affect the value of the firm. They used 
different variables which measure firm characteristics in the form of the variables’ current 
value, lagged value, and lead value. Those variables include the firm’s earnings, research and 
development expenses, interest expenses, cash dividends, the lagged value in the firm’s value, 
and the change in firm’s total assets. Their model has been used by many researchers such as 
Pinkowitz and Williamson (2002), Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), Fresard and Salva 
(2010) and others to investigate how cash-holding affects the value of the firm. They did this 
by dividing the total assets variable in the Fama and French model into its cash and non-cash 
components, and then analysed the affect of the firm’s cash-holding on the firm’s value. 
 
Pinkowitz and Williamson (2002) adapted the regression approach of Fama and French 
(1998). They studied the market value of cash-holding by firms. Using data from the 2000 
COMPUSTAT tapes from the period from 1955 to 1999, they found that this value is $1.20 
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for each dollar held in cash, but they also found that this value varied cross-sectionally. When 
they split the sample by firm characteristics, the value of the firm’s cash ranged between 
$0.26 and $2.38. They found that, when growth options are poor and there is poor investor 
protection and financial distress, firms have their cash valued at a significant discount to the 
book value because the aforementioned conditions will increase the possibility that 
controlling shareholders will use the cash for their private benefits. They also found that good 
growing opportunities and high uncertainty in future investment makes the value of cash 
greater, while financial distress values cash at a discount, and there is no evidence that access 
to capital market has any effect on the value of cash. Their results suggest that shareholders 
believe that the benefits of holding cash could offset the agency cost associated with cash-
holding. 
 
Schwetzler and Reimund (2003) analysed 5,126 firm-year observations taken from 547 
publicly traded German firms. They analysed two issues. The first issue is how the cash-
holding decision affects the performance of the firm. They adapted the methodology of 
Mikkelson and Partch (2002) and found that German firms which held excess cash in the 
previous three years significantly underperformed in their operations; this can be explained by 
the agency problem since the excess cash inside the firm will increase the free cash flow 
which can be used by the firm’s managers inefficiently. The second issue is the effect of cash-
holding on the firm’s value. They adapted Berger and Ofek’s (1995) valuation algorithm and 
found that, when the cash ratio has positive deviations from the industrial benchmark, this 
will lead to a value increase, while negative deviations from the industrial benchmark will be 
value decreasing. 
 
Pinkowitz et al. (2006) investigate how the value of each dollar invested in liquid assets has 
been evaluated by investors in countries with high and poor investor protection. They found 
that when investor protection is high, minority investors evaluate each dollar invested in 
liquid assets to be worth almost one dollar, while this value is lower in countries with poor 
investor protection. In countries with poor investor protection the agency problem will be 
higher, which suggests that controller shareholders will be more able to extract their own 
private benefits in a way that will negatively affect the minority investors. Consistent with 
this, they found that for countries with above median investor protection, each dollar invested 
in cash is worth $0.91 while this value drops to $0.33 in countries with poor investor 
protection. They took the firm-level data from the Thomson Financial Worldscope database 
90 
 
for the period 1983-1998, but they report results only for the period from 1988 to 1998, 
because the number of firms in emerging countries included in the study increased sharply in 
the late 1980s; thus, they started from 1988 to avoid any unexpected effects in the late 1980s. 
The sample includes 12,339 firms, with 75,887 firm years’ observations. They studied the 
relationship between firm value and cash-holding using the Fama and French (1998) 
regression valuation model and found that, in countries with low protection for the investor, 
this relationship is weaker than in countries with high protection for the investor. In contrast, 
the relationship between dividend and firm value is weaker in countries with high protection 
for the investor. 
 
Faulkender and Wang (2006) also study the value of cash-holding. Based on data collected 
from COMPUSTAT over the period 1971-2001, they developed a model that measures the 
value of the shareholder by using the excess return on the firm’s stock rather than the firm’s 
value, as Fama and French had done. Using the stock’s excess return rather than the firm’s 
value has two main benefits: (1) It captures the risk factor since it compares the stock’s return 
with the benchmark return; (2) using accounting numbers such as market-to-book value might 
be misleading because these numbers are backward looking and might be unable to reflect the 
actual replacement value of the firm’s assets. This model measures the value of cash-holding, 
the effect of the leverage and the level of the cash on the marginal value of cash, and how 
distributing cash dividends or stock repurchasing affects the cash-holding value. In this model 
they control for the firm’s characteristics such as firm’s earnings, interest expenses, 
dividends, research and development expenses, new financing, and non-cash assets. They 
found that the investors evaluate cash at a discounted value since cash can be used 
inefficiently by the firm’s managers, which will affect shareholders negatively, especially 
when the asymmetric information is higher, corporate governance system is weak, or there is 
low investor protection. The marginal value of cash declines when the amount held as cash 
becomes larger, because with higher levels of cash, the problem of free cash flow is more 
likely to occur. It also declines when the firm has a high level of leverage because, with 
higher leverage, more cash will benefit the debt-holders rather than the stockholders; it will 
also make the firm less risky, which is less preferred by stockholders, as those stockholders 
who consider their position as being equivalent to a call option on the firm’s assets would 
cause them to prefer riskier firms. Also the marginal value of cash declines when the firm has 
access to capital markets since, when the firm is able to access the capital markets, it will be 
easier to obtain funds when needed; thus, holding cash inside the firm might create the free 
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cash flow problem, when the firm pays more dividends rather than undertakes a stock 
repurchase since dividend income is taxed at a higher rate compared to the capital gains 
income resulting from stock repurchasing. This model has been adapted by several 
researchers and has become a preferred alternative to the Fama and French (1998) model. 
 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) used a sample of 1,952 US publicly traded firms with 13,095 
firm-year observations for the period 1990-2003. They investigated how the value of the firm 
will be affected by corporate governance issues by studying the value of the cash held by 
poorly governed firms and well governed firms. By using a regression model based on the 
Fama and French (1998) regression valuation model and that by Faulkender and Wang 
(2006), they found that, in poorly governed firms, the value of each one dollar of cash is 
between 42 and 88 cents, rising to almost double this amount in well governed firms, because 
firms with poor corporate governance disperse cash quickly in a way that reduces the 
operating performance significantly since, with poor corporate governance, the possibility of 
the agency problem will be greater, as will the associated problem of free cash flow. This 
reduction in the firm’s operating performance will be reduced when firms enhance their 
corporate governance. 
 
Kalcheva and Lins (2007) investigate how cash-holding can affect the value of the firm when 
shareholder protection is weak. They also investigate how paying a cash dividend will affect 
the value of the firm when shareholder protection is weak. They used data from 31 countries 
with more than 5,000 firms for the financial year ending on 31 December, 1996. By using a 
cross-sectional regression framework they found that, when shareholder protection is weak, 
the value of the firm will be lower when the firm’s managers hold higher levels of cash 
because this will create agency and free cash flow problems; however, if the firm pays a cash 
dividend the value will be higher even if shareholder protection is weak since the cash 
dividends will reduce the amount of free cash flow available to the firm’s managers, and firm 
value is uncorrelated with the level of cash-holding when the shareholder protection is strong 
because this strong protection will reduce the agency problem inside the firm. 
 
Harford et al. (2008) used a sample of 1,872 firms with 11,645 firm-year observations taken 
from the COMPUSTAT database for the period 1993-2004. They found that, when firms have 
a weak structure of corporate governance, they tend to hold a lower amount of cash reserves, 
and those firms with a weak corporate governance structure prefer stock repurchasing over 
92 
 
cash dividends because, with stock repurchasing, the firm can avoid any future commitments 
to cash dividends. Also, when firms have excess cash, which is associated with weak rights 
for their shareholders, this will lead to more acquisitions and capital expenditure, as well as 
low profitability and valuation. 
 
Kisser (2009) used data collected from COMPUSTAT during the period 1950-2006 to 
analyse the value of internal funds from a real-options framework point of view. When firms 
have real options to expand their capacity they will be in the form of a trade-off between the 
agency costs associated with the free cash flow and the cost of external financing. He found 
that holding a huge amount of cash and continuing to pay a cash dividend resulted in value-
maximizing since, with sufficient amounts of cash, firms are able to finance future 
opportunities and avoid the costs associated with external financing; also, by paying cash 
dividends they can reduce the possibility of free cash flow in managers’ hands. The value of 
cash held by the firm can be valued at a premium when the firm has growth opportunities, 
when the firm needs external financing, and when the agency cost of free cash flow is low. 
 
Masulis et al. (2009) based their study on the framework developed by Faulkender and Wang 
(2006) and used a sample of 503 U.S. dual-class companies for the period from 1995 to 2003 
which includes 2,440 firm-year observations. They found a significant negative relation 
between excess control rights (insider voting rights) and the change in cash. Consistent with 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), they found that shareholders place a lower value on the 
extra dollar of cash in corporations with low institutional ownership and more anti-takeover 
provisions. Also, consistent with Pinkowitz et al. (2006), the cash contribution to firm value is 
lower in countries where investors have less protection. They found that the interaction 
between the level of cash and the change in the level has a significant negative coefficient 
with the interaction between leverage and change in cash. 
 
Denis and Sibilkov (2010) based their work on a sample of publicly traded companies in the 
United States for the period from 1985 to 2006, which included 74,347 firm-year 
observations. They tried to answer two questions: Firstly, why is cash-holding considered 
more valuable in financially constrained firms?; and secondly, if cash is considered more 
valuable in financially constrained firms, why do some financially constrained firms still hold 
too little cash? Using their data they ran a regression of firm value on cash-holding and other 
control variables. They found that the coefficient of cash-holding for financially constrained 
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firms is significantly greater than for unconstrained firms. To understand why cash is more 
valuable for financially constrained firms, they analyzed how cash will affect investments, 
and then how investment will affect the value of the firm, for both constrained and 
unconstrained firms, by using the three-stage least squares methodology after accounting for 
endogeneity of the level of cash-holding. They found that, for financially constrained firms, 
there is a positive association between cash-holding and net investment, and this positive 
association becomes stronger when the firm’s hedging needs are higher because hedging 
needs come from the low correlation between a firm’s cash flow and the investment 
opportunities. So, for precautionary reasons firms with hedging needs attempt to hold more 
cash to finance their investment opportunities. Furthermore, they found that, for constrained 
firms, the association between firm value and investment is higher. Their results are 
consistent with the view that, for constrained firms, cash-holding is more valuable since more 
cash will allow constrained firms to invest more and, compared to unconstrained firms, 
marginal investments are more related to value for constrained firms. As for the second 
question about why some financially constrained firms still hold too little cash, their 
investigation supports the view that, when a firm has low internal financial resources and the 
cost of external financial resources is high, this will limit the financial resources available for 
low-cash firms. They found that, for the firms with low cash resulting from poor financial 
performance, the following ratios are very low compared to firms with high cash ratios: 
Altman’s z-scores, interest coverage ratios, cash flow margins, and changes in cash flow 
margins. As a result, low-cash firms were unable to build up cash reserves and faced the 
problem of insufficient external financing, ending up with significant declines in the cash 
balance. 
 
Drobetz et al. (2010) investigate the market value of corporate cash holdings using data from 
more than 8,500 companies from 45 countries during the period from 1995 to 2005. They 
study the effect of two opposing theories on the value of corporate cash-holding. The first 
theory is the pecking order theory, which suggests that the problem of adverse selection will 
make the cost of external financing higher than the cost of internal financing, which will 
increase the marginal value of each dollar held in cash. The second theory is the free cash 
flow theory, which predicts that excess cash-holding will be associated with high information 
asymmetry which will generate moral hazard problems; this will lead to a decrease in the 
marginal value of each dollar held in cash. Drobetz et al. start from Fama and French’s (1998) 
valuation models and the other modified versions by Pinkowitz and Williamson (2004), 
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Pinkowitz et al. (2006) and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), and further extend the 
framework by adding a test of the impact of the time-varying information asymmetry and 
firm-specific information asymmetry on the market value of corporate cash-holding since 
information asymmetry could be varying over time, especially when new inside or private 
information arrived. They used the standard deviation of the earnings per share forecasts 
across analysts that cover a firm, since the volatility in earnings reflects the quality of 
information available (Parkash et al. 1995). They obtained the following results: firstly, for 
the whole sample, the regression model without the information asymmetry shows that the 
market value of an additional dollar is $0.66; secondly, when introducing the measure of 
time-varying information asymmetry and firm-specific information asymmetry, the 
coefficient of the interaction term has a negative sign, which supports the hypothesis that the 
market value of the corporate cash-holding is less with a higher degree of information 
asymmetry. 
 
Fresard and Salva (2010) followed the Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) way of measuring 
cash and used the modified version of Fama and French’s (1998) valuation model on a sample 
of 868 non-US firms listed in US secondary markets during the period from 1989 to 2005. 
They found that investors consider a cross-listing in US financial markets as a way to reduce 
insiders’ inefficient actions; the investors give a valuation premium on the excess cash for the 
firms that have a cross-listing in US stock markets, and this premium becomes higher if the 
firm comes from a country where shareholders have weak protection. They also found that 
when the investors have higher protection against insiders, based on the disclosure 
requirements and the legal enforcement of the US listing requirements, those investors will 
place a higher premium on the cash-holding because those disclosure requirements and the 
legal enforcement will reduce the inefficient actions by the firm’s insiders.  
 
Haw et al. (2011) used the valuation regression model developed by Fama and French (1998) 
and the modified model used by Faulkender and Wang (2006); they tested the effect of the 
cash-holding, cash dividend, and stock repurchasing on the firm value. Based on a sample of 
59,011 firm-year observations taken from 14,495 firms during the period from 1998 to 2004, 
they found that the contribution of stock repurchasing to the firm’s value is greater in 
countries with strong shareholder protection than in countries with weak shareholder 
protection. In countries with weak shareholder protection, cash dividends contribute more to 
the firm value than the stock repurchasing contributes. The marginal value of cash-holding 
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increases in countries with strong shareholder protection, while it will decrease in countries 
with weak shareholder protection as the proportion of stock repurchasing increases since, with 
strong shareholder protection, the agency problem will decrease as well as the free cash flow 
problem, which will increase the marginal value of cash-holding. Also, in countries with weak 
shareholder protection the marginal value of cash-holding is reduced by 12 cents when the 
firm used the payout on stock repurchases rather than on cash dividends. Their results are 
consistent with the theory of free cash flow which is associated with the agency problem in 
countries where shareholder protection is weak. 
 
Tong (2011) studied how firms’ diversification can affect the value of the corporate cash-
holding by studying the effect of agency problems and financial constraints. Using data from 
1998 to 2005 taken from 6,867 firms with 28,563 firm-year observations and employing the 
methodology developed by Faulkender and Wang (2006) to measure the marginal value of 
cash, he found that, in diversified firms, the value of cash is lower compared to single-
segment firms. In both financially constrained and unconstrained firms diversification is 
associated with a lower value of cash-holding. Also, with a lower level of corporate 
governance, diversification has a negative impact on cash-holding value while, with a higher 
level of corporate governance; diversification has no impact on cash-holding value. The 
results of this study support the interpretation of agency problems that diversification reduces 
the value of corporate cash-holding because managers of multi-segment firms might 
misallocate the cash invested compared to managers of single-segment firms, i.e. there will be 
an incentive for managers to use the cash to cross-subsidise between divisions. 
 
To summarize, in the last 10 years several researchers have investigated the value of cash-
holding by studying firms with different characteristics, such as those with strong or weak 
shareholder protection, or those with higher or lower agency problems. Those researchers 
followed either Fama and French’s (1998) or Faulkender and Wang’s (2006) valuation 
models; some researchers such as Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) used both models. Both 
models were used to investigate how cash-holding affects the value for the shareholders after 
controlling for the firm’s characteristics. The main difference is that, in the Fama and French 
(1998) model, the value for the shareholders is measured by the firm’s value while, in 
Faulkender and Wang’s (2006) model, this value is measured by the stock’s excess return. 
Faulkender and Wang’s (2006) model has several advantages over Fama and French’s (1998) 
model. Firstly, Faulkender and Wang’s (2006) model has been developed for the purpose of 
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measuring the effect of cash-holding on the shareholders’ value, while Fama and French’s 
(1998) model was originally developed to test how taxes on dividends and debts will affect 
the firm’s value; it was later modified by several researchers such as Pinkowitz and 
Williamson (2002), Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) and others to test the effect of cash-
holding on the firm’s value. Secondly, Faulkender and Wang’s (2006) model takes into 
consideration the risk factor by using the stock’s excess return over a benchmark return. 
Finally, using the stock’s excess return rather that market-to-book value is more accurate and 
up to date since there is the problem of reflecting the true replacement cost using different 
accounting methods and numbers. 
 
Agency theory, free cash flow theory, and pecking order theory played significant roles in 
explaining the relationship between cash-holding and shareholders’ value. In the presence of 
the agency problem, managers will act inefficiently and put their own interests ahead of 
shareholders’ benefits, spending cash inefficiently either on personal benefits or on 
acquisitions, and causing shareholders to place a discounted value on cash-holding. The same 
is true with the free cash flow problem; when this problem exists, managers will have more 
cash to spend on their personal benefits and acquisitions, thus causing shareholders to place a 
discounted value on cash-holding. On the other hand, the pecking order theory tells us that, 
when a firm needs funds, it will obtain them from internal sources first and then from external 
sources, starting from the cheapest source. In some cases, the problem of adverse selection 
could exist, making it difficult for the firm to obtain the required funds from external sources; 
even if this adverse selection problem does not exist, the process of raising funds from 
external sources could take a long time and result in a delayed investment. All of this makes 
internal sources of funding very important, especially when the firm has projects and 
investments to finance. In such cases, investors will place a premium value on the firm’s 
cash-holding. 
 
Studies by several researchers have confirmed what the previous theories suggest. Those 
studies conducted in countries where shareholders’ protection rights are weak, and where 
there are high agency and free cash flow problems, found that investors place a discounted 
value on cash-holding; meanwhile, where there are strong shareholder protection rights and 
good corporate governance systems that reduce both the agency and free cash flow problems, 
they found that investors place a premium value on cash-holding. 
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3.2.1. Research Hypotheses 
 
When the agency problem exists, a firm’s managers will act in a way that affects shareholders 
negatively. Managers will put their personal benefits ahead of the shareholders’ benefits. The 
greater the degree of asymmetry of information, the greater the agency problem that will 
arise. In this case, the free cash flow problem might occur. This will cause the shareholders to 
believe that the cash accumulated inside the firm will be used inefficiently by the firm’s 
managers; therefore, they will value this cash at a discounted level to its book value. As 
investors in Jordan do not benefit from strong investor protection and the corporate 
governance system is weak, investors in Jordan are expected to value cash at a discount. 
H1: cash is valued at a discount in the Jordanian financial market. 
 
When the firm has a higher level of cash-holding, it will become less likely to seek external 
sources of funding. With each additional pound of cash the marginal value associated with 
that additional pound will become less and less. In other words, there is a decreasing function 
between the additional pound of cash and the marginal value associated with that additional 
pound. Furthermore, with higher levels of cash, there is more likelihood of the free cash flow 
problem, which will affect the shareholders negatively. On the other hand, if funds are 
difficult to obtain from external sources, a higher level of cash might become preferable. 
Since debt financing is less preferred in Jordan due to the religion rules, a higher level of cash 
might not have a detrimental effect on firm value especially if equity financing is limited, 
involves a high cost, or becomes unavailable. 
H2: with a higher level of cash-holding the marginal value of cash-holding will decrease. 
 
In the presence of leverage, firm equity can be considered as the call option on the firm value. 
Holding more cash will increase the value of the firm. With higher leverage, cash will benefit 
debt-holders more than equity-holders since this cash will increase the debt-holders’ chances 
of being paid. Furthermore, equity-holders prefer riskier investments to obtain higher returns 
and maximize their profit and wealth, so having an additional pound of cash can be 
considered as investing in risk-free assets. Therefore, in higher-leverage firms with an 
additional pound of cash, the marginal value associated with that additional pound will 
become lower. 
H3: with higher leverage an additional pound of cash is less valuable for shareholders. 
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With less investor protection, shareholders will gain greater benefit if the liquid assets are 
paid out as cash dividends rather than being used inefficiently by the firm’s managers.  
H4: the dividend has a positive effect on the firm value. 
 
3.3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.3.1. Research Sample 
 
The sample of this research included non-financial publicly traded firms in the Amman stock 
exchange. The study used the annual financial data taken from the companies guide for the 
period from 2000 to 2011. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the reason for including 
only non-financial firms is that financial firms need to hold a certain level of cash as part of 
their business activities; thus the results may be affected if those firms are included in the 
sample. Also, firms that have missing data either at the beginning or at the end of the analysis 
period will be excluded from the research sample because those firms are either new to the 
business or are in the liquidation process, so the level of cash-holding in those firms is not a 
result of the firms’ operations or activities; thus, including these data could affect the results 
of this research. 
 
Out of 247 firms listed at the end of the financial year 2011, there are 109 financial firms and 
58 firms that are new or under liquidation, which means that the final number of firms 
included in the research sample is 80. 
 
3.3.2. Research Variables 
 
3.3.2.1. Research Variables for Fama and French’s (1998) Model 
We used the Fama and French (1998) firm evaluation model, which has also been adapted by 
Pinkowitz and Williamson (2005), Pinkowitz et al. (2006), Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), 
Kalcheva and Lins (2007), Kisser (2009) and others. The model has been adjusted from the 
original form where Fama and French used the change in total assets as one of the variables 
that contribute to the firm value. In the model that we used, we split the total assets to cash 
assets and non-cash assets to be able to determine how cash contributes to the firm value (for 
more details, see section 3.3.5.). 
 
99 
 
The research variables are as follows: the dependent variable for this research is the firm’s 
value (Vt), which is measured as the market value of the firm’s equity plus the book value of 
the firm’s liabilities, all divided by the book value of the firm’s total assets. 
 
The independent variables are as follows: 
Firm’s earnings (Et), which are measured as the firm’s earnings before extraordinary items 
plus interest and taxes for the current year (EBIT), all divided by the book value of the firm’s 
total assets for the current year. 
 
Change in the firm’s earnings from the previous year (dEt), which is measured as the firm’s 
earnings before extraordinary items plus interest and taxes for the current year (EBIT), minus 
the firm’s earnings before extraordinary items plus interest and taxes for the previous year 
(EBIT), all divided by the book value of the firm’s total assets for the current year. 
 
Change in the firm’s earnings between the current year and the next year (dEt+1), which is 
measured as the firm’s earnings before extraordinary items plus interest and taxes for the next 
year (EBIT), minus the firm’s earnings before extraordinary items plus interest and taxes for 
the current year (EBIT), all divided by the book value of the firm’s total assets for the current 
year. 
 
Change in the firm’s assets from the previous year (dAt), which is measured as the firm’s 
assets for the current year, minus the firm’s assets for the previous year, all divided by the 
book value of the firm’s total assets for the current year. 
 
Change in the firm’s assets between the current year and the next year (dAt+1), which is 
measured as the firm’s assets for the next year, minus the firm’s assets for the current year, all 
divided by the book value of the firm’s total assets for the current year. 
 
Firm’s research and development expenses (RDt), which are measured as the firm’s research 
and development expenses for the current year, divided by the book value of the firm’s total 
assets for the current year; if there are no research and development expenses, this figure will 
be set at zero. 
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Change in the firm’s research and development expenses from the previous year (dRDt), 
which is measured as the firm’s research and development expenses for the current year, 
minus the firm’s research and development expenses for the previous year, all divided by the 
book value of the firm’s total assets for the current year. 
 
Change in the firm’s research and development expenses between the current year and the 
next year (dRDt+1), which is measured as the firm’s research and development expenses for 
the next year, minus the firm’s research and development expenses for the current year, all 
divided by the book value of the firm’s total assets for the current year. 
 
Firm’s interest expenses (It), which are measured as the firm’s interest expenses for the 
current year, divided by the book value of the firm’s total assets for the current year. 
 
Change in the firm’s interest expenses from the previous year (dIt), which is measured as the 
firm’s interest expenses for the current year, minus the firm’s interest expenses for the 
previous year, all divided by the book value of the firm’s total assets for the current year. 
 
Change in the firm’s interest expenses between the current year and the next year (dIt+1), 
which is measured as the firm’s interest expenses for the next year, minus the firm’s interest 
expenses for the current year, all divided by the book value of the firm’s total assets for the 
current year. 
 
Firm’s cash dividend (Dt), which is measured as the firm’s total cash dividend paid to the 
shareholders for the current year, divided by the book value of the firm’s total assets for the 
current year. 
 
Change in the firm’s cash dividend from the previous year (dDt), which is measured as the 
firm’s total cash dividend paid to the shareholders for the current year, minus the firm’s total 
cash dividend paid to the shareholders for the previous year, all divided by the book value of 
the firm’s total assets for the current year. 
 
Change in the firm’s cash dividend between the current year and the next year (dDt+1), which 
is measured as the firm’s total cash dividend paid to the shareholders for the next year, minus 
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the firm’s total cash dividend paid to the shareholders for the current year, all divided by the 
book value of the firm’s total assets for the current year. 
 
Change in the firm’s value from the previous year (dVt), which is measured as the firm’s 
value for the current year, minus the firm’s value for the previous year, all divided by the 
book value of the firm’s total assets for the current year. 
 
Firm’s cash assets (CAt), which are measured as the firm’s cash assets for the current year, 
divided by the book value of the firm’s total assets for the current year. 
 
Change in the firm’s cash assets from the previous year (dCAt), which is measured as the 
firm’s cash assets for the current year, minus the firm’s cash assets for the previous year, all 
divided by the book value of the firm’s total assets for the current year. 
 
Change in the firm’s cash assets between the current year and the next year (dCAt+1), which is 
measured as the firm’s cash assets for the next year, minus the firm’s cash assets for the 
current year, all divided by the book value of the firm’s total assets for the current year. 
 
Change in the firm’s non-cash assets from the previous year (dNAt), which is measured as the 
firm’s total assets minus cash assets for the current year, minus the firm’s total assets minus 
cash assets for the previous year, all divided by the book value of the firm’s total assets for 
the current year. 
 
Change in the firm’s non-cash assets between the current year and the next year (dNAt+1), 
which is measured as the firm’s total assets minus cash assets for the next year, minus the 
firm’s total assets minus cash assets for the current year, all divided by the book value of the 
firm’s total assets for the current year. 
 
3.3.2.2. Research Variables for Faulkender and Wang’s (2006) Model 
Another model has been introduced by Faulkender and Wang (2006). In this model they used 
stock excess return rather than the firm’s value as used in Fama and French’s model. They 
argued that their model is an enhancement of Fama and French model’s for the following 
reasons. Firstly, time-varying risk factors were included into their model estimation. Fama 
and French’s model controlled for firm-specific characteristics that affect cash, but did not 
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provide any measures for risk factors or discount rates. On the other hand, the model provided 
by Faulkender and Wang takes this issue into account by controlling for the risk factors using 
the benchmark of the stock’s return. Secondly, the stock return is easier to measure and 
interpret compared to the market-to-book value ratio since “part of the variability in market-
to-book may result from the cross-sectional differences in accounting for the book value of 
assets relative to their true replacement cost.” That could make the estimated marginal value 
of cash biased. 
 
The research variables are as follows. The dependent variable for this research is the stock’s 
excess return (ri,t – Ri,t) which is measured as the firm’s stock return (ri,t) minus the 
benchmark return. The stock’s return is equal to the stock’s price in year t minus the stock’s 
price in year t-1 all divided by the stock’s price in year t-1. Meanwhile, the stock’s benchmark 
return (Ri,t), is measured as the market return
13
. 
 
The independent variables are as follows: 
The change in the firm’s cash-holding (ΔCi,t), which is measured as the change in the cash 
and cash equivalents between year t and year t-1 divided by the lagged market value of equity 
(Mi,t-1), which is measured as the market value of the equity in year t-1. We used the lagged 
market value of equity to standardize the measurement of the variable and in order to be able 
to do the interpretation since the stock return is calculated as the value in year t minus the 
value in year t-1 divided by the value in year t-1. This variable will measure how the change 
in cash and cash equivalents contributes to the shareholders’ value. 
 
The change in the firm’s earnings (ΔEi,t), which is measured as the change in the firm’s 
earnings before extraordinary items plus interest and taxes (EBIT), between year t and year t-
1 divided by the lagged market value of equity (Mi,t-1). This variable is used to control for the 
contribution of the firm’s profitability to the shareholders’ value. 
 
The change in the firm’s non-cash assets (ΔNAi,t), which is measured as the change in the 
firm’s total assets net of cash (total assets – cash and cash equivalents) between year t and 
                                                 
13
 Faulkender and Wang (2006) used Fama and French’s 25 portfolios formed on size and book-to-market as 
their benchmark portfolios. In this research we used the market portfolio since the size of the financial market in 
Jordan is very small compared to the market size in the US, and it will not be possible to obtain the 25 Fama and 
French portfolios formed. 
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year t-1 divided by the lagged market value of equity (Mi,t-1). This variable is used to control 
for the contribution of the changes in the firm’s investment policy to the shareholders’ value. 
 
The change in the research and development expenses (ΔRDi,t), which is measured as the 
change in the research and development expenses between year t and year t-1 divided by the 
lagged market value of equity (Mi,t-1), as a control variable for the contribution of the research 
and development expenses. 
 
The change in the interest expenses (ΔIi,t), which is measured as the change in the interest 
expenses between year t and year t-1 divided by the lagged market value of equity (Mi,t-1), as 
a control variable for the contribution of the interest expenses. 
 
The change in the dividends paid (ΔDi,t), which is measured as the change in the total 
dividends paid to the shareholders between year t and year t-1 divided by the lagged market 
value of equity (Mi,t-1), as a control variable for the contribution of the dividends. 
 
The lagged value of cash-holding (Ci,t-1), which is measured as the level of cash and cash 
equivalents in the year t-1 divided by the lagged market value of equity (Mi,t-1). This variable 
will measure how the cash and cash equivalents in the previous year contribute to the 
shareholders’ value. 
 
The market leverage (Li,t), which is measured as the total debt divided by the total debt and 
the market value of the equity in the year t. This variable will control for how the leverage 
contributes to the shareholders’ value. 
 
The firm’s net financing (NFi,t), which is measured as the total equity issued minus stock 
repurchases plus debt issuance minus debt redemption divided by the lagged market value of 
equity (Mi,t-1). This variable will control for how the net financing contributes to the 
shareholders’ value. 
 
The product of (Ci,t-1 / Mi,t-1) and (ΔCi,t / Mi,t-1); this variable is used to capture the effect of 
changes in the value of cash for different levels of cash holdings (Faulkender and Wang 
(2006)). 
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The product of (Li,t) and (ΔCi,t / Mi,t-1); this variable is used to capture the effect of leverage 
on the marginal value of cash holdings (Faulkender and Wang (2006)). 
 
3.3.3. Research Methodology 
 
As we mentioned earlier in chapter 1, when dealing with financial data that are cross-sectional 
and time-series at the same time, the best method is to use a panel data analysis, for the 
reasons that we mentioned in chapter 1. Also, as we explained in chapter 1, this panel data 
analysis can be conducted in three ways; ordinary least squares OLS, fixed-effect model, and 
random effect model. Using the likelihood ratio test and Hausman test we can decide which of 
those three forms is the most appropriate. 
 
3.3.4. Research Models 
 
3.3.4.1. Fama and French (1998) Research Models 
These research models are based on the Fama and French (1998) firm valuation model and 
the adjusted models presented by Pinkowitz and Williamson (2005), Pinkowitz et al. (2006), 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), Kalcheva and Lins (2007), Kisser (2009), and others. 
 
The model of Fama and French (1998) is: 
 
Vi,t = α0 + β1 Ei,t + β2 dEi,t + β3 dEi,t+1 + β4 dAi,t + β5 dAi,t+1 + β6 RDi,t + β7 dRDi,t + β8 dRDi,t+1 
+ β9 Ii,t + β10 dIi,t + β11 dIi,t+1 + β12 Di,t + β13 dDi,t + β14 dDi,t+1 + β15 dVi,t + ε i,t  (3.1) 
 
Where: 
Vt : Firm’s value in year t, divided by the total assets in year t. 
Et : Firm’s earning in year t, divided by the total assets in year t. 
dEt : Firm’s earning in year t, minus firm’s earning in year t-1, all divided by the total 
assets in year t. 
dEt+1 : Firm’s earning in year t+1, minus firm’s earning in year t, all divided by the total 
assets in year t. 
dAt : Firm’s assets in year t, minus firm’s assets in year t-1, all divided by the total assets 
in year t. 
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dAt+1 : Firm’s assets in year t+1, minus firm’s assets in year t, all divided by the total assets 
in year t. 
RDt : Firm’s research and development expenses in year t, divided by the total assets in 
year t. 
dRDt : Firm’s research and development expenses in year t, minus firm’s research and 
development expenses in year t-1, all divided by the total assets in year t. 
dRDt+1 : Firm’s research and development expenses in year t+1, minus firm’s research and 
development expenses in year t, all divided by the total assets in year t. 
It : Firm’s interest expenses in year t, divided by the total assets in year t. 
dIt : Firm’s interest expenses in year t, minus firm’s interest expenses in year t-1, all 
divided by the total assets in year t. 
dIt+1 : Firm’s interest expenses in year t+1, minus firm’s interest expenses in year t, all 
divided by the total assets in year t. 
Dt : Firm’s total dividend in year t, divided by the total assets in year t. 
dDt : Firm’s total dividend in year t, minus firm’s total dividend in year t-1, all divided by 
the total assets in year t. 
dDt+1 : Firm’s total dividend in year t+1, minus firm’s total dividend in year t, all divided by 
the total assets in year t. 
dVt : Firm’s value in year t, minus firm’s value in year t-1, all divided by the total assets in 
year t. 
βi :variables’ betas. 
ε i,t : unobservable characteristics. 
 
The first model is an adjusted version of the Fama and French (1998) model, by taking the 
variable (A), which is the total assets and is divided into two parts; cash assets CA, and NA 
non-cash assets: 
 
Vi,t = α0 + β1 Ei,t + β2 dEi,t + β3 dEi,t+1 + β4 dNAi,t + β5 dNAi,t+1 + β6 RDi,t + β7 dRDi,t + β8 
dRDi,t+1 + β9 Ii,t + β10 dIi,t + β11 dIi,t+1 + β12 Di,t + β13 dDi,t + β14 dDi,t+1 + β15 dVi,t + β16 
dCAi,t + β17 dCAi,t+1 + ε i,t             (3.2) 
Where: 
 
dCAt : Firm’s cash assets in year t, minus firm’s cash assets in year t-1, all divided by the 
total assets in year t. 
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dCAt+1 : Firm’s cash assets in year t+1, minus firm’s cash assets in year t, all divided by the 
total assets in year t. 
dNAt : Firm’s total assets minus cash assets in year t, minus firm’s total assets minus cash 
assets in year t-1, all divided by the total assets in year t. 
dNAt+1 : Firm’s total assets minus cash assets in year t+1, minus firm’s total assets minus cash 
assets in year t, all divided by the total assets in year t. 
 
The second model is also an adjusted version of the Fama and French (1998) model, by taking 
the variable (A), which is the total assets and is divided into two parts; cash assets CA, and 
NA non-cash assets. However, rather than check how the change in cash will affect the value 
of the firm, this model will check how the cash level itself will affect the firm’s value: 
 
Vi,t = α0 + β1 Ei,t + β2 dEi,t + β3 dEi,t+1 + β4 dNAi,t + β5 dNAi,t+1 + β6 RDi,t + β7 dRDi,t + β8 
dRDi,t+1 + β9 Ii,t + β10 dIi,t + β11 dIi,t+1 + β12 Di,t + β13 dDi,t + β14 dDi,t+1 + β15 dVi,t + β16 
CAi,t + ε i,t                 (3.3) 
 
Where: 
 
CAt : Firm’s cash assets in year t, divided by the total assets in year t. 
 
3.3.4.2. Faulkender and Wang (2006) Research Model 
This research model has been developed by Faulkender and Wang (2006) and is also used by 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), Tong (2011), Denis and Sibikov (2010) and Haw et al. 
(2011). 
 
The model of Faulkender and Wang (2006) is: 
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Where: 
ri,t – Ri,t : Stock excess return for stock i in the time t. 
ΔCi,t : Change in the cash ratio for stock i between time t and time t-1. 
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ΔEi,t : Change in firm’s earnings for stock i between time t and time t-1. 
ΔNAi,t : Change in non-cash assets for stock i between time t and time t-1. 
ΔRDi,t : Change in the research and development expenses for stock i between time t and 
time t-1. 
ΔIi,t : Change in interest expenses for stock i between time t and time t-1. 
ΔDi,t : Change in the cash dividends for stock i between time t and time t-1. 
Ci,t-1 : Cash ratio for stock i in the time t-1. 
Li,t : Market leverage for stock i in the time t. 
NFi,t : Net financing for stock i in the time t. 
Mi,t-1 : Equity market value for stock i in the time t-1. 
ε i,t : Unobservable characteristics. 
 
3.4. Results and analysis 
 
3.4.1. The change in cash level model 
 
In this section we will conduct the analysis of the model that is concerned with the change in 
cash level and how it affects the firm’s value. This model has been developed based on Fama 
and French’s (1998) valuation model. 
 
Table 3.1 shows the basic descriptive analysis of the variables for this research. The results in 
this table cover the period from 2001 to 2010, although the original data have been collected 
for the period from 2000 to 2011; however, since some of the research variables need to be 
calculated as the difference between the current year and the previous year, and other 
variables need to be calculated as the difference between the next year and the current year, 
the value of the variables between 2001 and 2010 only will be included. From table 3.1 we 
can make several observations. The average value of the firm’s value to total assets is 154% 
with a high standard deviation of 83%, which explains the wide range for this variable from   
-3% to 620%. The firm’s current earnings have a maximum value of 50% and a minimum 
value of -59%, with an average value of 5%. The change in the earnings from the previous 
year has an average value of 0.2% while the change in earnings between the next and the 
current year has an average value of 0.6%. Research and development expenditure represents 
a small amount of firms’ assets with an average value of 0.1% and a maximum value of 1.4%. 
Interest expenses are also a small amount of the firm’s assets with an average value of 1.2%. 
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The average cash dividend to the total assets is 2.9% while the maximum value for this ratio 
is 35%. The average change in the cash ratio from the previous year is 0.3%. 
 
For a better view of the data, we can consult table 3.2 which presents a year-by-year 
descriptive analysis of the data from the year 2001 to the year 2010. From these tables we can 
see that the research variables are stable from year to year, with no big changes. 
 
Finally, table 3.3 shows the correlation matrix for the research variables. The correlations 
between the research variables are low except between a few variables where one might 
expect to see high correlations; the most important issue is whether there is any high 
correlation between the cash variables and any other variables. From table 3.3 we can see that 
cash variables have no high correlations with any of the research variables. 
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Table 3.1 
Descriptive analysis 
 
The dependent variable is the firm’s value (Vt), The independent variables are; Firm’s earnings (Et); Change in the firm’s earning from the previous year (dEt); Change in the 
firm’s earning between the current year and the next year (dEt+1); Firm’s research and development expenses (RDt); Change in the firm’s research and development expenses 
from the previous year (dRDt); Change in the firm’s research and development expenses between the current year and the next year (dRDt+1); Firm’s interest expenses (It); 
Change in the firm’s interest expenses from the previous year (dIt); Change in the firm’s interest expenses between the current year and the next year (dIt+1); Firm’s cash 
dividend (Dt); Change in the firm’s cash dividend from the previous year (dDt); Change in the firm’s cash dividend between the current year and the next year (dDt+1); 
Change in the firm’s value from the previous year (dVt); Change in the firm’s cash assets from the previous year (dCAt); Change in the firm’s cash assets between the current 
year and the next year (dCAt+1); Change in the firm’s non cash assets from the previous year (dNAt); Change in the firm’s non cash assets between the current year and the 
next year (dNAt+1). All divided by the total assets. For the period from 2001 to 2010. 
 
 
Vt Et dEt dEt+1 dNAt dNAt+1 RDt dRDt dRDt+1 It dIt dIt+1 Dt dDt dDt+1 dVt dCAt dCAt+1 
Mean% 153.9 5.0 0.2 0.6 2.3 7.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.2 -0.1 0.0 2.9 0.2 0.2 10.3 0.3 1.0 
Median% 135.2 5.2 0.4 0.2 2.0 1.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.7 0.2 0.1 
Max% 916.8 50.1 43.8 70.6 90.6 895.8 1.4 1.2 2.0 8.6 6.7 7.0 35.2 20.0 23.4 392.7 38.0 145.7 
Min% -2.6 -58.7 -70.2 -40.3 -450.0 -81.3 0.0 -1.3 -1.1 0.0 -5.3 -4.8 0.0 -53.1 -22.0 -452.3 -87.0 -35.8 
SD% 82.9 9.7 9.2 9.4 23.7 49.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.4 0.8 0.8 4.3 3.6 3.2 56.0 8.8 10.1 
Obs. 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 
Source: Calculated by the researcher based on companies’ guides available in Amman stock exchange website for several years. 
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Table 3.2 
Descriptive analysis 
 
The dependent variable is the firm’s value (Vt), The independent variables are; Firm’s earnings (Et); Change in the firm’s earning from the previous year (dEt); Change in the 
firm’s earning between the current year and the next year (dEt+1); Firm’s research and development expenses (RDt); Change in the firm’s research and development expenses 
from the previous year (dRDt); Change in the firm’s research and development expenses between the current year and the next year (dRD t+1); Firm’s interest expenses (It); 
Change in the firm’s interest expenses from the previous year (dIt); Change in the firm’s interest expenses between the current year and the next year (dIt+1); Firm’s cash 
dividend (Dt); Change in the firm’s cash dividend from the previous year (dDt); Change in the firm’s cash dividend between the current year and the next year (dDt+1); 
Change in the firm’s value from the previous year (dVt); Change in the firm’s cash assets from the previous year (dCAt); Change in the firm’s cash assets between the current 
year and the next year (dCAt+1); Change in the firm’s non cash assets from the previous year (dNAt); Change in the firm’s non cash assets between the current year and the 
next year (dNAt+1). All divided by the total assets. For the period from 2001 to 2010. 
 
 
 
Vt Et dEt dEt+1 dNAt dNAt+1 RDt dRDt dRDt+1 It dIt dIt+1 Dt dDt dDt+1 dVt dCAt dCAt+1 
2
0
0
1
 
Mean% 111.2 5.1 1.1 0.5 1.4 0.9 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.6 -0.3 -0.3 3.0 0.8 -0.1 3.1 -0.1 1.1 
Median% 100.5 5.4 0.7 0.1 1.3 -0.7 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.2 0.1 0.0 
Max% 307.9 23.4 40.7 37.0 69.4 78.3 0.5 0.5 0.3 7.1 1.8 1.2 18.5 18.5 7.0 93.9 26.9 39.9 
Min% 8.9 -44.3 -41.1 -24.4 -62.1 -34.9 0.0 -0.4 -0.5 0.0 -5.0 -2.9 0.0 -5.4 -18.5 -122.0 -33.0 -30.3 
SD% 55.6 9.7 8.8 7.0 16.8 15.7 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.7 1.1 0.7 4.3 2.8 2.6 33.3 7.5 9.2 
2
0
0
2
 
Mean% 119.6 5.3 0.0 0.7 -1.6 5.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.3 -0.3 -0.2 2.8 -0.6 0.0 7.3 -0.2 -0.8 
Median% 108.9 5.0 0.1 0.3 -0.6 1.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.7 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.9 0.0 0.1 
Max% 328.3 26.0 43.8 22.5 42.6 91.0 0.7 0.3 0.6 6.6 1.2 2.5 17.8 6.0 5.1 104.0 36.3 30.9 
Min% 0.7 -16.4 -70.2 -21.2 -100.4 -34.8 0.0 -1.3 -0.4 0.0 -3.2 -4.8 0.0 -53.1 -6.7 -155.8 -87.0 -35.8 
SD% 58.6 7.7 10.7 7.1 16.9 17.7 0.2 0.2 0.1 1.6 0.7 0.8 3.8 6.1 1.6 31.9 13.6 8.8 
2
0
0
3
 
Mean% 145.3 5.2 0.2 3.6 2.8 28.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 1.2 -0.2 -0.1 2.6 0.0 1.2 28.2 -1.2 0.7 
Median% 132.9 5.5 0.3 1.5 1.5 8.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 21.3 0.1 0.1 
Max% 462.2 29.5 22.5 32.8 47.1 895.8 0.9 0.4 1.0 6.9 1.7 2.9 18.1 3.6 18.3 178.4 21.9 30.3 
Min% 33.5 -31.3 -30.2 -10.0 -53.2 -25.8 0.0 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 -5.3 -3.0 0.0 -6.1 -6.8 -153.0 -56.4 -28.3 
SD% 72.3 8.1 7.6 8.1 14.8 106.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 1.5 0.8 0.7 3.7 1.5 4.0 48.1 9.5 8.8 
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Table 3.2 Continued 
 
 
 
Vt Et dEt dEt+1 dNAt dNAt+1 RDt dRDt dRDt+1 It dIt dIt+1 Dt dDt dDt+1 dVt dCAt dCAt+1 
2
0
0
4
 
Mean% 166.6 7.3 2.8 2.5 10.8 14.4 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.9 -0.1 0.1 3.4 1.0 0.3 37.0 0.3 3.4 
Median% 153.5 6.6 1.3 1.7 7.7 10.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 34.0 0.1 0.7 
Max% 444.4 32.1 26.6 47.1 90.6 153.6 0.9 0.5 0.8 6.2 1.6 5.2 22.0 18.2 23.4 208.0 19.1 55.5 
Min% 21.0 -6.7 -9.1 -22.8 -31.5 -81.3 0.0 -0.2 -0.7 0.0 -3.0 -2.3 0.0 -5.8 -22.0 -41.3 -17.1 -26.0 
SD% 74.4 7.0 6.8 9.6 18.2 33.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 1.2 0.6 0.9 4.6 3.4 4.9 46.5 6.6 12.0 
2
0
0
5
 
Mean% 184.4 7.5 1.2 -2.5 2.8 4.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.3 3.1 0.0 0.2 31.8 2.1 0.5 
Median% 171.7 5.7 1.4 -0.6 9.5 3.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 24.5 0.5 0.1 
Max% 488.7 39.4 22.7 32.0 58.8 65.1 1.2 0.6 1.2 4.5 4.3 3.1 35.2 20.0 7.7 175.1 35.3 29.2 
Min% 25.4 -32.4 -30.9 -39.8 -450.0 -28.0 0.0 -0.6 -0.9 0.0 -2.2 -1.5 0.0 -31.3 -20.0 -452.3 -29.3 -17.5 
SD% 79.2 9.7 7.4 9.7 54.4 15.5 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.1 0.8 0.7 5.4 5.1 3.4 78.2 9.4 7.3 
2
0
0
6
 
Mean% 163.3 4.2 -2.9 2.6 2.1 9.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.2 0.2 3.2 0.1 0.3 -16.6 0.1 0.2 
Median% 143.0 5.2 -0.6 1.5 3.7 7.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 2.3 0.0 0.0 -15.8 0.1 0.2 
Max% 613.0 29.5 32.5 33.2 39.4 82.5 0.9 0.9 1.3 4.2 1.9 3.4 16.9 7.8 13.5 180.9 17.6 28.4 
Min% 65.9 -26.0 -37.4 -20.2 -38.7 -36.6 0.0 -1.0 -0.6 0.0 -2.1 -3.3 0.0 -21.7 -16.6 -162.8 -20.1 -30.6 
SD% 82.0 8.8 10.0 7.7 13.7 17.8 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.1 0.6 0.8 4.0 3.6 3.4 53.4 6.7 7.4 
2
0
0
7
 
Mean% 177.0 5.7 2.3 -1.1 6.4 20.8 0.2 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.1 0.2 3.1 0.2 -0.3 27.5 0.1 3.9 
Median% 154.0 6.3 1.4 -0.9 7.1 4.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 17.7 0.2 0.0 
Max% 619.8 34.9 33.1 70.6 42.5 699.4 1.0 0.9 2.0 5.3 2.7 7.0 19.1 13.5 14.6 392.7 15.9 145.7 
Min% 55.8 -29.6 -25.4 -40.3 -51.1 -39.9 0.0 -0.5 -0.3 0.0 -4.6 -2.9 0.0 -14.6 -7.4 -75.0 -25.3 -24.5 
SD% 92.6 9.7 7.6 13.8 14.7 96.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 1.1 0.8 1.1 4.2 3.1 3.1 64.9 6.2 19.2 
2
0
0
8
 
Mean% 164.0 3.8 -1.3 -0.3 4.8 -0.9 0.2 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.2 -0.1 2.6 -0.3 0.0 1.4 1.6 0.5 
Median% 136.0 5.0 -0.5 -1.0 4.0 -2.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -5.6 0.0 0.2 
Max% 460.5 50.1 40.8 68.1 84.3 39.0 1.4 1.1 0.6 8.1 6.7 1.7 24.1 13.9 6.6 229.9 38.0 33.1 
Min% 32.4 -58.7 -61.1 -35.5 -62.0 -32.6 0.0 -0.3 -0.8 0.0 -1.7 -2.0 0.0 -7.0 -9.8 -100.6 -21.1 -35.5 
SD% 88.5 13.3 12.1 12.0 21.3 14.0 0.3 0.2 0.2 1.4 1.0 0.6 4.4 2.8 2.5 55.7 9.8 8.1 
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Table 3.2 Continued 
 
 
 
Vt Et dEt dEt+1 dNAt dNAt+1 RDt dRDt dRDt+1 It dIt dIt+1 Dt dDt dDt+1 dVt dCAt dCAt+1 
2
0
0
9
 
Mean% 156.6 2.8 -1.1 0.6 -2.6 -1.8 0.1 0.0 -0.1 1.2 -0.1 0.0 2.4 -0.1 0.4 -11.0 0.2 1.1 
Median% 133.2 3.8 -0.9 0.1 -2.4 -2.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -5.7 0.2 0.5 
Max% 437.2 36.0 41.2 24.9 28.4 49.0 1.1 0.5 0.8 8.6 1.5 2.9 19.2 5.8 16.1 186.4 29.0 18.1 
Min% 15.4 -40.8 -47.3 -18.5 -48.4 -37.3 0.0 -0.8 -1.1 0.0 -2.3 -2.2 0.0 -10.5 -6.9 -171.3 -39.4 -17.5 
SD% 92.4 10.5 11.1 6.7 14.5 14.7 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.5 0.6 0.6 3.8 2.5 2.2 55.5 7.8 6.3 
2
0
1
0
 
Mean% 151.2 2.6 0.1 -0.9 -4.3 -3.5 0.1 -0.1 0.0 1.3 0.0 -0.1 2.7 0.4 -0.4 -6.0 0.6 -0.4 
Median% 126.3 3.2 0.1 -0.8 -2.4 -1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 -3.2 0.6 -0.1 
Max% 451.3 35.5 26.3 22.4 33.0 48.5 1.1 0.8 0.1 7.1 3.0 1.6 18.3 18.3 4.5 141.3 16.3 18.7 
Min% -2.6 -22.4 -24.0 -24.8 -81.5 -58.6 0.0 -0.9 -1.1 0.0 -2.4 -2.9 0.0 -6.5 -17.1 -154.8 -38.4 -17.1 
SD% 92.6 9.7 7.4 7.3 17.8 16.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 1.5 0.7 0.7 4.1 2.4 3.0 44.8 7.4 4.8 
Source: Calculated by the researcher based on companies’ guides available in Amman stock exchange website for several years. 
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Table 3.3 
Correlation Matrix for the Research Variables 
 
The dependent variable is the firm’s value (Vt), The independent variables are; Firm’s earnings (Et); Change in the firm’s earning from the previous year (dEt); Change in the 
firm’s earning between the current year and the next year (dEt+1); Firm’s research and development expenses (RDt); Change in the firm’s research and development expenses 
from the previous year (dRDt); Change in the firm’s research and development expenses between the current year and the next year (dRDt+1); Firm’s interest expenses (It); 
Change in the firm’s interest expenses from the previous year (dIt); Change in the firm’s interest expenses between the current year and the next year (dIt+1); Firm’s cash 
dividend (Dt); Change in the firm’s cash dividend from the previous year (dDt); Change in the firm’s cash dividend between the current year and the next year (dDt+1); 
Change in the firm’s value from the previous year (dVt); Change in the firm’s cash assets from the previous year (dCAt); Change in the firm’s cash assets between the current 
year and the next year (dCAt+1); Change in the firm’s non cash assets from the previous year (dNAt); Change in the firm’s non cash assets between the current year and the 
next year (dNAt+1). All divided by the total assets. For the period from 2001 to 2010. 
 
 Vt Et dEt dEt+1 RDt dRDt dRDt+1 It dIt dIt+1 Dt dDt dDt+1 dVt dCAt dCAt+1 dNAt dNAt+1 
Vt 1.00 
                 Et 0.54 1.00 
                dEt 0.11 0.50 1.00 
               dEt+1 -0.01 -0.34 -0.35 1.00 
              RDt 0.57 0.73 0.27 -0.11 1.00 
             dRDt 0.07 0.28 0.58 -0.12 0.50 1.00 
            dRDt+1 -0.02 -0.13 -0.14 0.57 -0.25 -0.22 1.00 
           It -0.28 -0.18 -0.02 0.02 -0.27 0.01 0.02 1.00 
          dIt 0.10 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.08 1.00 
         dIt+1 0.09 0.07 0.01 -0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.35 0.06 1.00 
        Dt 0.54 0.62 0.12 -0.04 0.66 0.10 -0.04 -0.29 0.01 0.02 1.00 
       dDt 0.06 0.19 0.38 -0.07 0.17 0.39 -0.07 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.37 1.00 
      dDt+1 0.05 -0.02 -0.04 0.30 -0.02 -0.01 0.31 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.26 -0.21 1.00 
     dVt 0.41 0.38 0.39 -0.06 0.30 0.36 0.02 -0.10 0.07 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.11 1.00 
    dCAt 0.04 0.14 0.22 -0.08 0.14 0.25 -0.11 -0.03 -0.04 0.10 0.06 0.31 0.02 0.17 1.00 
   dCAt+1 0.06 0.04 -0.02 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.18 0.01 -0.04 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 0.19 0.06 -0.15 1.00 
  dNAt 0.11 0.24 0.21 -0.08 0.12 0.14 -0.02 -0.09 0.19 0.21 0.05 0.11 0.01 0.52 -0.06 0.04 1.00 
 dNAt+1 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.12 -0.07 -0.01 0.16 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.11 0.04 0.19 0.04 1.00 
Source: Calculated by the researcher based on companies’ guides available in Amman stock exchange website for several years. 
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The estimated results of the research model are presented in table 3.4. We used the fixed-
effect model to obtain the results from the empirical data. The benefits of using the fixed-
effect model over using the pooling ordinary least squares model or the random effect model 
are that, under the fixed-effect model, the constant (intercept) is allowed to vary over each 
individual unit, time or both. This will help to eliminate the individual effect of the intercept. 
Then the necessary tests to check whether the fixed-effect model is the appropriate model or 
not will be performed to ensure that it is the right model. 
 
So, it is very important to check whether the fixed-effect model is the most appropriate model 
to use. To do so, we need to run two kinds of test. The first one is the likelihood ratio test, 
which is a test to check whether the fixed-effect model is better than the pooling ordinary 
least squares model or not. If the result of this test is significant, this will mean that the fixed-
effect model is preferred to the pooling ordinary least squares model; if it is not significant 
then we should not use the result from the fixed-effect model. Table 3.5 shows the results of 
the likelihood ratio test; as we see from the table, the results are significant at the 1% level 
which means we can use the results from the fixed-effect model. 
 
Another important test is the Hausman test, which tests whether the fixed-effect model is 
better than the random effect model. Again, if the result of this test is significant, this will 
mean that the fixed-effect model is preferred to the random effect model. Table 3.6 shows the 
results of the Hausman test; from the table we can see that it is significant at the 1% level, 
which again means that the fixed-effect model is preferred to the random effect model. From 
both tests, we can accept that the most appropriate model to use is the fixed-effect model. 
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Table 3.4 
Regression results fixed effect model 
 
The dependent variable is the firm’s value (Vt), The independent variables are; Firm’s earnings (Et); Change in 
the firm’s earning from the previous year (dEt); Change in the firm’s earning between the current year and the 
next year (dEt+1); Firm’s research and development expenses (RDt); Change in the firm’s research and 
development expenses from the previous year (dRDt); Change in the firm’s research and development expenses 
between the current year and the next year (dRDt+1); Firm’s interest expenses (It); Change in the firm’s interest 
expenses from the previous year (dIt); Change in the firm’s interest expenses between the current year and the 
next year (dIt+1); Firm’s cash dividend (Dt); Change in the firm’s cash dividend from the previous year (dDt); 
Change in the firm’s cash dividend between the current year and the next year (dDt+1); Change in the firm’s 
value from the previous year (dVt); Change in the firm’s cash assets from the previous year (dCAt); Change in 
the firm’s cash assets between the current year and the next year (dCAt+1); Change in the firm’s non cash assets 
from the previous year (dNAt); Change in the firm’s non cash assets between the current year and the next year 
(dNAt+1). All divided by the total assets. For the period from 2001 to 2010. ***, **, * indicate coefficients are 
significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity using 
White's (1980) correction. 
 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
C 1.1958*** 23.6698 
E 0.5304 1.0030 
dEt -0.0003 -0.0008 
dEt+1 0.1083 0.3813 
dNAt -0.5340*** -6.2712 
dNAt+1 -0.0016 -0.0718 
RD 162.1135*** 5.9287 
dRDt -101.8884*** -4.7938 
dRDt+1 16.4444 1.3373 
I 4.0438 1.5746 
dIt 0.9802 0.4601 
dIt+1 3.3031 1.6402 
D 0.0170 0.0143 
dDt 0.5524 0.7771 
dDt+1 -0.1619 -0.2266 
dVt 0.5453*** 9.0994 
dCAt -0.5167*** -2.4581 
dCAt+1 0.0774 0.5196 
Adjusted R square 75.28%  
F statistic 24.1742***  
Observation 800  
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Table 3.5 
Likelihood ratio test 
 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section and period fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 8.3851 -79,694 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 536.1090 79 0.0000 
Period F 18.7662 -9,694 0.0000 
Period Chi-square 174.2578 9 0.0000 
Cross-Section/Period F 9.5669 -88,694 0.0000 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 635.5110 88 0.0000 
     
      
Table 3.6 
Hausman test 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 76.9369 17 0.0000 
     
     
 
Having found the most appropriate model, we can start the model analysis, and our main 
concern is to test how the change in cash will affect the value of the firm. The result shows 
that the coefficient of the change in cash variable is -0.52, significant at the 1% level, which 
means that changing the cash level has a negative effect on the firm’s value. To be more 
specific, this result means a one JD increase in cash will result in a -0.52 JD in firm value, 
although this result supports the free cash flow theory, which suggests that, when there is 
high asymmetric information, the marginal value of cash-holding will decrease; however, this 
result showed a very strong and unusual relationship since we expected to find a positive 
relationship with low value in the case of high asymmetric information or low investor 
protection, and a higher positive coefficient when asymmetric information is low or the 
investors have higher protection. Another important result is that the dividend and the change 
in dividend have no significant effect on the firm’s value, which means that using the 
available resources to pay a cash dividend to the shareholders will not have a significant 
effect on firm value; again, this is an unexpected and unusual result. The overall model has a 
very high adjusted R square value of 75.28% which means the dependent variables explained 
about 75% of the relationship; also the model is significant at the 1% level with an F statistic 
of 24.17. These unusual results cast serious doubt on whether the Fama and French (1998) 
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model is the best or correct model to investigate our data set, especially if we compare these 
results with those of other researchers who used the same model on different sets of data. 
 
This model has also been used by several researchers such as Pinkowitz and Williamson 
(2005), Pinkowitz et al. (2006), Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), Kalcheva and Lins (2007), 
Kisser (2009), and others. By taking the value of the firm as the dependent variable and using 
the cash ratio and the change in cash ratio as independent variables plus several control 
variables including earnings, research and development, interest expenses, dividend, change 
in the firm value, and non-cash assets, Pinkowitz and Williamson (2005) found this 
coefficient to be 0.45. Pinkowitz et al. (2006) found that this value is 0.33 for high-corruption 
firms and 0.29 for poor anti-director firms. In their study, Faulkender and Wang (2006) found 
that this coefficient ranges between 0.75 and 1.47. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) found 
that the change in cash coefficient ranged between 0.69 and 1.39. Kisser (2009) found that, 
for the zero leverage firms, the coefficient of the change in cash is 1.03. Tong (2011) found 
this coefficient to be equal to 1.39. Masulis et al. (2009) found the value of this coefficient to 
be between 1.05 and 1.11. Denis and Sibilkov (2010) found a coefficient range between 0.63 
and 1.02. Drobetz et al. (2010) found that, for emerging markets, this coefficient is equal to 
0.29, while Haw et al. (2011) found that the coefficient is 2.39. 
 
3.4.2. The level of cash model 
 
In this section we will use the same model used by Fama and French (1998) but now we will 
conduct the analysis on how the cash level itself will affect the firm value rather than the 
change in cash level as we did in the previous model. This model has been developed based 
on Fama and French’s (1998) valuation model. 
 
In addition to the basic analysis from the previous model (i.e. the one concerned with the 
change in the cash level), in this model, instead of using the change in cash from the previous 
year and the change in cash between the current and the next year, we will replace those two 
terms with a new variable which is the cash ratio (cash and cash equivalents to total assets). 
Table 3.7 shows the descriptive analysis for the new variable. The most interesting result in 
this table is that the cash ratio in the last three years (2008, 2009 and 2010) starts to increase 
and in all of those years it has been higher than the average value of 9.3%. These increases in 
the cash ratio might be a result of the financial crisis; cash has become more appreciated 
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because debt-financing since the crisis has become more difficult, so many firms have started 
to accumulate more cash for use as a source of financing. 
 
Since we changed the structure of the variables, the new correlation matrix from the new data 
can be seen in table 3.8. From table 3.8 we can see that the new variable (i.e. cash ratio) has a 
low correlation with the other independent variables, except with the dividend where the 
coefficient is 0.50; this high coefficient can be explained by the fact that firms with more 
available cash can afford to pay dividends to their shareholders, and with more cash available 
those firms can pay more dividends. 
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Table 3.7 
Descriptive analysis 
 
The independent variables are; Firm’s cash assets (Ct) measures as cash divided by the total assets descriptive analysis. 
For the period from 2001 to 2010 and year by year from 2001 to 2010. 
 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2001-2010 
Mean% 8.9 10.2 8.9 7.8 9.2 9.1 8.5 9.4 9.7 10.8 9.3 
Median% 4.1 3.4 4.2 3.9 4.9 5.8 4.6 4.9 5.3 7.1 4.9 
Max% 48.5 51.8 52.0 38.9 39.9 48.5 50.7 52.0 66.4 63.7 66.4 
Min% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
SD% 12.1 13.1 11.0 9.6 10.4 9.8 10.0 11.8 11.9 11.5 11.2 
Obs. 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 800 
Source: Calculated by the researcher based on companies’ guides available in Amman stock exchange website for several years.  
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Table 3.8 
Correlation Matrix for the Research Variables 
 
The dependent variable is the firm’s value (Vt), The independent variables are; Firm’s earnings (Et); Change in the firm’s earning from the previous year (dEt); Change in the 
firm’s earning between the current year and the next year (dEt+1); Firm’s research and development expenses (RDt); Change in the firm’s research and development expenses 
from the previous year (dRDt); Change in the firm’s research and development expenses between the current year and the next year (dRDt+1); Firm’s interest expenses (It); 
Change in the firm’s interest expenses from the previous year (dIt); Change in the firm’s interest expenses between the current year and the next year (dIt+1); Firm’s cash 
dividend (Dt); Change in the firm’s cash dividend from the previous year (dDt); Change in the firm’s cash dividend between the current year and the next year (dDt+1); 
Change in the firm’s value from the previous year (dVt); Firm’s cash assets (Ct); Change in the firm’s non cash assets from the previous year (dNAt); Change in the firm’s 
non cash assets between the current year and the next year (dNAt+1). All divided by the total assets. For the period from 2001 to 2010. 
 
 
Vt Et dEt dEt+1 dNAt dNAt+1 RDt dRDt dRDt+1 It dIt dIt+1 Dt dDt dDt+1 dVt Ct 
Vt 1.00 
                Et 0.54 1.00 
               dEt 0.11 0.50 1.00 
              dEt+1 -0.01 -0.34 -0.35 1.00 
             dNAt 0.11 0.24 0.21 -0.08 1.00 
            dNAt+1 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.04 1.00 
           RDt 0.57 0.73 0.27 -0.11 0.12 0.03 1.00 
          dRDt 0.07 0.28 0.58 -0.12 0.14 0.02 0.50 1.00 
         dRDt+1 -0.02 -0.13 -0.14 0.57 -0.02 0.12 -0.25 -0.22 1.00 
        It -0.28 -0.18 -0.02 0.02 -0.09 -0.07 -0.27 0.01 0.02 1.00 
       dIt 0.10 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.19 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.08 1.00 
      dIt+1 0.09 0.07 0.01 -0.04 0.21 0.16 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.35 0.06 1.00 
     Dt 0.54 0.62 0.12 -0.04 0.05 -0.01 0.66 0.10 -0.04 -0.29 0.01 0.02 1.00 
    dDt 0.06 0.19 0.38 -0.07 0.11 -0.01 0.17 0.39 -0.07 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.37 1.00 
   dDt+1 0.05 -0.02 -0.04 0.30 0.01 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 0.31 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.26 -0.21 1.00 
  dVt 0.41 0.38 0.39 -0.06 0.52 0.11 0.30 0.36 0.02 -0.10 0.07 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.11 1.00 
 Ct 0.33 0.32 0.02 -0.01 -0.07 0.04 0.35 -0.01 -0.03 -0.27 0.00 0.03 0.50 0.06 0.00 0.09 1.00 
Source: Calculated by the researcher based on companies’ guides available in Amman stock exchange website for several years. 
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Table 3.9 shows the fixed-effect regression model results, which have been estimated from 
the model concerned with the level of cash itself rather than the mere change in cash level. 
We also checked whether the fixed-effect model is the best model to use or whether we 
should use either the random effect model or the pooling ordinary least squares model. By 
running the likelihood ratio test we obtained significant values for the results, which suggest 
that the fixed-effect model is better than the pooling ordinary least squares model; the results 
of the likelihood ratio test are shown in table 3.10. Then, by running the Hausman test, we 
also obtained a significant result which again suggests that the fixed-effect model is preferred 
to the random effect model; the results of the Hausman test are presented in table 3.11. 
 
Again, we are looking at the effect of cash on the value of the firm and, from the table, we 
can see that this variable has a significant negative effect on the value of the firm, with a 
coefficient of -0.62 significant at the 10% level. The results also support the free cash flow 
theory, which suggests that cash has a decreasing value when it is associated with asymmetric 
information. For this model, dividend and change in dividend have no significant effect on 
the firm value. The model as a whole is significant at the 1% level, with an F statistic of 
28.61 and a high adjusted R square of 75.73%. 
 
This negative sign of the cash level coefficient means that cash-holding is reducing the value 
of the firm; again, this is an unusual result especially given that other researchers who applied 
the same model on different data sets found that this coefficient is low and positive for firms 
in countries with low investor protection or high asymmetric information, while it becomes 
higher when asymmetric information is reduced or when investor protection becomes higher. 
 
From the results of this model and the previous model, we can infer that Fama and French’s 
(1998) model was not a good model to examine the contribution of cash to the firm’s value. 
In the next section, we will use an alternative model to examine how cash contributes to the 
firm value. 
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Table 3.9 
Regression results fixed effect model 
 
The dependent variable is the firm’s value (Vt), The independent variables are; Firm’s earnings (Et); Change in 
the firm’s earning from the previous year (dEt); Change in the firm’s earning between the current year and the 
next year (dEt+1); Firm’s research and development expenses (RDt); Change in the firm’s research and 
development expenses from the previous year (dRDt); Change in the firm’s research and development expenses 
between the current year and the next year (dRDt+1); Firm’s interest expenses (It); Change in the firm’s interest 
expenses from the previous year (dIt); Change in the firm’s interest expenses between the current year and the 
next year (dIt+1); Firm’s cash dividend (Dt); Change in the firm’s cash dividend from the previous year (dDt); 
Change in the firm’s cash dividend between the current year and the next year (dIt+1); Change in the firm’s value 
from the previous year (dVt); Firm’s cash assets (Ct); Change in the firm’s non cash assets from the previous 
year (dNAt); Change in the firm’s non cash assets between the current year and the next year (dNAt+1). All 
divided by the total assets. For the period from 2001 to 2010. ***, **, * indicate coefficients are significant at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity using White's (1980) 
correction. 
 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
C 1.2318*** 20.4435 
E 0.5688 1.0460 
dEt -0.0360 -0.9496 
dEt+1 0.1126 0.3970 
dNAt -0.5169*** -5.6488 
dNAt+1 0.0084 0.4448 
RD 156.6745*** 5.8051 
dRDt -102.1136*** -4.8354 
dRDt+1 15.2788 1.1917 
I 3.5536 1.2851 
dIt 1.1185 0.5021 
dIt+1 2.4000 1.1886 
D 1.1683 1.1125 
dDt -0.0895 -0.1389 
dDt+1 0.1061 0.1495 
dVt 0.5364*** 8.8781 
Ct -0.6248* -1.9584 
R square 75.37%  
F statistic 24.5157***  
Observation 800  
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Table 3.10 
Likelihood ratio test 
 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section and period fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 8.5739 -79,695 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 544.2891 79 0.0000 
Period F 18.6239 -9,695 0.0000 
Period Chi-square 172.8455 9 0.0000 
Cross-Section/Period F 9.6914 -88,695 0.0000 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 640.5643 88 0.0000 
     
     
 
Table 3.11 
Hausman test 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 71.6102 16 0.0000 
     
      
3.4.3. The stock’s excess return model 
 
In this section we will present the results of an alternative model. This model has been 
developed by Faulkender and Wang (2006) and uses the excess return on the stock as a 
measurement of the wealth of the shareholders rather than using the value of the firm as in 
the previous models. 
 
Table 3.12 shows the basic descriptive analysis of the Faulkender and Wang (2006) model 
variables. The results in this table cover the period from the year 2001 to the year 2011. The 
original data cover the period from the year 2000 to the year 2011. We lose one year of data 
as some of the research variables need to be calculated as the change value between the 
current and the previous year. The value of the dependent variable ranges between -132% and 
594%, with an average value of -0.59% and a high standard deviation of 55.7%. For the 
independent variables, the change in the cash ratio ranges between -222% and 245% with an 
average value of 1.16% and a standard deviation of 22%. The lag value of the cash ratio 
ranges between 0% and 341% with an average value of 12.3% and a standard deviation of 
29%. The product of the change in the cash ratio and the lag value of the cash ratio ranges 
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between -748% and 491%, with an average value of -0.94% and a standard deviation of 36%. 
The product of the change in the cash ratio and the market leverage ranges between -132% 
and 169%, with an average value of 0.67% and a standard deviation of 13%. The change in 
the dividend ranges between -21% and 36% with an average value of 0.3% and a relatively 
small standard deviation compared to the other variables of only 3%. 
 
Table 3.13 shows the same descriptive analysis for those variables year by year to provide a 
better understanding of those variables and whether there are any big changes in them. 
 
Table 3.14 shows the correlation matrix between the research variables. By looking at table 
3.14 we can see that the correlation coefficients between the research variables are small. 
Apart from the high correlations between cash and the variables resulting from the 
combination of cash and other variables, there are only a few high correlations; there is a high 
correlation between non-cash assets and new financing, as new financing is normally used to 
buy fixed assets (non-cash assets). Earnings and research and development also have high 
correlations since Jordanian firms only assign research and development expenses from the 
firm’s earnings if the firm has positive earnings.  
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Table 3.12 
Descriptive analysis (model 3) 
 
The dependent variable is the stock’s excess return (ri,t – Ri,t), The independent variables are; Change in the cash ratio between time t and time t-1 (ΔCi,t); Change in firm’s 
earnings between time t and time t-1 (ΔEi,t); Change in non cash assets between time t and time t-1 (ΔNAi,t); Change in the research and development expenses between time t 
and time t-1 (ΔRDi,t); Change in interest expenses between time t and time t-1 (ΔIi,t); : Change in the cash dividends between time t and time t-1 (ΔDi,t); Cash ratio in the time 
t-1 (Ci,t-1); Market leverage in the time t (Li,t); Net financing in the time t (NFi,t). All divided by the equity market value in the time t-1 (Mi,t-1), expect for the Market leverage 
(Li,t). For the period from 2001 to 2011. 
 
 
ri,t – Ri,t ΔCi,t ΔEi,t ΔNAi,t ΔRDi,t ΔIi,t ΔDi,t Ci,t-1 Li,t NFi,t Ci,t-1 × ΔCi,t Li,t × ΔCi,t 
Mean -0.59% 1.16% 4.01% 8.20% 0.04% -0.44% 0.27% 12.27% 27.72% 8.78% -0.94% 0.67% 
Median -5.54% 0.11% 0.27% 1.31% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5.02% 20.66% 0.84% 0.00% 0.02% 
Max 594.08% 244.87% 602.18% 2755.17% 9.16% 19.93% 35.60% 340.89% 99.18% 4798.61% 491.53% 169.24% 
Min -131.76% -222.41% -200.70% -933.14% -0.81% -70.85% -20.88% 0.00% 0.19% -930.20% -748.46% -131.65% 
SD 55.72% 21.78% 37.44% 128.55% 0.39% 4.08% 2.88% 29.37% 23.20% 184.67% 35.96% 12.68% 
Obs. 880 880 880 880 880 880 880 880 880 880 880 880 
Source: Calculated by the researcher based on companies’ guides available in Amman stock exchange website for several years. 
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Table 3.13 
Descriptive analysis (model 3) 
 
The dependent variable is the stock’s excess return (ri,t – Ri,t), The independent variables are; Change in the cash ratio between time t and time t-1 (ΔCi,t); Change in firm’s 
earnings between time t and time t-1 (ΔEi,t); Change in non cash assets between time t and time t-1 (ΔNAi,t); Change in the research and development expenses between time t 
and time t-1 (ΔRDi,t); Change in interest expenses between time t and time t-1 (ΔIi,t); : Change in the cash dividends between time t and time t-1 (ΔDi,t); Cash ratio in the time 
t-1 (Ci,t-1); Market leverage in the time t (Li,t); Net financing in the time t (NFi,t). All divided by the equity market value in the time t-1 (Mi,t-1), expect for the Market leverage 
(Li,t). For the period from 2001 to 2009. 
 
 
 
ri,t – Ri,t ΔCi,t ΔEi,t ΔNAi,t ΔRDi,t ΔIi,t ΔDi,t Ci,t-1 Li,t NFi,t Ci,t-1 × ΔCi,t Li,t × ΔCi,t 
2
0
0
1
 
Mean -20.66% 0.74% 11.51% 4.48% 0.16% -1.23% 1.12% 16.32% 33.47% -1.74% -3.72% 0.73% 
Median -29.01% 0.07% 0.84% 1.50% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5.32% 29.52% 0.40% 0.00% 0.02% 
Max 180.70% 211.14% 602.18% 385.58% 9.16% 6.45% 35.60% 175.04% 92.67% 282.87% 17.25% 148.64% 
Min -99.97% -99.03% -89.80% -243.26% -0.45% -22.93% -5.37% 0.00% 1.82% -268.20% -123.66% -73.40% 
SD 41.06% 29.85% 70.17% 61.64% 1.03% 4.32% 4.59% 31.76% 23.57% 59.37% 18.89% 19.76% 
2
0
0
2
 
Mean 13.22% 3.67% 5.01% -1.37% 0.05% -1.21% -0.10% 16.95% 32.05% 0.77% 4.24% 0.53% 
Median -1.81% 0.04% 0.24% -0.67% 0.00% -0.17% 0.00% 5.70% 23.69% 0.07% 0.00% 0.01% 
Max 159.05% 244.87% 262.26% 318.78% 0.55% 7.01% 8.06% 340.89% 92.07% 319.61% 416.04% 27.63% 
Min -43.93% -70.89% -35.37% -313.02% -0.51% -35.40% -20.88% 0.00% 1.91% -152.78% -56.05% -13.57% 
SD 38.63% 30.03% 32.19% 60.24% 0.14% 4.59% 2.88% 43.08% 25.10% 55.37% 46.84% 4.72% 
2
0
0
3
 
Mean -6.77% -3.33% 3.42% 5.10% 0.11% -0.65% 0.03% 16.89% 26.70% -2.79% -10.56% -0.38% 
Median -27.35% 0.14% 0.57% 3.99% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 6.55% 18.52% -0.19% 0.00% 0.02% 
Max 594.08% 30.90% 168.78% 261.63% 3.39% 8.86% 7.23% 336.51% 85.10% 115.96% 11.72% 15.36% 
Min -131.76% -222.41% -200.70% -353.17% -0.56% -24.24% -5.37% 0.00% 1.17% -202.07% -748.46% -45.38% 
SD 91.47% 27.07% 40.28% 63.52% 0.47% 3.27% 1.43% 40.70% 22.50% 34.58% 83.36% 6.74% 
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Table 3.13 Continued 
 
 
 
ri,t – Ri,t ΔCi,t ΔEi,t ΔNAi,t ΔRDi,t ΔIi,t ΔDi,t Ci,t-1 Li,t NFi,t Ci,t-1 × ΔCi,t Li,t × ΔCi,t 
2
0
0
4
 
Mean -19.69% 2.93% 9.15% 36.66% 0.17% -0.42% 1.20% 8.72% 25.35% 25.64% 0.04% 2.25% 
Median -29.93% 0.10% 1.51% 7.54% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 4.68% 14.09% 1.60% 0.00% 0.01% 
Max 175.92% 109.21% 177.66% 981.05% 1.86% 11.16% 17.82% 53.62% 90.21% 969.47% 12.47% 93.68% 
Min -95.84% -29.21% -19.37% -93.44% -0.23% -20.00% -5.22% 0.00% 0.66% -123.77% -15.66% -7.30% 
SD 53.88% 16.79% 28.26% 128.59% 0.42% 3.20% 3.77% 10.64% 23.33% 125.71% 3.13% 11.62% 
2
0
0
5
 
Mean -20.41% 2.51% 2.83% 5.68% 0.01% 0.03% 0.13% 7.38% 19.78% -11.13% -0.57% 0.44% 
Median -43.52% 1.10% 1.78% 7.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.55% 14.52% 1.56% 0.01% 0.09% 
Max 458.92% 89.55% 103.70% 337.88% 0.58% 19.93% 13.86% 78.42% 78.62% 131.90% 40.66% 50.50% 
Min -106.67% -63.65% -21.19% -799.42% -0.81% -11.49% -16.38% 0.00% 0.54% -843.54% -49.91% -27.95% 
SD 82.94% 17.38% 13.86% 102.55% 0.18% 2.94% 3.41% 12.22% 18.06% 117.61% 7.91% 7.79% 
2
0
0
6
 
Mean 14.93% 0.49% -1.28% 3.91% -0.02% 0.19% 0.33% 6.70% 23.22% 9.75% -0.25% 0.37% 
Median 6.68% 0.07% -0.30% 1.87% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 3.40% 17.90% 3.04% 0.00% 0.02% 
Max 269.07% 23.78% 32.99% 48.66% 0.40% 3.03% 9.03% 72.27% 88.88% 158.92% 1.00% 10.14% 
Min -38.75% -17.48% -38.53% -43.89% -0.35% -3.33% -6.27% 0.02% 1.10% -20.20% -12.63% -5.58% 
SD 43.25% 5.68% 8.65% 13.58% 0.10% 0.89% 2.15% 9.96% 19.73% 25.07% 1.55% 1.94% 
2
0
0
7
 
Mean 3.95% 0.51% 3.92% 6.67% 0.03% -0.12% 0.29% 8.14% 22.68% 7.53% -0.47% -0.04% 
Median -12.58% 0.13% 1.44% 5.10% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 5.29% 19.59% 1.88% 0.00% 0.01% 
Max 253.37% 81.54% 234.60% 295.17% 0.46% 5.52% 16.02% 75.25% 92.37% 495.73% 7.65% 32.87% 
Min -69.35% -51.12% -88.34% -362.78% -0.31% -32.71% -5.35% 0.00% 0.37% -350.50% -38.47% -47.22% 
SD 57.57% 12.51% 28.57% 54.96% 0.11% 3.84% 2.56% 10.32% 17.97% 69.37% 4.53% 6.67% 
2
0
0
8
 
Mean 18.24% 4.16% -3.57% 24.60% 0.01% 0.32% -0.32% 6.90% 28.01% 23.28% -0.22% 2.21% 
Median 10.79% 0.02% -0.55% 3.13% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.89% 22.41% 3.01% 0.00% 0.00% 
Max 341.61% 213.61% 38.75% 742.44% 0.62% 9.86% 10.49% 37.59% 94.20% 882.48% 5.67% 150.72% 
Min -46.35% -28.56% -63.27% -101.02% -0.27% -5.08% -7.25% 0.00% 0.53% -201.87% -10.74% -13.47% 
SD 51.37% 26.81% 16.26% 118.38% 0.13% 1.57% 2.43% 7.82% 22.64% 132.58% 1.79% 17.63% 
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Table 3.13 Continued 
 
 
 
ri,t – Ri,t ΔCi,t ΔEi,t ΔNAi,t ΔRDi,t ΔIi,t ΔDi,t Ci,t-1 Li,t NFi,t Ci,t-1 × ΔCi,t Li,t × ΔCi,t 
2
0
0
9
 
Mean 5.20% 0.22% 6.50% 2.31% -0.02% -0.13% 0.21% 10.79% 28.98% 3.58% 0.09% 0.20% 
Median 2.01% 0.22% -0.86% -2.05% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5.47% 25.85% -0.46% 0.00% 0.03% 
Max 134.96% 71.38% 229.45% 352.50% 0.46% 3.66% 7.69% 103.20% 97.45% 333.75% 73.66% 65.84% 
Min -54.85% -50.82% -42.71% -140.07% -0.80% -10.06% -7.16% 0.00% 0.19% -260.54% -26.22% -26.52% 
SD 35.22% 12.33% 35.90% 46.25% 0.15% 1.50% 2.34% 17.34% 23.47% 53.86% 9.18% 8.78% 
2
0
1
0
 
Mean 3.35% 0.03% 0.46% -3.16% -0.05% -0.24% 0.16% 13.27% 30.54% 6.69% -3.88% -0.45% 
Median -0.51% 0.34% 0.16% -1.59% -0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 6.51% 25.58% 0.40% 0.00% 0.03% 
Max 104.36% 58.75% 118.05% 663.23% 0.61% 5.34% 5.04% 174.99% 99.18% 711.10% 22.69% 58.27% 
Min -64.93% -174.33% -39.34% -370.16% -0.67% -19.10% -5.22% 0.00% 0.84% -173.40% -305.07% -131.65% 
SD 33.68% 21.80% 16.28% 90.38% 0.15% 2.45% 1.12% 27.59% 25.81% 85.68% 34.10% 16.60% 
2
0
1
1
 
Mean 2.21% 0.79% 6.12% 5.35% -0.02% -1.37% -0.10% 22.94% 34.13% 35.00% 4.91% 1.46% 
Median 3.57% -0.05% -0.66% -1.35% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 7.60% 27.92% -0.08% 0.00% 0.00% 
Max 76.47% 188.57% 539.63% 2755.17% 0.92% 13.77% 7.86% 330.83% 96.45% 4798.61% 491.53% 169.24% 
Min -52.24% -45.49% -80.84% -933.14% -0.68% -70.85% -10.26% 0.00% 0.31% -930.20% -117.72% -43.87% 
SD 23.80% 23.00% 62.81% 338.15% 0.14% 9.17% 2.84% 55.54% 26.45% 550.02% 56.63% 19.84% 
Source: Calculated by the researcher based on companies’ guides available in Amman stock exchange website for several years. 
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Table 3.14 
Correlation Matrix for the Research Variables (model 3) 
 
The dependent variable is the stock’s excess return (ri,t – Ri,t), The independent variables are; Change in the cash ratio between time t and time t-1 (ΔCi,t); Change in firm’s 
earnings between time t and time t-1 (ΔEi,t); Change in non cash assets between time t and time t-1 (ΔNAi,t); Change in the research and development expenses between time t 
and time t-1 (ΔRDi,t); Change in interest expenses between time t and time t-1 (ΔIi,t); : Change in the cash dividends between time t and time t-1 (ΔDi,t); Cash ratio in the time 
t-1 (Ci,t-1); Market leverage in the time t (Li,t); Net financing in the time t (NFi,t). All divided by the equity market value in the time t-1 (Mi,t-1), expect for the Market leverage 
(Li,t). For the period from 2001 to 2011. 
 
 ri,t – Ri,t ΔCi,t ΔEi,t ΔNAi,t ΔRDi,t ΔIi,t ΔDi,t Ci,t-1 Li,t NFi,t Ci,t-1 × ΔCi,t Li,t × ΔCi,t 
ri,t – Ri,t 1.00 
           ΔCi,t 0.04 1.00 
          ΔEi,t 0.12 0.24 1.00 
         ΔNAi,t 0.10 0.25 -0.02 1.00 
        ΔRDi,t 0.18 0.28 0.62 0.01 1.00 
       ΔIi,t -0.02 -0.04 -0.54 0.35 -0.27 1.00 
      ΔDi,t 0.08 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.15 -0.07 1.00 
     Ci,t-1 0.05 -0.17 0.22 0.07 0.05 -0.28 0.05 1.00 
    Li,t -0.09 0.07 0.12 0.10 0.07 -0.18 -0.03 0.17 1.00 
   NFi,t 0.03 0.32 -0.08 0.91 -0.06 0.28 -0.02 0.18 0.13 1.00 
  Ci,t-1 × ΔCi,t 0.04 0.70 0.01 0.28 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.19 0.01 0.41 1.00 
 Li,t × ΔCi,t 0.01 0.85 0.33 0.44 0.33 -0.03 0.00 -0.07 0.10 0.47 0.49 1.00 
Source: Calculated by the researcher based on companies’ guides available in Amman stock exchange website for several years. 
  
130 
 
Table 3.15 shows the regression results of our third model using the fixed-effect model. As 
with the previous two models, we need to check whether the fixed-effect model is the best 
model to use or we whether should use either the random effect model or the pooling ordinary 
least squares model, using the likelihood ratio and Hausman test. 
 
Table 3.15 
Regression results of the fixed effect (model 3) 
 
              
     
      
    
     
      
    
      
      
    
      
      
    
     
      
    
     
      
    
      
      
         
     
     
      
     
      
      
 
     
      
          
     
      
       
 
The dependent variable is the stock’s excess return (ri,t – Ri,t), The independent variables are; Change in the cash 
ratio between time t and time t-1 (ΔCi,t); Change in firm’s earnings between time t and time t-1 (ΔEi,t); Change in 
non cash assets between time t and time t-1 (ΔNAi,t); Change in the research and development expenses between 
time t and time t-1 (ΔRDi,t); Change in interest expenses between time t and time t-1 (ΔIi,t); : Change in the cash 
dividends between time t and time t-1 (ΔDi,t); Cash ratio in the time t-1 (Ci,t-1); Market leverage in the time t 
(Li,t); Net financing in the time t (NFi,t). All divided by the equity market value in the time t-1 (Mi,t-1), expect for 
the Market leverage (Li,t). For the period from 2001 to 2011. ***, **, * indicate coefficients are significant at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity using White's (1980) 
correction. 
 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
C 0.1985*** 4.8641 
ΔCi,t 0.4131* 1.8355 
ΔEi,t -0.0211 -0.2780 
ΔNAi,t 0.2855*** 6.8205 
ΔRDi,t 32.6477*** 5.3507 
ΔIi,t -0.9227 -1.4972 
ΔDi,t 0.7775 1.2476 
Ci,t-1 0.2582*** 3.1607 
Li,t -0.9360*** -7.1084 
NFi,t -0.1509*** -5.0230 
Ci,t-1 × ΔCi,t 0.1735** 2.0490 
Li,t × ΔCi,t -1.1924*** -3.4001 
R square 17.51%  
F statistic 2.8656***  
Observation 880  
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The results of the likelihood ratio test to compare between the fixed-effect model and the 
pooling ordinary least squares model, as shown in table 3.16, suggest that the fixed-effect 
model is preferred to the pooling ordinary least squares model. Then, by using the Hausman 
test to compare between the fixed-effect model and the random effect model, we also obtained 
a significant result which suggested that the fixed-effect model is preferred to the random 
effect model. The results of the Hausman test are presented in table 3.17. 
 
Table 3.16 
Likelihood ratio test 
 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section and period fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 1.0173 -79,779 0.4410 
Cross-section Chi-square 86.4028 79 0.2663 
Period F 10.2886 -10,779 0.0000 
Period Chi-square 109.1653 10 0.0000 
Cross-Section/Period F 1.9894 -89,779 0.0000 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 180.2267 89 0.0000 
     
      
 
Table 3.17 
Hausman test 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 38.6687 11 0.0001 
     
     
 
From table 3.15, we can observe the following points. Firstly, the coefficient of the change in 
cash assets variable (ΔCi,t) is positively significant and equal to 0.41; this suggests that, for 
each extra Jordanian Dinar (JD) invested in cash, shareholders value this one JD at a discount 
value equal to 0.41 JD. This result confirms what the free cash flow theory suggests: with 
higher amounts of cash inside the firm, managers can spend this cash in inefficient ways or on 
their personal interests, which will affect the shareholders of the firm badly. The problem of 
free cash flow will be worse if there is a high level of information asymmetry, a poor 
corporate governance system, or weak investor protection. Secondly, the coefficient of the 
lagged value of the cash assets variable (Ci,t-1) is also positively significant and equal to 0.26, 
suggesting that each JD invested in cash in the previous period will contribute 0.26 JD in the 
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current period. Thirdly, the product of (Li,t) and (ΔCi,t / Mi,t-1) has a significant negative 
coefficient of –1.19; this result suggests that, with a higher level of leverage, the marginal 
value of each JD invested in cash will decrease. The decrease in the marginal value of cash 
assets occurs because, with a higher level of leverage, the additional cash assets will serve the 
debt-holders, as it will guarantee that the debt-holders will get their money back, and the 
value added to these cash assets will go to the debt-holders but not to the equity-holders. 
Fourthly, the product of (Ci,t-1 / Mi,t-1) and (ΔCi,t / Mi,t-1) is positively significant; this variable 
is used to capture the effect of how the different level of cash will affect the marginal value of 
each JD invested in cash. We expected the coefficient to be negative since, with a higher level 
of cash-holding, any additional JD invested in cash will be valued less and less; also, with 
more cash accumulated inside the firm the likelihood of the free cash flow problem will 
increase. This significant positive relationship is the opposite of what we expected, as it 
showed that, with more cash invested in the firm, the value of the additional units of cash is 
increasing. This result looks unusual for a normal situation but if one considers the current 
situation in which all economies around the world have been hit by the financial crisis, 
holding extra cash might be a good thing for two reasons. First, due to the crisis, debt- and 
equity-financing have become more difficult, which means that firms must depend more on 
their internal financing sources; this makes cash more valuable for firms and every extra unit 
of cash will contribute positively to the firm’s value rather than having the expected negative 
effect in a normal situation. Second, cash represents a risk-free investment to the firm 
compared to investing in financial assets which have lost their value in the last few years 
because of the financial crisis. To gain a better understanding, we will perform some further 
analysis to comprehend the value associated with cash and the increase in cash. The last 
variable we will look at is the change in cash dividend. We expected this variable to be 
significantly positive, as cash paid to shareholders will reduce the amount of free cash flow 
available to the firm’s managers. This result might suggest that the cash dividend paid to the 
shareholders is not high enough to reduce the free cash flow problem. 
 
To gain a better understanding of the value of cash and the value of extra cash in the firm, we 
ran our regression model for the subsample up to the year 2007 before the crisis affected most 
of the firms. The result in table 3.18 shows the outcome for our model for the period from 
2001 to 2007. From table 18 we see many important points; firstly, cash is now valued at 0.94 
JD and it is significant at the 1% level. The first important question is how this coefficient 
differs from the one in table 3.15. To answer this question we performed the test to determine 
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whether they are significantly different; the absolute value of the t-statistic for the difference 
is 1.2893 (the p-value is approximately 0.20) which means those two coefficients are not 
statistically different. This gap in the value (0.94 and 0.41) is due to the method of 
measurement as we measure the value for the shareholders as excess return; the effect of the 
financial crisis on share prices and return makes the coefficient look smaller. The coefficient 
of the product of (Ci,t-1 / Mi,t-1) and (ΔCi,t / Mi,t-1) is insignificant which means that, before the 
crisis, the greater amount of cash that the firm retains will not contribute to the value and will 
only be an opportunity cost for the firm. 
 
To summarize, cash held by the firm is valued at a discount by the Jordanian shareholders; 
this is because, in the Jordanian capital market, there is no clear corporate governance system, 
which means that shareholders have less protection than they would have in developed 
markets. Thus, with no corporate governance system the likelihood of the free cash flow 
problem will increase, which explains the discounted value of cash. Higher levels of cash are 
important and contribute positively to the value only when cash becomes more difficult to 
obtain as the financial crisis hits many countries, banks, financial institutions and firms; in the 
normal situation, however, higher levels of cash were statically insignificant with respect to 
the value of the firm. Finally, dividends did not contribute to the shareholders’ value before or 
during the crisis; the possible reason for this insignificant effect is that those dividends are 
insufficient to cancel out the free cash flow problem. This implies that there is limited 
dividend smoothing, and that firms that pay dividends do not effectively commit to continuing 
to pay dividends in the future. 
 
Finally, having obtained the results from the three different models, we need to decide which 
one of them should be our main research model. As we can see, the third model (i.e. 
Faulkender and Wang’s (2006)) takes into consideration the risk factor by using the stock’s 
excess return over a benchmark return, avoiding the problem of finding an accurate 
replacement value for the firm’s assets when it uses the stock’s excess return rather than the 
market-to-book ratio. Also, unlike Fama and French (1998) the model by Faulkender and 
Wang (2006) has been developed specifically to investigate the contribution of cash-holding 
to the firm’s value. Also, the results obtained from Faulkender and Wang’s (2006) model 
compared to the results from Fama and French’s (1998) model are more consistent with the 
financial theories and literature dealing with the cash-holding value. On that basis, we believe 
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that the Faulkender and Wang (2006) model is the best model to use as our main research 
model. 
 
Table 3.18 
Regression results of the fixed effect (model 3) 
 
              
     
      
    
     
      
    
      
      
    
      
      
    
     
      
    
     
      
    
      
      
         
     
     
      
     
      
      
 
     
      
          
     
      
       
 
The dependent variable is the stock’s excess return (ri,t – Ri,t), The independent variables are; Change in the cash 
ratio between time t and time t-1 (ΔCi,t); Change in firm’s earnings between time t and time t-1 (ΔEi,t); Change in 
non cash assets between time t and time t-1 (ΔNAi,t); Change in the research and development expenses between 
time t and time t-1 (ΔRDi,t); Change in interest expenses between time t and time t-1 (ΔIi,t); : Change in the cash 
dividends between time t and time t-1 (ΔDi,t); Cash ratio in the time t-1 (Ci,t-1); Market leverage in the time t 
(Li,t); Net financing in the time t (NFi,t). All divided by the equity market value in the time t-1 (Mi,t-1), expect for 
the Market leverage (Li,t). For the period from 2001 to 2007. ***, **, * indicate coefficients are significant at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity using White's (1980) 
correction. 
 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
C 0.2104*** 3.4844 
ΔCi,t 0.9410*** 2.7508 
ΔEi,t -0.0467 -0.4008 
ΔNAi,t 0.5198*** 8.2044 
ΔRDi,t 38.8470*** 4.8978 
ΔIi,t -0.2709 -0.2996 
ΔDi,t 0.1169 0.1515 
Ci,t-1 0.1832 1.4718 
Li,t -1.2642*** -6.0278 
NFi,t -0.4286*** -6.9027 
Ci,t-1 × ΔCi,t 0.0923 0.7067 
Li,t × ΔCi,t -2.8286*** -4.7049 
Adjusted R square 26.85%  
F statistic 3.1371***  
Observation 560  
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3.4.4. Hypotheses analysis 
 
The first hypothesis; H1: cash is valued at a discount in the Jordanian financial market. 
 
The results confirm that cash-holding is valued at a discount from the investors’ point of view 
in the Jordan capital market. This result supports what we expect to find in the Jordan capital 
market and is consistent with what the free cash flow theory suggests: in markets with poor 
investor protection, higher levels of information asymmetric, and a weak corporate 
governance system, firm managers use the available cash inefficiently. This problem will 
cause investors to evaluate cash invested in the firm at a discounted value to its face value. 
 
The second hypothesis; H2: with higher levels of cash-holding the marginal value of cash-
holding will decrease. 
 
We expected to see a decreasing marginal value of the cash-holding with a higher level of 
cash-holding, since more cash inside the firm will increase the possibility of the free cash 
flow problem. Also, with a higher level of cash the firm becomes less willing to seek more 
cash and the additional value associated with an extra amount of cash will decrease. The 
result from our sample is insignificant for this relationship when we studied Jordanian firms 
before the crisis; this result suggests that, in the Jordanian capital market, investors do not 
differentiate between different levels of cash-holding. On the other hand, because of the 
financial crisis cash has become more difficult to obtain and the result from Jordanian firms 
showed that a higher level of cash contributes positively to the value. 
 
H3: with higher leverage, an additional pound of cash is less valuable to shareholders. 
 
With higher leverage, any increase in the cash level will make the firm less risky since it will 
increase the likelihood of the debt-holders being paid back; from the stock-holders’ point of 
view, this situation will cause the additional value of the firm resulting from the higher level 
of cash to benefit the debt-holders. So, stock-holders will increasingly reduce their valuation 
of the additional JD. The result confirms this expectation and we found that, with higher 
leverage, the value of additional JD invested in cash is decreasing. 
 
The fourth hypothesis; H4: the dividend has a positive effect on the firm value. 
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In markets with poor investor protection, weak corporate governance systems, high 
information asymmetry and free cash flow problems, investors prefer to receive money from 
the firm as cash dividends to reduce the amount of the free cash flow inside the firm. The 
result from our sample shows that the cash dividends’ effect on the value for the shareholders 
is insignificant. This result might suggest that the cash dividends paid by the firm are 
insufficient to offset the previous problem and create added value for the shareholders, or it 
might be better for the shareholders if the firm undertook stock repurchasing rather than 
paying cash dividends, as suggested by Faulkender and Wang (2006), Harford et al. (2008) 
and Haw et al. (2011).  
 
3.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter examines cash-holding’s contribution to the corporate value, based on a sample 
of publicly traded Jordanian firms, including all firms except financial firms, firms 
undergoing liquidation and newly listed firms. This analysis is applied to the period between 
2000 and 2011 using annual firm data. Financial firms have been excluded from the sample 
because such firms tend to hold certain amounts of cash assets based on the nature of their 
business. Firms undergoing liquidation are excluded from the sample since the level of cash 
in the most recent years does not reflect the true level of cash; the same is true for new firms 
where the cash level in their early years does not reflect the true level of cash. The final 
number of firms involved in this research is 80. We used three models in this chapter; the first 
two models were based on the adjusted form of Fama and French’s (1998) valuation model, 
while the third model was based on Faulkender and Wang’s (2006) model. We applied both 
the likelihood ratio test and the Hausman test to make sure that the fixed-effects model is 
preferred to the pooling ordinary least squares model and the random effects model. Then we 
adapted our third model (i.e. Faulkender and Wang’s (2006) model) as our research model, 
since this model accounted for the risk factor by using the stock’s excess return and it avoids 
the problem of calculating the correct assets’ replacement value by using the stock’s excess 
return rather than the market-to-book ratio as a measurement of shareholders’ value. 
 
The results from our research model show that cash-holding is valued at a discount in the 
Jordanian capital market, with a significant coefficient of 0.41 JD for the whole period of 
analysis and 0.94 for the period up 2007. This result is in line with what the free cash flow 
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theory suggests: in firms with a free cash flow problem, shareholders place a discounted value 
on the cash-holding. This result also matches the results of other researchers, such as 
Pinkowitz and Williamson (2005), Pinkowitz et al. (2006), Faulkender and Wang (2006), 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), Denis and Sibilkov (2010) and Drobetz at el. (2010) who 
found this coefficient to be less than 1.00. This indicates that investors place a discounted 
value on each JD invested in cash when the firm has an agency problem and a free cash flow 
problem, or when investors have weak protection. The results also show that, with a higher 
level of leverage, the marginal value of each JD invested in cash is declining. With a 
significant negative coefficient of –1.19, the variable that measures this relationship confirms 
our earlier expectation: with a higher level of leverage, the increase in the cash level will 
benefit the debt-holders since it will increase the likelihood of them being paid back. It will 
also make the firm less risky and, since shareholders prefer riskier firms (the shareholders’ 
stake is considered as a call option on the firm assets) they will place a lower value on each 
additional pound invested in cash. Other researchers, such as Faulkender and Wang (2006), 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), Tong (2011) and others, also found this relationship to be 
negative.  
 
Finally, the results from our preferred model showed a positive significant relationship 
between a higher cash level and the marginal value of the extra pound invested in cash; this 
can be explained by the current financial crisis, as higher levels of cash have become more 
appreciated since the financial crisis, and has made it more difficult for firms to obtain the 
funding they need from external sources of financing. Finally, the results did not show any 
significant effect of cash dividends on the firm value. That might suggest that investors in the 
Jordanian capital market do not regard cash dividends as sufficient to offset the agency 
problem or the free cash flow problem. Another possibility is that using stock repurchasing 
rather that cash dividends might contribute more to the firm value compared to cash 
dividends, as Faulkender and Wang (2006) and Haw et al. (2011) suggest. It also implies that 
shareholders do not expect firms to attempt to maintain their dividend over time, and 
therefore do not regard the dividend payment as an ongoing commitment by firms to 
distribute their free cash flow to shareholders. 
 
The results of this chapter provide us with both theoretical and practical implications; it is 
important to study and include a way to reflect the market condition as well as the firm’s 
characteristics, as the market condition such as the recent financial crisis appears to have a 
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significant effect on the results regarding cash holding. Studying the effect of the recent 
financial crisis in our model showed that a higher level of cash is becoming more appreciated 
even with the existence of free cash flow problems, agency problems, weak investor 
protection, and a poor corporate governance system. It also affects the coefficient of the cash 
value, by reducing the value of that coefficient due to the way it has been used to measure that 
coefficient, since both the value and the return on firm’s stocks fall as a result of the financial 
crisis. Practical implications on the other hand, will be as a guide for financial managers in 
countries and firms that have free cash problems, agency problems, weak investor protection, 
poor corporate governance, or more than one of the previous issues. When the firm faces any 
of the previous issues it should not hold a large amount of cash; this cash will be evaluated at 
a discount to face value by shareholders, hence reducing the overall value of firm. If the firm 
faces any of those issues need to keep a higher level of cash for any reason, then the firm’s 
managers should take serious actions to reduce any free cash problem or agency problem or 
corporate governance issue. This can be done by enhancing the corporate governance system, 
giving investors more protection and rights, and providing shareholders with sufficient reward 
on their investments by creating a good and fair dividends policy which will help to reduce 
any potential free cash flow problem.  
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Chapter 4: How the cash-holding decisions affect the capital structure: 
Amman stock exchange 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
In the previous two chapters we investigated two issues in regard to corporate cash-holding 
decisions. The first issue was about the determinants of cash-holding based on the firm’s 
characteristics. We examined how firm’s size, cash flow, growth opportunities, profitability, 
leverage, cash dividend, and liquid assets substitute can affect the decision on corporate cash-
holding. The results showed that corporate cash-holding has a positive relationship with 
profitability and cash dividends, but a negative relationship with firm’s cash flow, leverage, 
and liquid assets substitute; there is no significant relationship between corporate cash-
holding and firm’s size and growth opportunities. 
 
The second issue we investigated was the value associated with cash-holding, in other words, 
how cash-holding contributed to the firm value. Using a model developed by Faulkender and 
Wang (2006) and after controlling for other firm characteristics, we found that each 1 
Jordanian Dinar (JD) held in cash is valued at only 0.41 JD by Jordanian investors. 
 
In this chapter we will investigate another issue related to cash-holding: how the level of 
cash-holding affects or contributes to the firm’s capital structure decisions. 
 
Capital structure determinants became an increasingly important topic of research after the 
seminal paper by Modigliani and Miller (1958) who suggested that, in a perfect market with 
no taxes, the value of the firm and its weighted average cost of capital are independent of its 
capital structure decisions. A few years later in 1963, in their other seminal paper, Modigliani 
and Miller (1963) relaxed the assumption of a perfect market and introduced the effect of 
taxes to examine the effect of capital structure on the firm value and its weighted average cost 
of capital. They found that, in a world of taxes, the value of the firm will increase as the 
portion of debt increases since tax expenses will reduce the taxable income; therefore, the 
amount of taxes paid to the government will be reduced, and the value of the firm will 
increase because of the tax shield. Since then, many researchers have investigated the 
determinants of firm capital structure to understand the reasons behind this finding. 
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Different researchers have used different samples in different time periods, some in developed 
countries, and others in developing countries. Some of those researchers included a few 
variables to understand the capital structure decisions, such as firm’s size, growth 
opportunities, profitability, and assets tangibility. Others included more variables such as 
liquidity, availability of any non-debt tax, ownership structure, business uniqueness, business 
risk, firm’s age, tax systems, corporate governance practices, exposure to capital markets, the 
level of investor protection, the borrower-lender relationship, and dividend. 
 
Two principal theories that have been proposed to explain how the firm’s characteristics 
affect the capital structure decisions are the Trade-off theory and the Pecking Order theory. 
The Trade-off theory is concerned with the trade-off between the benefits of having debt in a 
firm’s capital structure, such as the tax-saving benefits, and the cost associated with this debt, 
such as bankruptcy cost. The Trade-off theory explains how different firm characteristics 
affect the firm’s capital structure, as follows. Firm’s size has a positive relationship with 
capital structure since larger firms are more able to diversify compared to smaller firms, 
which will reduce the chance of bankruptcy and allow the firm to have a higher level of debt. 
Another reason for this positive relationship is that larger firms can obtain cheaper debt 
compared to smaller firms; therefore, larger firms are able to have more debt in their capital 
structure. 
 
Growth opportunities, according to the Trade-off theory, have a negative relationship with 
debt level, and this can be explained by the agency cost associated with the growth; as the 
firm grows it tends to accept riskier projects which will carry more risks for the debt-holders, 
but to the benefit of the shareholders. Profitability has a positive relationship with the debt 
ratio for three reasons; firstly, when the firm is more profitable it has to pay more taxes 
associated with higher taxable income, so having more debt will reduce the amount of taxable 
income and enable the firm to pay less tax. Secondly, more profitable firms are less likely to 
experience bankruptcy (or to face the possibility of bankruptcy), which allows those 
profitable firms to obtain higher levels of debt. Thirdly, profitable firms are more likely to 
have a free cash flow problem; increasing the level of debt in those profitable firms will help 
to significantly reduce the free cash flow problem since, with more debt in the firm’s capital 
structure, the managers will be under more monitoring and control from the debt-holders. A 
related argument, but one which does not rely on the tax advantage of debt, is that firms use 
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debt to signal their underlying profitability to outside investors, since only those firms with 
good underlying profitability will be confident that they will be able to pay back the debt. 
This signalling argument also implies that more profitable firms will issue more debt. 
 
The non-debt tax shield, according to the Trade-off theory, has a negative relationship with 
the debt ratio; this negative relationship can be explained by the notion that the non-debt tax 
shield such as depreciation expenses can be considered a substitute for the interest expenses to 
reduce the taxable income of the firm. Furthermore, this non-debt tax shield is independent of 
the firm’s financing decisions, as some non-debt tax shields such as depreciation expenses are 
generated from the firm’s existing assets or investment. Liquidity has a positive relationship 
with the debt ratio, as the Trade-off theory suggests; with more liquidity available, the firm 
will be able to obtain more debt as the higher amount of liquidity will help the firm to repay 
and service the debt when any of the financial obligations related to that debt are due. Assets 
tangibility is expected to have a positive relationship with debt ratio according to the Trade-
off theory; if tangible assets are available inside the firm they will be considered as collateral 
for the debt-holders, thus reducing the financial distress costs. Assets tangibility also 
contributed by reducing the conflict between debt-holders and shareholders. 
 
On the other hand, the Pecking Order theory provides different explanations of how the 
different firm characteristics will affect the firm’s capital structure decisions. The Pecking 
Order theory is concerned with the order in which the firm will consider the alternative 
sources of finance, and this order is itself determined by the cost and availability of these 
sources of finance; this theory suggests that the firm will follow a specific order to finance 
itself, starting with the cheapest available source. The firm will depend first on its internal 
funds, using the retained earnings; then it will use the external sources of financing starting 
with debt-financing, as this source has a tax benefit, before finally using equity-financing as 
this is the most expensive source as it is associated with the greatest degree of asymmetric 
information. The relationship between the debt ratio and the firm’s characteristics can be 
explained as follows. Firm size has a negative relationship with the debt ratio because, as the 
Pecking Order theory suggests, larger firms have less asymmetric information between the 
firm’s managers and the outside investors, thus making equity-financing relatively more 
preferable for those investors. 
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Growth opportunities have a positive relationship with the debt ratio since, with growth, firms 
will need more funds to finance this growth, and the internal funds might not be sufficient to 
finance all the growth needs; furthermore, the growing firm has a higher level of asymmetric 
information which will make equity-financing more difficult and more expensive. Pecking 
Order theory suggests that profitability has a negative relationship with debt ratio since 
profitable firms will be able to depend on their internal funds which they have accumulated as 
returned earnings, and will therefore be less dependent on external finance. Liquidity, 
according to Pecking Order theory, has a negative relationship with the debt ratio as the 
available liquidity inside the firm provides a cheaper internal source to finance the firm’s 
investment and growth needs. Tangibility has a negative relationship with debt ratio as, the 
more tangible assets that are available, the more they will help to reduce the asymmetric 
information between the outsider investors and the firm’s managers, which will cause the 
investors to prefer equity-financing. Table 4.1 summarises the expected effect of the firms’ 
characteristics on the debt ratio. 
 
On the basis of the Trade-off theory, the Pecking Order theory and empirical research, we will 
investigate the determinants of capital structure in Jordanian corporate firms by focusing on 
the liquidity variable. Jordanian firms hold low levels of debt in their capital structures; the 
ratio of the total debt to total assets for the research sample is between 27% and 35%.
14
 About 
one third of this total is long-term debt, which means that Jordanian firms depend on short-
term debt more than long-term debt in their debt structure. Omet and Mashharawe (2002) 
reported this issue when they investigated the determinants of capital structure in four 
Arabian countries including Jordan; they found that the mean debt ratio in Jordan is 37.7% 
compared to the 58%, 69%, 73% and 54% debt ratios in the US, Japan, Germany and the UK 
respectively, as reported by Rajan and Zingales (1995). Zeitun and Tian (2008) also reported 
a low long-term debt ratio in Jordanian firms with an average value of 6.3% during the period 
from 1989 to 2003 compared to a higher long-term debt ratio in some developed countries 
such as 55% in Germany and 67% in the US; it is also lower than the long-term debt ratio in 
Thailand, Taiwan and Malaysia of about 30%, as reported by Claessens et al. (1998, cited by 
Zeitun and Tian, 2008). Al-Shubiri (2010) reported a total debt ratio of 31.6% for the period 
from 2004 to 2007 in Jordan. This confirms that the market for long-term debt is not well 
                                                 
14
 See Table 4.2 for more details. 
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established in Jordan, which means that firms have to be more reliant on shorter term bank 
based finance.  
 
As firms in Jordan are more focused on short-term debt, available liquidity is a very important 
factor in meeting financial obligations when they are due. Not all researchers included 
liquidity as a variable to explain the capital structure decisions; in this chapter we will 
investigate the effect of liquidity on capital structure decisions in Jordanian firms. Liquidity in 
the capital structure literature is usually measured by the net working capital ratio (current 
assets minus current liabilities to total assets). In this chapter we will take the analysis a step 
further by decomposing the liquidity variable into its two components: liquidity from cash 
assets and liquidity from non-cash assets. Then we will determine whether there is any effect 
of cash-holding on the firm’s capital structure and, if so, how this manifests itself. Ozkan 
(2001) suggested that the liquidity ratio has a mixed effect on the capital structure of the firm. 
In one explanation he suggested that, with more liquidity available in the firm’s hands, the 
firm can borrow more funds as it will be able to support a higher ratio of debt by meeting the 
short-term financial obligations. In the second explanation he suggested that, with more 
liquidity available in the firm’s hands, the firm does not need to borrow funds since it can use 
its internal funds to finance its needs and investments. 
 
The aims of this chapter are as follows: First, it seeks to understand which factors affect the 
firm’s capital structure in a developing country such as Jordan and how those factors affect 
the capital structure decisions; second, it will also focus on the liquidity variable and examine 
how it affects the capital structure; third, it will examine cash liquidity as a special type of 
liquidity and how it affects the firm’s capital structure decision. 
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Table 4.1 
Summary of the expected effect of the firm’s characteristics on debt ratio 
 
 Expected Sign Reasons 
Firm’s size 
+ Trade off theory 
 Higher ability to diversify; less chance for bankruptcy. 
 Higher ability to access debt market at cheaper costs. 
– Pecking order theory 
 Less asymmetric information; equity financing is more 
preferable. 
Growth opportunities 
– Trade off theory  Higher agency cost. 
+ Pecking order theory 
 Need for extra financing with asymmetric information; 
equity financing is less preferable. 
Profitability 
+ Trade off theory 
 Help to reduce the taxable income. 
 Profitable firms are less likely to face bankruptcy. 
 Help to reduce the free cash flow problem. 
– Pecking order theory  Depend on the internal cheaper source of financing. 
Non-debt tax shield 
– Trade off theory  Help to reduce the taxable income. 
+ Trade off theory 
 Can be considered as more fixed assets available to help 
secure the debt as collaterals. 
Liquidity 
+ Trade off theory  Help to repay and serve the debt. 
– Pecking order theory  Provide cheaper internal sources of financing. 
Tangibility 
+ Trade off theory 
 Available collaterals for debt holders. 
 Reduces the conflict between debt holders and share 
holders. 
– Pecking order theory 
 Reduce the asymmetric information; equity financing is 
more preferable. 
Source: Financial theories and literature. 
 
4.2. Literature reviewed 
 
Myers (1977) argued that a firm’s growth has a negative effect on corporate borrowing, 
mentioning that “the value of a growth option vanishes or declines if it is not exercised by the 
firm”, for two reasons: firstly, the growth might be firm-specific and will have no value for 
other firms; secondly, the liquidation value of the growth options is less than the actual value, 
thus making growth options less preferred as secure sources for debt, especially if they are not 
exercised at the right time. 
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Titman and Wessels (1988) investigated the effects of a group of explanatory variables, 
including collator value of the firm’s assets, non-debt tax shield, growth, uniqueness, industry 
classification, and firm’s size, volatility and profitability, on the short-term, long-term and 
convertible debt. They used a sample of 469 firms for the period from 1974 to 1982. They 
found that the firm’s business uniqueness has a negative relationship with the debt level, 
firm’s size has a negative relationship with short-term debt, past profitability has a negative 
relationship with current debt level, short-term debt has a negative relationship with growth, 
and there is no relationship between debt level and non-debt tax shields, volatility or collateral 
value. 
 
Chittenden et al. (1996) investigated the financial structure of 3,480 small firms in the UK 
during the period from 1989 to 1993 using an Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS 
regression). They investigated the firm’s size, growth rate, profitability, assets structure, age, 
and access to stock markets. They found that total and short-term debt has a negative 
relationship with firm’s size, long-term debt has a positive relationship with firm’s size, 
profitability has a negative relationship with debt ratios, short-term debt has a negative 
relationship with assets structure, long-term debt has a positive relationship with assets 
structure, debt ratios have a negative relationship with firm’s age, access to capital market has 
a positive relationship with debt ratios, and there is no significant relationship between debt 
ratios and growth. 
 
Ozkan (2001) investigated the determinants of capital structure and the empirical 
determinants of target capital structure of firms by using several variables including firm’s 
size, growth opportunities, profitability, non-debt tax shields and liquidity. Based on a sample 
of 390 UK firms for the period from 1984 to 1996, he applied a dynamic model by using a 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM model). He found that profitability, liquidity and 
growth opportunities have a negative effect on the capital structure. Also, there is an inverse 
relationship between non-debt tax shields and borrowing ratio. Finally, there is limited 
support for a positive effect arising from the size of firms. 
 
Booth et al. (2001) investigated capital structure in 10 developing countries: India, Pakistan, 
Thailand, Malaysia, Turkey, Zimbabwe, Mexico, Brazil, Jordan, and Korea. The data were 
collected from the International Finance Corporation (IFC) for the period from 1980 to 1990, 
with 772 firms (India 99, Pakistan 96, Thailand 64, Malaysia 96, Turkey 45, Zimbabwe 48, 
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Mexico 99, Brazil 99, Jordan 38, and Korea 93). By using pooling and fixed-effect models, 
they found that the variables that explain the capital structure in developed countries such as 
the European countries and the US are also relevant to explain the capital structure in 
developing countries, with some small differences related to different aspects in different 
countries, such as; different institutional factors, the tax rate and business risk. They also 
found that, regardless of how the debt ratio is measured, the relationship between the debt 
ratio and profitability is negative, consistent with Pecking Order theory. 
 
Omet and Mashharawe (2002) investigated the capital structure determinants in four Arabian 
countries: Jordan, Kuwait, Oman and Saudi Arabia. This investigation covers the period from 
1996 to 2001 and included 51 Jordanian companies, 30 Kuwaiti companies, 38 Omani 
companies and 29 Saudi Arabian companies. Capital structure has been measured in two 
different ways: as total debt to total assets and as long-term debt to total assets; they used an 
Ordinary Least Squares regression, fixed-effect model, and random effect model. Their results 
showed that, firstly, for Jordanian companies the total debt ratio has a significant positive 
relationship with firm’s size and growth opportunities and it has a significant negative 
relationship with firm’s profitability and liquidity. For the long-term debt ratio there is a 
significant positive relationship with firm’s size and tangibility, and a significant negative 
relationship with firm’s growth opportunities, profitability and liquidity. Secondly, for 
Kuwaiti companies the total debt ratio has a significant positive relationship with firm’s size 
and growth opportunities, and a significant negative relationship with firm’s profitability and 
liquidity. For the long-term debt ratio there is a significant positive relationship with 
tangibility and growth opportunities and a significant negative relationship with firm’s 
profitability and liquidity. Thirdly, for Omani companies the total debt ratio has a significant 
positive relationship with firm’s size and growth opportunities and a significant negative 
relationship with firm’s profitability and liquidity. For the long-term debt ratio there is a 
significant positive relationship with growth opportunities and tangibility, and a significant 
negative relationship with firm’s liquidity. Fourthly, for Saudi companies the total debt ratio 
has a significant positive relationship with firm’s size and a significant negative relationship 
with firm’s tangibility, profitability and liquidity. For the long-term debt ratio there is a 
significant positive relationship with firm’s size, and a significant negative relationship with 
firm’s growth tangibility, profitability and liquidity. They also found that, for these countries, 
the capital structure decisions did not reflect the tax benefit advantage of the long-term debt 
financing, as they found that Jordanian companies that are subject to the highest tax rate of 
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35%, compared to the 10% tax rate in Oman and zero taxes in both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, 
do not hold significantly higher debts than other countries in their sample. 
 
Bevan and Danbolt (2002) investigated the determinants of capital structure in the UK by 
studying 822 firms in 1991 using a cross-sectional analysis. They found that growth is 
positively related to total and short-term debt but not significantly related to long-term debt, 
size is positively related to total and long-term debt but not significantly related to short-term 
debt, profitability is negatively related to debt ratios, and tangibility is negatively related to 
total and short-term debt but positively related to long-term debt. 
 
Frank and Goyal (2003) used data from non-financial U.S. firms for the period from 1950 to 
2000 to examine the relative importance of 39 variables for leverage decisions using stepwise 
regressions
15
; they found that the Trade-off theory and the stakeholder co-investment theory 
provide better descriptions of the data compared to the Pecking Order and market timing 
theories. They also found that some variables have a more reliable effect on the leverage 
decisions than others; for example, median industry leverage, firm’s size, intangibles, and 
collateral have a positive effect on leverage decisions, while bankruptcy risk, dividend 
payments, and market-to-book ratio have a negative effect on leverage decisions. The others 
have a less reliable effect, and they found that change in total corporate assets, corporate 
income tax rate, and Treasury bill rate have a positive effect, while variance of the firm’s 
stock returns, net operating loss carry-forwards, financial constraints, and profitability have a 
negative effect on leverage decisions. 
 
Chen (2004) investigated the determinants of capital structure using a sample of 88 Chinese 
firms for the period from 1995 to 2000. She examined how several firm characteristics 
including firm’s size, growth opportunities, profitability, tax shields effects, cost of financial 
distress, and assets structure affect the firm’s capital structure using both overall leverage and 
long-term leverage by using a pooled ordinary least squares regression, fixed-effect model, 
and random effect model. She found that firm’s size and profitability have negative 
                                                 
15
 Stepwise regressions: this is a process of creating or building a model by adding or removing variables to the 
model based on their t-statistics; this process can be done either forwards or backwards. The backward process is 
done by starting with all possible explanatory variables, and then removing one variable at the time; it will then 
report the square value of t-statistic for each variable still in the model and call it (F-to-remove) and the square 
value of t-statistic for each variable not in the model and call it (F-to-enter). After that, the model should include 
all the variables with the highest (F-to-enter) or remove all the variables with the lowest (F-to-remove). The 
forward process has the same methodology but rather than starting with all the possible explanatory variables, 
we will start with no variables and add one at a time. 
148 
 
relationships with the firm’s capital structure, while assets tangibility and growth 
opportunities have positive relationships with the firm’s capital structure. 
 
Hall et al. (2004) investigated the determinants of the capital structures of European small and 
medium-sized firms using a sample from Belgium, Germany, Spain, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, and the UK for the year 1995. They examined how some firm 
characteristics including firm’s size, growth opportunities, profitability, age, and assets 
structure affect the firm’s short- and long-term debt ratio by applying a cross-sectional 
regression. For the short-term debt ratio they found that only firm’s size and assets structure 
have a positive effect on debt ratio. On the other hand, for the long-term debt ratio they found 
that profitability, age, firm’s size and assets structure have a negative effect on debt ratio, 
while the opportunities have a positive effect on the firm’s debt ratio. 
 
Bevan and Danbolt (2004) investigated the determinants of capital structure of 1,054 firms for 
the period from 1991 to 1997 using different forms of debt ratio, including total liabilities, 
total long-term debt, long-term bank borrowing, long-term securitised debt, total current 
liabilities, total trade credit and equivalent, short-term bank borrowing, and short-term 
securitised debt. They included the firm’s size, growth opportunities, profitability, and assets 
tangibility in their analysis and used a pooled ordinary least squares regression and fixed-
effect model. They found that firm’s size has a positive relationship with debt level, and 
profitability has a negative relationship with all forms of debt except for short-term bank debt, 
where the relationship becomes positive. Tangibility has a positive relationship with long-
term debt and short-term bank borrowing, but it is insignificant for other forms of debt. They 
found that growth opportunities are negatively related to short-term bank borrowing. 
 
Low and Chen (2004) investigated the effect of diversifications as product and international 
diversifications on the firm’s capital structure. Using a sample from 30 countries, including 
232 firms, and ordinary least squares regression, they found that there is a significant negative 
relationship between international diversification and capital structure, but when they applied 
a further analysis they found that this significant negative relationship is only related to US 
firms and it becomes insignificant for non-US firms. For the product diversification, their 
results showed that there is a significant positive relationship between product diversification 
and capital structure since, with product diversification, the firm’s risk will be reduced, thus 
allowing the firm to obtain a higher level of debt. As other variables in their model they 
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include measurements for liquidity, growth opportunities, financial performance, firm’s size, 
industrial effects, and country effects. The results showed that there is a significant negative 
relationship between capital structure from one side and liquidity and financial performance 
(except US firms) from the other side; there is also a significant positive relationship between 
capital structure and firm’s size and with growth opportunities for non-US firms only. 
 
Gaud et al. (2005), employing data from 104 Swiss firms for the period from 1991 to 2000 
and using Generalised Method of Moments (GMM model), investigated the determinants of 
capital structure. By examining variables including firm’s size, growth opportunities, 
profitability, tangibles, and financial distress costs, they found that leverage has a positive 
relationship with the firm’s size and assets tangibility, and a negative relationship with growth 
and profitability. Those results support both Pecking Order theory and Trade-off theory. 
 
Abdullah (2005) investigated the determinants of capital structure using a sample of listed 
firms in Saudi Arabia. His sample included 56 listed firms for the period from 1995 to 2000. 
He examined how the firm’s size, growth opportunities, profitability, liquidity, age, and assets 
structure will affect the capital structure of the firm, including the effect on total debt, long-
term debt, and short-term debt, using an ordinary least squares regression. He found that, for 
total debt, there is a significant and positive relationship between growth opportunity and total 
debt, and a significant and negative relationship between total debt and both liquidity and 
assets structure. He found that long-term debt is significantly and positively related to firm’s 
size and growth opportunities, and it is significantly and negatively related to assets structure. 
Finally, he found that short-term debt is significantly and negatively related to firm’s size and 
growth opportunities only. 
 
Song (2005) investigated the determinants of capital structure for about 6,000 Swedish firms 
from 1992 to 2000. He investigated the effect of firm’s size, growth, profitability, tangibility, 
non-debt tax shield, uniqueness, and income variability on debt ratios including total debt, 
long-term debt and short-term debt ratios by using a fixed-effect model. He found that firm’s 
size has a positive relationship with total and short-term debt ratios but a negative relationship 
with long-term debt ratio, growth and uniqueness; income variability has no relationship with 
capital structure, profitability is negatively related to debt ratios, tangibility has a positive 
relationship with total and long-term debt ratios and a negative relationship with short-term 
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debt ratio, and non-debt tax shields are positively related to short-term debt and negatively 
related to long-term debt. 
 
Sayilgan et al. (2006) tested the impact of a firm’s characteristics on its capital structure 
decisions. They used a sample of 123 Turkish manufacturing firms that had been listed on the 
Istanbul Stock Exchange for ten years from 1993 to 2002. They analyzed the effect of firm’s 
size, profitability, growth opportunities in plant, property and equipment, growth 
opportunities in the firm’s total assets, non-debt tax shields and tangibility using a fixed-effect 
model. They found that capital structure is positively related to firm’s size and growth 
opportunities (in the firm’s total assets), while it is negatively related to profitability and 
growth opportunities (in the firm’s plant, property and equipment), non-debt tax shields and 
tangibility. 
 
Qian et al. (2007) used data from 650 publicly listed Chinese companies for the period from 
1999 to 2004 to examine the capital structure determinants. By examining the firm 
characteristics including firm’s size, profitability, tangibility, non-debt tax shield, growth 
opportunities, volatility, and non-circulating share ratio using an ordinary least squares 
regression, fixed-effect model and random effect model, they found that firm’s capital 
structure is positively related to firm’s size, tangibility and ownership structure, while it is 
negatively related to profitability, non-debt tax shields, growth and volatility. Then they used 
a generalized method of moments model (GMM model) to study the adjustment process of 
the determinants of capital structure; they found this process to be very slow and the lagged 
profitability has a negligibly small and positive effect on the firm’s capital structure. 
 
Antoniou et al. (2008) investigated the determinants of firms’ leverage in two different types 
of economies: market-oriented economies and bank-oriented economies. Using a sample from 
the UK and the US as a market-oriented economy and a sample from France, Germany, and 
Japan as a bank-oriented economy for the period from 1987 to 2000, and employing a 
generalized method of moments model (GMM model) they found that, in both economies, 
there is a positive relationship between leverage and the firm’s size and tangibility, but there 
is a negative relationship between leverage and growth opportunities, profitability, and share 
price performance. They also found that firm’s leverage is affected by the type of economic 
environment, tax systems, corporate governance practices, exposure to capital markets, the 
level of investor protection, and the borrower-lender relationship. 
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Cheng and Green (2008) analyzed how the tax policy affects the firm’s leverage ratio; they 
used a balanced panel analysis on 129 medium-sized European firms during the period from 
1993 to 2005 using a generalized method of moments model (GMM model). As control 
variables they used assets tangibility, assets intangibility, growth opportunities, firm’s size, 
firm’s risk, profitability, liquidity, dividend dummy, industrial classification, and term spread. 
For their dependent variables they used total debt, long-term debt, and short-term debt. The 
result for the tax effect shows that the impact of tax is significant but small. On the other 
hand, the results for the control variables are as follows. Assets tangibility shows a significant 
negative coefficient with debt ratio. Assets intangibility shows an unexpected positive 
relationship except with short-term debt; the authors explained this unexpected positive sign 
by stating that those intangible assets might be seen as growth opportunities. Growth 
opportunities have a significant and positive effect on debt ratio except for the short-term 
debt, while profitability has a significant negative effect on all forms of debt ratio. Liquidity 
has a significant negative effect on total and short-term debt while it has a significant positive 
effect on long-term debt. Firm’s size has a positive and significant effect on all forms of debt. 
Firm’s risk (volatility) has a negative effect on debt ratio, while the dividend dummy shows a 
significant positive effect on all forms of debt ratio. The industrial dummy shows a significant 
effect on debt ratio, being positive on short-term debt and negative on long-term debt. Term 
spread has a negative sign for both short- and long-term debt but the magnitudes were 
different. Finally, their results suggested that there is a difference between the determinants of 
short- and long-term debt. 
 
Daskalakis and Psillaki (2008) investigated the determinants of firms’ capital structure by 
using a sample of European small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in France and 
Greece for the period from 1998 to 2002 employing a fixed-effect model. They attempted to 
examine whether the capital structure in those countries was driven by the same factors as in 
other countries, whether any differences are related to firm-specific or country-specific 
factors, and whether the structure and the size of the financial market played any role in 
explaining any cross-country difference in the capital structure. By applying a panel data 
analysis using asset structure, firm’s size, profitability and growth rate, they found that there 
is a similarity in the capital structure in both countries, there is a significant positive 
relationship between leverage and firm’s size in both countries, the relationship between 
leverage and both assets structure and profitability is significantly negative, and the growth 
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rate is only significant in France, with a positive relationship with leverage. They explained 
that the similarity in the results is due to the similarity in the institutional characteristics, 
specifically to the commonality of the civil law systems in both countries. They also found 
some differences in the intensity of the capital structure which are due to firm-specific rather 
than country-specific factors. 
 
Serrasqueiro and Macas Nunes (2008) used data from 39 Portuguese firms for the period from 
1998 to 2004 to find the determinants of the capital structure in Portuguese firms. They 
included firm’s size, growth opportunities, assets tangibility, profitability, non-debt tax shield, 
and the level of risk employing an ordinary least squares regression, fixed-effect model, and 
random effect model; then they used a generalized method of moments model (GMM model) 
for their dynamic model. They found that capital structure has a positive relationship with 
firm’s size and non-debt tax shield, and a negative relationship with profitability; they found 
that capital structure has no significant relationship with assets tangibility, growth 
opportunities and level of risk. 
 
Westgaard et al. (2008) investigated the determinants of the capital structure for real-estate 
companies in the UK. Using a generalized method of moments model (GMM model) and a 
sample of 308 firms during the time period from 1998 to 2006, they investigated the effect of 
profitability, tangibility, non-debt tax shield, assets turnover, size, earning variability and 
expected growth. They found that profitability, tangibility and firm’s size have a positive 
relationship with leverage, while asset turnover and earnings variability have a negative 
relationship with leverage. 
 
Zeitun and Tian (2008) investigated the determinants of capital structure using a sample of 
167 Jordanian firms during the period from 1989 to 2003 and employing an ordinary least 
squares regression, fixed-effect model, and random effect model. They used a group of 
variables to determine what drives the decision on capital structure including tangibility, 
profitability, firm’s size, growth opportunities, non-debt tax shield, liquidity, earnings 
volatility, share price or market performance, stock market development, regional crises and 
uniqueness. They found that Jordanian firms depend mostly on short-term debt. They also 
found that firm’s size, tangibility, and earnings volatility are positively related to capital 
structure, while capital structure is negatively correlated to profitability, the level of growth 
opportunities, liquidity and stock market activities. Short-term debt is negatively related to 
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tangibility. The 1990-1991 Gulf crisis had a significantly positive effect on corporate leverage 
in Jordan. Capital structure decisions associated with inadequate long-term debt are strongly 
driven by factors such as stock market activity. 
 
Balboa et al. (2009) investigated the determinants of capital structure on venture capital firms 
in Spain. They included 166 venture capital firms and 166 non-venture capital firms as a 
control group during the period between 1994 and 2003. They focused on the following 
variables in order to understand the capital structure determinants of venture capital firms: 
firm’s size, growth opportunities, profitability, assets tangibility, volatility and tax reduction. 
Using a fixed-effect model, they showed that firm’s size, growth opportunities and assets 
tangibility are positively related to capital structure, while profitability is negatively related to 
capital structure. Their results support the view of the Pecking Order theory. 
 
Psillaki and Daskalakis (2009) investigated the determinants of firms’ capital structure using a 
fixed effect model on a sample of 320 Italian, 52 Portuguese, 1,252 Greek, and 2006 French 
SMEs for the period from 1998 to 2002. By comparing the capital structure of the firms in 
their sample based on the firm’s characteristics, including asset structure, size, profitability, 
risk and growth, they found that the commonality of these countries’ civil law systems and the 
similarities in these countries’ financial and institutional characteristics cause them to 
determine their capital structures in the same way. On the other hand, firm-specific effects are 
the reason for capital structure differences. They found that leverage is positively related to 
the firm’s size, while it is negatively related to asset structure, profitability and risk; their 
result showed that growth is not a significant determinant of the firm’s capital structure. 
 
Ramlall (2009) analyzed the determinants of capital structure for the period from 2005 to 
2006 for about 450 non-listed non-financial firms in Mauritius by examining the effect of 
growth, firm’s size, tangibility of assets, profitability, liquidity, non-debt tax shield, age of the 
company and investment on capital structure in the form of liabilities, debt and leases 
including both short- and long-term forms. Using an ordinary least squares model he found 
that liquidity and firm’s size have a negative effect on firm’s capital structure, assets’ 
tangibility has a positive effect on firm’s capital structure, and profitability, non-debt tax 
shield and growth have no significant effect on a firm’s capital structure. Investment has 
mixed effects: it has a positive effect on leases but is negatively related to loans. 
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Al-Shubiri (2010) used an ordinary least squares model to examine the determinants of capital 
structure by using the following variables: firm’s size, growth rate, asset tangibility, liquidity, 
firm’s age, business risk, earnings rate (ROA), and non-tax shield. Based on a sample of 59 
Jordanian firms for the period from 2004 to 2007, he found that capital structure is 
significantly positively related to size, asset tangibility, growth rate and non-tax shield; it is 
significantly related to earnings rate (ROA), but there is no significant relationship between 
capital structure and liquidity and firm’s age. 
 
Arifin (2010) investigated the effect of ownership structure on a firm’s capital structure by 
using a sample of 333 publicly listed non-financial firms on the Jakarta Stock Exchange for 
the period from 2001 to 2003. Using an ordinary least squares model, he examined the effect 
of institutional ownership, managerial ownership, assets structure and assets growth, finding 
that managerial ownership and assets structure have a positive effect on capital structure, 
while institutional ownership and assets growth have a negative effect on capital structure. 
 
Belin et al. (2010) used a generalized method of moments model (GMM model) to investigate 
the effect of research and development on capital structure besides the other variables that 
affect the capital structure of the firm, such as profitability with a negative relationship and 
collaterals with a positive relationship. Based on a sample of 15,941 observations of French 
firms for the period from 1994 to 2004, they found that the relationship between the research 
and development-to-sales ratio and bank debt is negative. They explain that this negative 
relationship is due to the use of research and development in basic research activities and in 
internal research and development. They also found that the bank debt ratio is positively 
related to the past realization. 
 
Daskalakis and Thanou (2010) used data on 1,018 Greek SMEs (120 micro firms with less 
than 9 employees, 642 small firms with a total staff of between 10 and 49, and 256 medium-
sized firms with total numbers of employees ranging from 50 to 249). They investigated 
whether the determinants of capital structure will be different for firms in different groups 
according to their firm size. Using a panel data analysis on their sample and applying a pooled 
Generalized Least Squares model, they found that the factors that affect a firm’s capital 
structure, which are profitability, growth and assets structure, are not affected by the differing 
sizes of the groups. All groups have the same relationship with the factors affecting the capital 
structure. Profitability and assets structure have a significant negative relationship with the 
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debt ratio in all groups - micro, small, medium, and full sample - while growth has a 
significant positive relationship with the debt ratio in all groups. 
 
Al-Najjar (2011) investigated the determinants of a firm’s leverage using several variables 
including dividends, institutional ownership, profitability, business risk, asset structure, asset 
liquidity, growth opportunities and firm’s size. Using an ordinary least squares regression, 
fixed-effect model, and random effect model on a sample of 110 firms for the period from 
1999 to 2003, he found that there is a significant negative relationship between leverage and 
profitability, business risk and institutional ownership, and there is a positive relationship 
between leverage and firm’s size, market-to-book ratio, asset tangibility and liquidity, while 
there is no significant relationship between leverage and dividends. 
 
Aybar-Arias et al. (2011) examined the determinants of capital structure using a sample of 
Spanish SMEs included in the SABI (Sistema de Ana´lisis de Balances Ibe´ricos) database 
during the period from 1995 to 2005. They investigated the effect of firm’s size, growth 
opportunities, profitability, non-debt tax shields, business uniqueness, assets tangibility and 
default risk using a fixed-effect model, and then used a generalized method of moments 
model (GMM model) as a dynamic model. They found that there is a significant positive 
relationship between capital structure and firm’s size and growth opportunity, and there is a 
negative relationship between capital structure and profitability, non-debt tax shields, assets 
tangibility, business uniqueness and default risk. 
 
Balla and Mundaca (2011) investigated the determinants of capital structure using 4,178 
observations of Hungarian manufacturing firms; they employed a generalized method of 
moments model (GMM model) for the period from 1992 to 2006 to examine the effect of the 
following variables: firm’s size, growth opportunities, cash-holding, profitability, assets 
tangibility, foreign ownership, state ownership, and participation in export markets. They 
found that Hungarian firms have a higher ratio of short-term liabilities compared to long-term 
liabilities; this situation results in Hungarian firms facing difficulties in planning for long-
term investments. To be able to access external funding it is important that the firm is large 
both in terms of size and as an exporter; if a smaller firm is a large exporter, it will still have 
difficulty in accessing external funding. It is necessary to have collateral assets to be able to 
obtain long-term debt. They found no evidence to show that when the firm becomes large it 
will be able to access long-term funding easily. They also found that the small firms used the 
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free cash-holding to reduce their long-term liabilities in order to obtain a good reputation, 
while the large firms used their free cash-holding to reduce their short-term liabilities in order 
to reduce the costs associated with those short-term liabilities. Firms with foreign ownership 
keep their liabilities unchanged even with they have free cash-holding. 
 
Although other researchers investigated the capital determinants on a sample of Jordanian 
firms, such as Booth et al. (2001) Omet and Mashharawe (2002) and Al-Shubiri, (2010). The 
new contributions of this chapter are; it has included a much larger sample size, covered a 
long period of time, included a deeper analysis of the liquidity variable by studying the cash 
and the non-cash liquidity as well as the total liquidity, and most importantly it has 
investigated the speed of adjustment of the debt ratios by considering a GMM dynamic 
model. 
 
4.2.1. Research Hypotheses 
 
As the Trade-off theory suggested, larger firms are more able to diversify their investments 
which will reduce the firm’s total risk as well as the bankruptcy risk; this enables larger firms 
to have more debt in their capital structure. Also, larger firms are more able to access debt 
markets at a cheaper cost of debt compared to smaller firms. Another issue is that larger firms 
will inspire more confidence in the lenders that their money is more likely to be repaid 
because of the collateral assets available inside the firm. Larger Jordanian firms are more 
likely to be able to obtain more debt financing from external sources as those firms have more 
collateral to satisfy the lenders. 
H1: Firm’s size has a positive effect on the firm’s capital structure. 
 
As the Pecking Order theory suggested, larger firms have less asymmetric information 
between the firms’ insiders (managers) and outsiders (investors); this means that equity-
financing will be easier and preferable. As debt financing in Jordan is less preferable due to 
the Islamic rules that will make equity financing a more preferable option for Jordanian firms. 
H2: Firm’s size has a negative effect on the firm’s capital structure. 
 
Growing firms have higher agency costs as these firms tend to accept riskier projects and 
investments which will carry more risk for the debt-holder for the benefit of the shareholders; 
the Trade-off theory expected that the relationship between growth opportunities and capital 
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structure will be negative. As equity financing is more preferable as a long term financing 
source in Jordan due to the religion issue, growing firms in Jordan will depend where possible 
on equity financing. 
H3: Growth opportunities have a negative effect on the firm’s capital structure. 
 
Pecking Order theory suggested that when firms are growing they need more funds to finance 
their growth; once they have used the internal funds available inside the firm they will borrow 
more funds as debt-financing will be the cheapest external source of funds. As firms in Jordan 
used all available sources of internal funds it will move to external sources although debt 
financing is less preferable in Jordan, firms might face a situation where it needs to use that 
source especially when it can raise more funds from equity financing. 
H4: Growth opportunities have a positive effect on the firm’s capital structure. 
 
The Trade-off theory expected the relationship between profitability and debt ratio to be 
positive for several reasons; more profitable firms are less likely to go bankrupt, which allows 
these more profitable firms to have higher levels of debt. With more profits, the firm has to 
pay more taxes as its taxable income will increase; having more debt in the firm’s capital 
structure will help it to reduce the taxable income and it will thus pay fewer taxes. With more 
profits, the likelihood of the free cash flow problem will increase; increasing the debt level in 
the firm’s capital structure will help to reduce the free cash flow problem since the firm’s 
managers will be under more monitoring. Although debt financing is less preferable in 
Jordan, more profitable firms might use debt financing to get the advantage of tax saving 
associated with debt. 
H5: Profitability has a positive effect on the firm’s capital structure. 
 
Pecking Order theory suggested that more profitable firms will accumulate their profits as 
retained earnings for later use as the cheapest internal source of financing compared to other 
external sources of financing, including debt-financing. Since debt financing is less preferred 
in Jordan, more profitable firms will be more motivated to accumulate retained earnings to 
avoid the need for using debt. 
H6: Profitability has a negative effect on the firm’s capital structure. 
 
Trade-off theory provided two explanations for the effect of non-debt tax shields; non-debt 
tax shields such as depreciation expenses can be used as a substitute for interest expenses in 
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order to reduce the taxable income, which means that the relationship between debt ratio and 
the non-debt tax shields is expected to be negative, have more non-debt tax shields will help 
Jordan firms to reduce the amount of debt to keep align with Islamic rules on interest. On the 
other hand, a higher level of non-debt tax shields can be a sign of a higher level of fixed 
assets, which means more collateral for the lender; in other words, there is a positive 
relationship between debt ratio and non-debt tax shields. 
H7: Non-debt tax shields have a negative effect on the firm’s capital structure. 
H8: Non-debt tax shields have a positive effect on the firm’s capital structure. 
 
According to the Trade-off theory, liquidity has a positive relationship with the debt ratio as 
this liquidity can be used to service the debt and its interest when it becomes due. Jordanian 
firms which decide to use debt financing will find that available liquidity is very useful to 
support the debt and meet the financial obligations when it becomes due. 
H9: Liquidity has a positive effect on the firm’s capital structure. 
 
Pecking Order theory, on the other hand, has a different explanation for the relationship 
between debt ratio and liquidity; Pecking order theory suggests that when the firm has more 
liquidity it can use this liquidity as an internal cheaper source of financing, which means that 
liquidity has a negative relationship with debt ratio according to Pecking Order theory. 
Jordanian firms which avoid using debt financing that carry interest expenses will find more 
liquidity more appreciated as this liquidity will provide a good source for financing which 
will reduce their dependency on debt financing. 
H10: Liquidity has a negative effect on the firm’s capital structure. 
 
Assets tangibility has a positive relationship with debt ratio, as the Trade-off theory 
suggested; by providing collateral for the debt, firms with more tangible assets can afford to 
have a higher level of debt, while tangible assets can also contribute by reducing the conflict 
between debt-holders and shareholders.  
H11: Assets tangibility has a positive effect on firm’s capital structure. 
 
Pecking Order theory, on the other hand, suggested that, with more tangible assets inside the 
firm, the asymmetric information between the investors and the managers will be reduced, 
which makes equity financing preferable. As tangible assets reduce the asymmetric 
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information, Jordanian firms will be more able to obtain more external funds from equity 
financing rather than debt financing. 
H12: Assets tangibility has a negative effect on firm’s capital structure. 
 
Long-term and short-term debts have different time maturities, which might result in different 
effects of the firm’s characteristics on long- and short-term debt. 
H13: The effects of the firm’s characteristics on the long-term debt ratio are different from the 
effects on the short-term debt. 
 
4.3. Data and Methodology 
 
4.3.1. Research Sample 
 
The sample will include all firms listed in the Amman stock exchange for the period from 
2000 to 2011 based on annual data for the firms; all financial firms will be excluded from the 
sample along with new firms and any firm that does not have a full set of observations for the 
study period. Out of 247 firms listed at the end of the financial year 2011, there are 109 
financial firms and 58 new firms or firms undergoing liquidation, which means that the final 
number of firms included in the research sample is 80. 
 
4.3.2. Research Variables 
 
The literature on capital structure determinants provides us with many variables that 
determine the firm’s capital structure. Some of those variables are common to all research 
such as firm’s size, growth opportunities, tangibility, non-debt tax shield and profitability. 
While some researchers use other variables to determine the firm’s capital structure, such as 
business uniqueness, we did not include this variable in our analysis since the sample for this 
research contains many sub-industries, and many of these sub-industries contain only 2 or 3 
firms. In this chapter we will use a model that includes the variables used most frequently to 
determine the firm’s capital structure and we will include liquidity as an explanatory variable 
beside the most frequently-used variables. 
 
The dependent variable for this research will be the debt ratio (DEBT), and we will use 
different forms of debt ratio: (1) total debt ratio, calculated as total debt to total assets; (2) 
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long-term debt, calculated as long-term debt to total assets; (3) short-term debt, calculated as 
short-term debt to total assets. 
 
The independent variables for this research will be as follows: 
 
Firm’s size (SIZE) will be calculated as the natural logarithm of the total assets at the book 
value of each firm. It is expected that firm’s size will have a positive relationship with debt 
ratio; larger firms are more able to access external sources of funds as debt sources, and are 
more able to diversify their investments and assets, meaning they are less likely to go 
bankrupt. Furthermore, more assets can be used as collateral for debt, which allows the firm 
to have more debt when it becomes larger. 
 
Growth opportunities (GROW) will be calculated as the book value of total assets, minus the 
book value of equity, plus the market value of equity all divided by the book value of assets 
(market-to-book value). It is expected that there will be a positive relationship between the 
debt ratio and growth opportunities; with more growth, firms will need more funds to finance 
that growth, which explains the positive relationship. Another explanation for the positive 
relationship is that, with growth, the value of the firm will increase, thus enabling it to take on 
more debt. 
 
Profitability (PROFIT) will be calculated as the return on assets ROA (earnings before 
interest and taxes to total assets). There is expected to be a negative relationship between debt 
ratio and profitability; more profitable firms tend to depend on internal sources of financing 
and will depend on those internal sources before searching for any external sources of 
financing, including debt-financing. 
 
Non-debt tax shields (NDTS) will be calculated as annual depreciation expense to total assets. 
There is expected to be a negative relationship between debt ratio and non-debt tax shields; 
with non-debt tax shields, the benefits of having debt in the capital structure become 
relatively less important. 
 
Liquidity (LIQ) we will include this variable which is measured as net working capital to total 
assets. Then we will break this variable down into two variables; cash liquidity (CLIQ) will 
be calculated as cash and cash equivalent assets to total assets, and non-cash liquidity 
161 
 
(NCLIQ) will be calculated as current assets minus cash and cash equivalent assets to total 
assets. The relationship between liquidity and debt ratio could be positive or negative. With 
more liquidity, firms will be able to service and repay their debt, which might explain the 
positive relationship. On the other hand, with the availability of internal funds firms will 
depend less on external sources of financing, including debt-financing, which might explain 
the negative relationship. 
 
Assets tangibility (TANG) will be calculated as fixed assets to total assets. There is expected 
to be a positive relationship between assets tangibility and capital structure; with more 
tangible assets, firms will be better able to obtain secured debt since those assets can be used 
as collateral. 
 
4.3.3. Research Methodology 
 
As we mentioned earlier in the introduction chapter and in our previous two empirical 
chapters, since we are dealing with data that have both cross-sectional and time-series 
dimensions, the appropriate way to analyse those data is to use panel data analysis because of 
the advantages that have been listed in chapter one. On the other hand, panel data analysis 
will be become biased when we use the dynamic model, as we explained in chapter one; thus, 
for that dynamic model we will use the Generalized Method of Moments model (GMM 
model). 
 
4.3.4. Research Models 
 
Harris and Raviv (1991, cited in Westgaard et al., 2008) stated that “the number of factors and 
circumstances that can affect a company’s capital structure is uncountable”. For our models 
we will include the most used variables that can explain the capital structure decisions; these 
are the variables that have been used in the capital structure literature. 
 
Proposed models 
 
In this chapter we will investigate the determinants of debt ratio, firstly by using static models 
as listed below, and then by using a dynamic model to investigate the speed of adjustment of 
the debt ratio. 
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Firstly, the static models will be based on panel data models including pooled OLS, fixed-
effect model and random effect model; then, we will decide which one of those models is the 
most appropriate by using the likelihood ratio test and the Hausman test. 
 
TDEBTit = α0 + β1 SIZEit + β2 GROWit + β3 PROFITit + β4 NDTSit + β5 LIQit + β6 TANGit + 
ui,t                  (4.1.) 
 
LDEBTit = α0 + β1 SIZEit + β2 GROWit + β3 PROFITit + β4 NDTSit + β5 LIQit + β6 TANGit + 
ui,t                  (4.2.) 
 
SDEBTit = α0 + β1 SIZEit + β2 GROWit + β3 PROFITit + β4 NDTSit + β5 LIQit + β6 TANGit + 
ui,t                  (4.3.) 
 
TDEBTit = α0 + β1 SIZEit + β2 GROWit + β3 PROFITit + β4 NDTSit + β5 CLIQit + β6 NCLIQit  
+ β7 TANGit + ui,t              (4.4.) 
 
LDEBTit = α0 + β1 SIZEit + β2 GROWit + β3 PROFITit + β4 NDTSit + β5 CLIQit + β6 NCLIQit  
+ β7 TANGit + ui,t              (4.5.) 
 
SDEBTit = α0 + β1 SIZEit + β2 GROWit + β3 PROFITit + β4 NDTSit + β5 CLIQit+ β6 NCLIQit  
+ β7 TANGit + ui,t              (4.6.) 
 
Where: 
 
DEBT  : Debt ratio. 
TDEBT  : Total debt ratio. 
LDEBT  : Long debt ratio. 
SDEBT  : Short debt ratio. 
SIZE  : Firm’s size. 
GROW  : Firm’s growth opportunities. 
PROFIT  : Firm’s profitability. 
LIQ   : Liquid assets. 
CLIQ  : Firm’s cash liquid assets. 
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NCLIQ  : Firm’s non-cash liquid assets. 
NDTS  : Firm’s non-debt tax shields. 
TANG  : Firm’s fixed assets. 
u   : error term. 
 
All of the explanatory variables are measured as ratios which will correct for 
heteroscedasticity in the results. 
 
Secondly, we will use the dynamic models to measure the adjustment speed toward the 
optimal debt ratio. Like many other researchers such as Gaud et al. (2005), Gonzales and 
Gonzales (2008) and La Rocca et al. (2009), we will consider the change in the debt ratio 
between the current year and the previous year (DEBTit – DEBTit-1) to reflect the difference 
between the target level of the debt ratio (DEBT*it) and the lagged level of the debt ratio 
(DEBTit-1); 
 
DEBTit – DEBTit-1 = α (DEBT*it – DEBTit-1) 
DEBTit = α DEBT*it + (1 – α) DEBTit-1 
Where; 
DEBT*it = α0 + β1 SIZEit + β2 GROWit + β3 PROFITit + β4 NDTSit + β5 LIQit + β6 TANGit + 
ui,t 
DEBT*it = α0 + β1 SIZEit + β2 GROWit + β3 PROFITit + β4 NDTSit + β5 CLIQit + β6 NCLIQit 
+ β7 TANGit + ui,t 
 
DEBTit = αα0 + (1 – α) DEBTit-1 + αβ1 SIZEit + αβ2 GROWit + αβ3 PROFITit + αβ4 NDTSit + 
αβ5 LIQit + αβ6 TANGit + αui,t 
DEBTit = γ0 + δ DEBTit-1 + γ1 SIZEit + γ2 GROWit + γ3 PROFITit + γ4 NDTSit + γ5 LIQit + γ6 
TANGit + εi,t                (4.7.) 
 
DEBTit = αα0 + (1 – α) DEBTit-1 + αβ1 SIZEit + αβ2 GROWit + αβ3 PROFITit + αβ4 NDTSit + 
αβ5 CLIQit + αβ6 NCLIQit + αβ7 TANGit + αui,t 
DEBTit = γ0 + δ DEBTit-1 + γ1 SIZEit + γ2 GROWit + γ3 PROFITit + γ4 NDTSit + γ5 CLIQit + 
γ6 NCLIQit + γ7 TANGit + εi,t            (4.8.) 
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Where: 
 
TDEBT  : Total debt ratio. 
LDEBT  : Long debt ratio. 
SDEBT  : Short debt ratio. 
SIZE  : Firm’s size. 
GROW  : Firm’s growth opportunities. 
PROFIT  : Firm’s profitability. 
LIQ   : Liquid assets. 
CLIQ  : Firm’s cash liquid assets. 
NCLIQ  : Firm’s non-cash liquid assets. 
NDTS  : Firm’s non-debt tax shields. 
TANG  : Firm’s fixed assets. 
ε   : error term. 
 
4.4. Results and analysis 
 
4.4.1. Descriptive analysis 
 
In this first model we will investigate how the factors that affect capital structure affect 
Jordanian firms’ capital structure. In this model we will include the main factors mentioned in 
the literature by many researchers, including firm’s size, growth opportunities, profitability, 
liquidity, the availability of any non-debt tax shields, and assets tangibility. As these factors 
are most frequently mentioned in the literature, we will start our analysis by examining their 
effect on the firm’s total debt ratio, long-term debt ratio and short-term debt ratio. 
 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show the descriptive analysis of the variables for this basic model. In Table 
4.2 we included the descriptive analysis for the whole sample which covers the period from 
2000 to 2011. Then in Table 4.3 we included the same descriptive analysis for same set of 
data year by year to obtain a deeper view of the data. 
 
Table 4.2 reveals some interesting observations about this sample; firstly, we can see that the 
average total debt ratio in our sample is about 32%, which is relatively low, especially when 
we know that the capacity of debt-borrowing is an internal decision for the firm’s board of 
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directors. The firm’s board of directors are allowed to borrow up to 2 to 3 times the firm’s 
equity capital, which means that we expect to see a total debt-to-assets ratio of 60% to 75%. 
This relatively low debt ratio can be explained by Jordan’s religious background; as Islam is 
the dominant religion in Jordan which is followed by more than 90% of the total population, 
the rules of the Islamic religion might affect the capital structure decision. According to the 
Islamic rules, one is not allowed to deal with interest as it is prohibited in Islam. However, 
although dealing with interest is not allowed, because of the necessity of debt capital some 
Islamic scholars permit firms to use debt-borrowing which involves interest, but it should be 
kept to a minimum. 
 
Table 4.2 
Descriptive analysis 
The dependent variable is debt ratio (DEBT) which has three forms; total debt ratio (TDEBT) which is the ratio 
of total liabilities divided by the total assets, long term debt ratio (LDEBT) which is the ratio of long term 
liabilities divided by the total assets, and short term debt ratio (SDEBT) which is the ratio of current liabilities 
divided by the total assets. The independent variables; (SIZE) firm’s size which is the natural logarithm of the 
total assets, (GROW) growth opportunities which is the ratio of book value of total assets, minus the book value 
of equity, plus the market value of equity divided by book value of assets, (PROFIT) firm’s profitability which is 
the return on assets ROA, (LIQ) liquid assets which is net working capital divided by total assets, (NDTS) non-
debt tax shield which is the depreciation expenses divided by the total assets, and (TANG) assets tangibility 
which is the ratio of fixed assets divided by the total assets. For the period from 2000 to 2011. 
2000-2009 TDEBT LDEBT SDEBT SIZE GROW PROFIT NDTS LIQ CLIQ NCLIQ TANG 
Mean 32.47% 8.60% 23.87% 16.64 149.10% 2.71% 3.61% 21.10% 9.38% 11.73% 42.83% 
Median 28.93% 2.10% 20.42% 16.46 133.05% 3.25% 3.16% 19.43% 4.88% 10.51% 40.97% 
Max 94.47% 90.00% 87.66% 20.92 619.79% 43.30% 21.73% 98.74% 81.19% 78.02% 99.60% 
Min 0.44% 0.00% 0.05% 13.22 -67.21% -60.01% 0.00% -71.66% 0.00% -71.66% 0.39% 
SD 21.03% 13.37% 16.15% 1.41 82.24% 9.70% 2.67% 24.50% 11.62% 20.85% 23.64% 
Obs. 960 960 960 960 960 960 960 960 960 960 960 
Source: Calculated by the researcher based on companies’ guides available in Amman stock exchange website 
for several years. 
 
Secondly, the average long-term debt ratio is much lower than the average short-term debt 
ratio. The average long-term debt ratio is only one third of the average short-term debt ratio, 
at 8.60% compared to 23.87% respectively. As we mentioned before, due to religious 
considerations Jordanian firms try to avoid exposure to debt that involves interest. Since the 
short-term debt as measured by the current liabilities, it does not involve any interest 
expenses. This explains why Jordanian firms tend to depend more on short-term debt than on 
long-term debt: short-term debt does not involve interest costs. 
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Thirdly, the minimum value of the long-term debt ratio is 0.00%. With further investigation 
we found that there are 372 observations with no long-term debt; this represents more than 
one third of the total of 960 observations. In addition to the previous explanation, some firms 
depend only on short-term debt because it is much cheaper than long-term debt. 
 
Fourthly, the average total liquidity ratio is about 21%, which means that firms in Jordan can 
cover two thirds of their total debt using their net working capital. Cash liquidity measures as 
cash ratio are more than 9%, which means that, on average, firms in Jordan can cover all of 
their long-term debt just by using the cash available at hand, or they can use this cash to cover 
almost half of the short-term debt; if we consider the total debt, the cash liquidity can cover 
one third of the total debt. 
 
Fifthly, firms in Jordan have fixed assets which are worth more than their total debts; this 
means that all debt can be repaid in cases of bankruptcy, and it also means that firms in 
Jordan will still have the ability to borrow more money, as this money can be secured by the 
firms’ tangible assets. 
 
Table 4.3 shows the descriptive analysis for the research variables year by year, starting from 
the year 2000 and finishing at the year 2011. Table 4.3 shows that the research variables are 
stable over time with no abnormal changes. Some small changes occurred for the total debt 
ratio as it increases from around 31% in the first few years to about 35% in the last few years. 
These changes arise from the increases in the short-term debt ratio as it increases from around 
21% in the first few years to around 26% in the last few years, while the long-term debt ratio 
showed a slight decline in the last few years. 
 
These changes can be explained by the debt crisis: as debt-financing becomes more difficult 
to obtain, firms start to depend more on short-term debt and less on long-term debt. Cash ratio 
on the other hand showed a slight increase as cash became more important after the debt crisis 
when debt-financing became more difficult to obtain. Non-cash liquidity has declined in the 
last few years; as we mentioned earlier, increases in short-term debt cause this non-cash 
liquidity to decline as it is measured as net working capital minus cash. Firms’ profitability 
started to decrease from 2008 to become a negative number in 2011; this decline can be 
explained as the effect of the debt crisis on the firm’s profits as a result of the losses on 
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financial investments. Tangibility has increased in the last few years as firms focus on fixed-
assets investments more than financial assets investments since the financial markets have 
performed badly in recent years as a result of the debt crisis. 
 
Table 4.3 
Descriptive analysis 
The dependent variable is debt ratio (DEBT) which has three forms; total debt ratio (TDEBT) which is the ratio 
of total liabilities divided by the total assets, long term debt ratio (LDEBT) which is the ratio of long term 
liabilities divided by the total assets, and short term debt ratio (SDEBT) which is the ratio of current liabilities 
divided by the total assets. The independent variables; (SIZE) firm’s size which is the natural logarithm of the 
total assets, (GROW) growth opportunities which is the ratio of book value of total assets, minus the book value 
of equity, plus the market value of equity divided by book value of assets, (PROFIT) firm’s profitability which is 
the return on assets ROA, (LIQ) liquid assets which is net working capital divided by total assets, (NDTS) non-
debt tax shield which is the depreciation expenses divided by the total assets, and (TANG) assets tangibility 
which is the ratio of fixed assets divided by the total assets. Year by year for the period from 2000 to 2009. 
 
 
TDEBT LDEBT SDEBT SIZE GROW PROFIT NDTS LIQ CLIQ NCLIQ TANG 
2
0
0
0
 
Mean 31.64% 9.01% 22.63% 16.34 111.04% 1.95% 4.40% 21.03% 9.70% 11.32% 45.77% 
Median 29.11% 3.20% 19.74% 16.11 100.00% 2.30% 3.66% 16.55% 2.86% 8.65% 45.57% 
Max 91.58% 50.47% 57.41% 20.08 350.94% 27.43% 12.49% 98.74% 81.19% 67.20% 92.73% 
Min 0.60% 0.00% 0.05% 14.31 15.73% -20.67% 0.00% -38.17% 0.00% -39.83% 0.73% 
SD 20.11% 12.51% 14.05% 1.30 59.46% 9.23% 2.89% 25.90% 14.93% 19.86% 24.72% 
2
0
0
1
 
Mean 31.23% 9.08% 22.14% 16.37 111.23% 2.83% 4.50% 21.05% 8.94% 12.11% 46.03% 
Median 29.49% 1.95% 18.86% 16.18 100.51% 3.56% 3.70% 19.45% 4.13% 8.03% 45.49% 
Max 91.86% 63.22% 65.61% 20.18 307.86% 22.76% 16.58% 77.89% 48.50% 64.26% 93.35% 
Min 1.82% 0.00% 1.82% 14.06 8.88% -46.16% 0.00% -38.44% 0.00% -39.02% 0.63% 
SD 19.53% 13.44% 13.94% 1.31 55.55% 9.58% 3.09% 23.79% 12.13% 20.57% 24.23% 
2
0
0
2
 
Mean 31.33% 10.42% 20.91% 16.37 119.60% 3.43% 4.36% 23.22% 10.21% 13.01% 45.21% 
Median 28.10% 2.60% 16.87% 16.20 108.87% 2.98% 4.11% 22.88% 3.35% 9.50% 41.82% 
Max 91.99% 66.41% 54.79% 20.14 328.33% 22.21% 13.33% 78.29% 51.78% 68.20% 93.37% 
Min 2.31% 0.00% 2.15% 13.97 0.66% -18.91% 0.10% -26.67% 0.00% -28.69% 0.61% 
SD 21.24% 14.59% 13.61% 1.32 58.61% 7.36% 2.48% 23.92% 13.14% 20.27% 23.54% 
2
0
0
3
 
Mean 31.43% 10.39% 21.04% 16.40 145.27% 3.42% 4.17% 22.88% 8.89% 13.99% 44.53% 
Median 26.95% 2.56% 20.58% 16.27 132.90% 3.34% 3.64% 21.33% 4.22% 10.79% 41.48% 
Max 92.14% 67.03% 73.59% 20.15 462.16% 25.15% 14.13% 78.64% 52.03% 67.73% 90.74% 
Min 1.69% 0.00% 1.69% 14.03 33.54% -37.94% 0.00% -46.53% 0.00% -46.90% 0.75% 
SD 20.69% 14.87% 14.25% 1.32 72.28% 8.27% 2.81% 24.11% 11.03% 21.28% 23.47% 
2
0
0
4
 
Mean 33.53% 11.02% 22.52% 16.56 166.58% 5.66% 4.06% 22.26% 7.79% 14.47% 41.87% 
Median 25.24% 2.48% 16.70% 16.39 153.54% 5.27% 3.33% 20.18% 3.92% 15.30% 39.08% 
Max 93.77% 90.00% 87.38% 20.00 444.44% 28.00% 21.73% 77.75% 38.91% 67.88% 90.12% 
Min 0.89% 0.00% 0.89% 14.25 20.98% -11.22% 0.07% -64.77% 0.00% -65.03% 0.55% 
SD 24.00% 16.72% 17.95% 1.31 74.42% 6.82% 3.46% 25.52% 9.61% 23.24% 23.82% 
2
0
0
5
 
Mean 28.75% 7.33% 21.43% 16.67 184.69% 5.87% 3.40% 24.37% 9.19% 15.17% 40.33% 
Median 26.73% 0.49% 18.92% 16.53 171.66% 5.07% 2.84% 24.02% 4.87% 12.28% 38.90% 
Max 91.97% 68.20% 74.01% 20.12 488.74% 34.12% 12.64% 81.33% 39.92% 61.64% 91.23% 
Min 0.79% 0.00% 0.79% 14.06 25.43% -32.52% 0.00% -51.79% 0.00% -52.37% 0.39% 
SD 19.15% 12.48% 14.53% 1.35 79.52% 9.47% 2.59% 24.30% 10.44% 20.60% 24.63% 
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Table 4.3 Continued 
 
 
 
TDEBT LDEBT SDEBT SIZE GROW PROFIT NDTS LIQ CLIQ NCLIQ TANG 
2
0
0
6
 
Mean 30.15% 7.06% 23.10% 16.71 163.76% 2.51% 3.38% 21.76% 9.11% 12.66% 39.56% 
Median 27.50% 0.77% 21.09% 16.62 142.98% 3.40% 3.08% 20.80% 5.83% 11.96% 37.11% 
Max 91.85% 70.17% 67.25% 20.21 612.98% 29.47% 11.88% 81.26% 48.51% 68.77% 88.47% 
Min 1.71% 0.00% 1.71% 14.05 65.93% -26.01% 0.00% -28.25% 0.00% -31.53% 0.75% 
SD 18.77% 12.02% 14.44% 1.37 82.00% 8.34% 2.29% 22.90% 9.80% 19.22% 22.07% 
2
0
0
7
 
Mean 31.91% 6.02% 25.90% 16.79 177.58% 3.90% 3.16% 20.76% 8.46% 12.29% 38.19% 
Median 30.32% 0.40% 23.04% 16.71 154.84% 4.88% 3.04% 16.14% 4.59% 9.45% 35.72% 
Max 91.69% 69.25% 85.77% 20.31 619.79% 29.38% 11.14% 78.72% 50.70% 76.04% 89.94% 
Min 0.77% 0.00% 0.77% 14.01 55.84% -30.85% 0.00% -30.35% 0.00% -30.79% 0.44% 
SD 18.86% 11.37% 16.18% 1.40 92.49% 9.18% 2.12% 21.87% 10.01% 19.51% 22.30% 
2
0
0
8
 
Mean 34.85% 7.47% 27.37% 16.89 164.77% 1.80% 2.96% 19.88% 9.42% 10.45% 37.11% 
Median 32.28% 1.62% 24.87% 16.74 136.27% 3.34% 2.56% 17.45% 4.90% 9.26% 33.90% 
Max 90.20% 64.55% 84.50% 20.59 460.54% 43.30% 11.23% 80.29% 51.99% 63.98% 89.90% 
Min 1.35% 0.00% 0.93% 13.83 35.92% -60.01% 0.00% -28.44% 0.00% -32.06% 0.74% 
SD 21.62% 12.04% 18.74% 1.46 88.22% 12.74% 2.18% 23.16% 11.82% 19.38% 21.70% 
2
0
0
9
 
Mean 33.91% 8.35% 25.57% 16.88 157.24% 1.05% 2.55% 20.18% 9.69% 10.49% 37.81% 
Median 32.42% 3.13% 23.32% 16.79 133.21% 2.32% 2.36% 16.24% 5.27% 10.42% 35.40% 
Max 93.76% 67.62% 82.51% 20.60 437.16% 36.02% 11.79% 80.53% 66.35% 78.02% 92.95% 
Min 0.44% 0.00% 0.44% 13.76 15.36% -40.84% 0.00% -36.55% 0.00% -36.78% 0.84% 
SD 21.67% 12.91% 17.15% 1.49 92.19% 10.26% 2.26% 24.04% 11.87% 20.03% 21.69% 
2
0
1
0
 
Mean 34.61% 8.68% 25.93% 16.86 151.51% 0.76% 3.16% 19.57% 10.76% 8.82% 47.88% 
Median 32.71% 2.93% 23.01% 16.69 127.74% 2.02% 3.00% 19.70% 7.11% 9.42% 46.28% 
Max 94.47% 73.05% 87.66% 20.73 451.28% 35.51% 10.59% 79.22% 63.73% 75.91% 99.37% 
Min 1.25% 0.00% 1.25% 13.35 -2.59% -26.85% 0.00% -49.38% 0.00% -49.38% 1.22% 
SD 22.38% 13.20% 17.24% 1.54 92.55% 9.93% 2.22% 25.67% 11.54% 21.18% 23.50% 
2
0
1
1
 
Mean 36.28% 8.35% 27.93% 16.80 135.95% -0.72% 3.24% 16.28% 10.33% 5.96% 49.67% 
Median 32.47% 3.29% 23.57% 16.70 123.50% 0.96% 2.56% 15.62% 7.04% 7.75% 48.70% 
Max 91.53% 61.18% 73.41% 20.92 463.15% 31.47% 12.28% 74.88% 64.63% 72.92% 99.60% 
Min 0.47% 0.00% 0.47% 13.22 -67.21% -32.99% 0.00% -71.66% 0.00% -71.66% 0.86% 
SD 22.39% 12.46% 18.28% 1.54 83.85% 11.53% 2.45% 27.31% 11.72% 22.82% 23.57% 
Source: Calculated by the researcher based on companies’ guides available in Amman stock exchange website 
for several years. 
 
Table 4.4 shows the correlation matrix between the research variables. Most of the correlation 
coefficients are low, while a few are slightly high such as the correlation coefficient between 
growth opportunities and profitability; this high coefficient is not a major surprise since 
growing firms are likely to be more profitable than mature firms. Liquidity also has high 
correlation coefficients with most of the research variables, as we can see from Table 4.4. 
Liquidity has high negative correlation coefficients with the debt ratios, which might be a sign 
of support for the Pecking Order theory. Liquidity also has a high positive correlation 
coefficient with profitability; this can be explained by the fact that more profitable firms tend 
to accumulate their profits inside the firm. 
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Table 4.4 
Correlation Matrix 
The dependent variable is debt ratio (DEBT) which has three forms; total debt ratio (TDEBT) which is the ratio 
of total liabilities divided by the total assets, long term debt ratio (LDEBT) which is the ratio of long term 
liabilities divided by the total assets, and short term debt ratio (SDEBT) which is the ratio of current liabilities 
divided by the total assets. The independent variables; (SIZE) firm’s size which is the natural logarithm of the 
total assets, (GROW) growth opportunities which is the ratio of book value of total assets, minus the book value 
of equity, plus the market value of equity divided by book value of assets, (PROFIT) firm’s profitability which is 
the return on assets ROA, (LIQ) liquid assets which is net working capital divided by total assets, (NDTS) non-
debt tax shield which is the depreciation expenses divided by the total assets, and (TANG) assets tangibility 
which is the ratio of fixed assets divided by the total assets. For the period from 2000 to 2011. 
 
TDEBT LDEBT SDEBT SIZE GROW PROFIT NDTS LIQ CLIQ NCLIQ TANG 
TDEBT 1.0000 
          LDEBT 0.6405 1.0000 
         SDEBT 0.7717 0.0058 1.0000 
        SIZE 0.3550 0.3629 0.1618 1.0000 
       GROW -0.2373 -0.1559 -0.1799 0.2226 1.0000 
      PROFIT -0.2926 -0.1449 -0.2609 0.2789 0.5253 1.0000 
     NDTS -0.0447 0.0486 -0.0985 0.0320 -0.0319 0.0457 1.0000 
    LIQ -0.5400 -0.3287 -0.4309 -0.2160 0.2505 0.3334 -0.1509 1.0000 
   CLIQ -0.2804 -0.1989 -0.2004 0.0531 0.3282 0.3357 -0.0224 0.5280 1.0000 
  NCLIQ -0.4783 -0.2754 -0.3947 -0.2834 0.1114 0.2047 -0.1648 0.8808 0.0630 1.0000 
 TANG 0.0813 0.2387 -0.0919 -0.0050 -0.1356 -0.1796 0.4413 -0.5302 -0.3141 -0.4479 1.0000 
Source: Calculated by the researcher based on companies’ guides available in Amman stock exchange website 
for several years. 
 
4.4.2. Model analysis 
 
Our first model is the basic model which includes the dependent variable of the firm’s debt 
ratio DEBT. The firm’s debt will be analysed in three forms: as the total debt TDEBT (total 
liabilities to total assets), long-term debt LDEBT (long-term liabilities to total assets), and 
short-term debt SDEBT (current liabilities to total assets). For the independent variables, we 
will start with the main variables that have been used in the literature to determine the debt 
ratio, including firm’s size SIZE (the natural logarithm of the total assets), growth 
opportunities GROW (the market-to-book ratio), profitability PROFIT (return on assets 
ROA), non-debt tax shield NDTS (depreciation expenses to total assets), liquidity LIQ 
(current assets minus current liabilities to total assets), and assets tangibility TANG (fixed 
assets to total assets). 
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Table 4.5 shows the results of our three models. The first column shows the results of the 
model where the dependent variable is the total debt ratio, the second column shows the 
results where the dependent variable is the long-term debt, and the third column shows the 
results where the dependent variable is the short-term debt. The three models have been run as 
fixed-effect models for both cross-section and period. Further tests to determine whether the 
ordinary least squares, fixed-effect, or random effects model is the most appropriate model for 
our set of data have been conducted, including the likelihood ratio tests which determine 
wither the fixed-effect model is preferred to the ordinary least squares model or not; if the 
results of the likelihood ratio test show a statistical significance, the fixed-effect model is 
preferred to the ordinary least squares model, but if the results are insignificant then the 
ordinary least squares model is preferred to the fixed-effect model. Table 4.6 shows the 
results of the likelihood ratio tests where panel A is for total debt model, panel B is for long-
term debt model, and panel C is for short-term debt model.  
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Table 4.5 
Regression results 
DEBTit = αit + β1 SIZEit + β2 GROWit + β3 PROFITit + β4 NDTS it + β5 LIQit + β6 TANGit + uit. The dependent 
variable is debt ratio (DEBT) which has three forms; total debt ratio (TDEBT) which is the ratio of total 
liabilities divided by the total assets, long term debt ratio (LDEBT) which is the ratio of long term liabilities 
divided by the total assets, and short term debt ratio (SDEBT) which is the ratio of current liabilities divided by 
the total assets. The independent variables; (SIZE) firm’s size which is the natural logarithm of the total assets, 
(GROW) growth opportunities which is the ratio of book value of total assets, minus the book value of equity, 
plus the market value of equity divided by book value of assets, (PROFIT) firm’s profitability which is the return 
on assets ROA, (LIQ) liquid assets which is net working capital divided by total assets, (NDTS) non-debt tax 
shield which is the depreciation expenses divided by the total assets, and (TANG) assets tangibility which is the 
ratio of fixed assets divided by the total assets. The numbers in brackets are t-values, ***, **, * indicate 
coefficients are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. t-statistics are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity using White's (1980) correction. 
 
Dependent Variable 
TDEBT 
Fixed effects 
LDEBT 
Fixed effects 
SDEBT 
Fixed effects 
α0 
-0.3624 
(-1.2081) 
-1.0158*** 
(-7.3795) 
0.6534*** 
(3.3265) 
β1 (SIZE) 
0.0535*** 
(3.1927) 
0.0644*** 
(8.0289) 
-0.0110 
(-0.9497) 
β2 (GROW) 
-0.0100* 
(-1.6712) 
-0.0113** 
(-2.0892) 
0.0014 
(0.2768) 
β3 (PROFIT) 
-0.2689*** 
(-4.1694) 
-0.2648*** 
(-6.4608) 
-0.0041 
(0.0956) 
β4 (NDTS) 
0.3492 
(1.2195) 
0.4474*** 
(2.7362) 
-0.0982 
(-0.6959) 
β5 (LIQ) 
-0.5721*** 
(-8.4842) 
0.0390* 
(1.8446) 
-0.6111*** 
(-19.7621) 
β6 (TANG) 
-0.1633*** 
(-3.3359) 
0.0706*** 
(3.0181) 
-0.2339*** 
(-6.7296) 
Adj. R square 81.41% 66.89% 83.10% 
F statistic 44.74*** 21.1854*** 50.1132*** 
Number of observations 960 960 960 
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Table 4.6 shows that, for all models (i.e. total debt, long-term debt, and short-term debt 
models) the fixed-effect models are preferred to the ordinary least squares models, since the 
likelihood test showed significant results for cross-Section/period for our three models. 
 
Table 4.6 
Likelihood ratio test 
 
Panel A 
 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section and period fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 22.9634 -79863 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 1086.7951 79 0.0000 
Period F 1.9792 -11863 0.0275 
Period Chi-square 23.9183 11 0.0131 
Cross-Section/Period F 20.4995 -90.863 0.0000 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 1097.7936 90 0.0000 
     
      
 
Panel B 
 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section and period fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 15.2621 -79863 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 839.2917 79 0.0000 
Period F 4.7207 -11863 0.0000 
Period Chi-square 56.0931 11 0.0000 
Cross-Section/Period F 14.1834 -90863 0.0000 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 871.6000 90 0.0000 
     
     
 
Panel C 
 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section and period fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 32.1773 -79863 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 1317.6846 79 0.0000 
Period F 4.2294 -11863 0.0000 
Period Chi-square 50.4052 11 0.0000 
Cross-Section/Period F 28.9272 -90863 0.0000 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 1334.8523 90 0.0000 
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Another test conducted to determine whether the random effects model is preferred to the 
fixed-effect model is the Hausman test; if the results of the Hausman test show a statistical 
significance, the random effects model is not preferred over the fixed-effect model, but if the 
results are insignificant then the random effects model is preferred to the fixed-effect model. 
Table 7 shows the results of the Hausman tests where panel A is for total debt model, panel B 
is for long-term debt model, and panel C is for short-term debt model. The random effects 
tests have been run as random for both cross-section and period but because the results of 
Hausman tests always show that the period test variance is invalid, and the Hausman statistic 
is set to zero, we rerun all the models with random effect only for the cross-section. The 
results in Table 7 panels A, B, and C suggest that, for the total debt ratio model, and the long- 
and short-term debt ratio models, the fixed-effect model is preferred to the random effects 
model, since the results show a significant value for the Chi-Square statistic. 
 
Table 4.7 
Hausman test 
 
Panel A 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 13.6974 6 0.0332 
     
     
 
Panel B 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 17.6824 6 0.0071 
     
     
 
 
Panel C 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 32.8768 6 0.0000 
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Having found the preferred model from our three candidates, we can start our analysis. 
Firstly, in the total debt ratio model we regress the total debt ratio to a group of explanatory 
variables that include firm’s size, growth opportunities, profitability, non-debt tax shield, 
liquidity, and assets tangibility. As we mentioned before, having run some statistical tests we 
found that the preferred model is the fixed-effect model. The results for total debt ratio model 
suggest the following. Firm’s size has a positive and significant relationship with total debt 
ratio which means that larger firms tend have a higher total debt ratio compared to smaller 
firms; this result supports the transaction theory as it suggests that larger firms are more able 
to access debt markets to obtain external sources of funding, and are also more able to 
diversify their investments, thus reducing the likelihood of bankruptcy. 
 
Growth opportunities have a negative and significant relationship with total debt ratio. Myers 
(1977) and Titman and Wessels (1988) suggested that the relationship between growth 
opportunities and debt ratio is negative. In a state of nature, the firm will lose some of the 
valuable investment opportunities with more risky debt finance; also, growing firms have a 
higher agency cost, and even if they have invested in capital assets, some of those assets are 
not collateralized and can be seen as intangible or unable to generate income for the firm. 
Many capital assets are useful and valuable as long as the firm remains in business, but if the 
firm goes bankrupt those capital assets’ value will fall dramatically; this result is consistent 
with the Trade-off theory view. Another reason is that Jordanian firms depend on equity-
financing more than debt-financing; Table A1 in appendix A shows the secondary public 
offering (SEO) for the Jordanian firms during the period from 2000 to 2011. 
 
A firm’s profitability has a significant negative relationship with total debt ratio, which means 
that more profitable firms tend to have lower debt ratios. This result supports the Pecking 
Order theory view which suggests that firms follow a specific order when they require new 
financing started with the cheapest source and then moving to the next cheapest source and so 
on until they fulfil their needs. According to the Pecking Order theory, the firm will start with 
their internal funds as these are cheapest source of financing available; it will then move on to 
other sources such as debt- and equity-financing. So, we expect to find this negative 
relationship between profitability and debt ratio as those more profitable firms tend to depend 
more on their own funds rather than obtaining funds from external and more expensive 
sources. 
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Non-debt tax shield has no statistically significant effect on total debt ratio for Jordanian 
firms, which means that, for Jordanian firms, the existence of the other tax shields will not 
affect the total debt ratio. The relationship between debt ratio and the non-debt tax shield is 
expected to be negative since, with other tax shields, the benefits of having debt in the firm’s 
capital structure will become relatively less important as a way to reduce the taxable income; 
more debt in the firm’s capital will only increase the probability of bankruptcy and no extra 
benefits of tax reduction are associated with this increased debt. The most likely reason for 
the insignificant relationship between total debt ratio and the non-debt tax shield in Jordanian 
firms is that Jordanian firms depend more on short-term debt compared to long-term debt as 
we mentioned earlier in the descriptive analysis section; this means that most of the firm’s 
debt has no tax expenses or carries very low interest expenses with less than one year’s 
maturity, which explains why there is no significant relationship between total debt ratio and 
non-debt tax shield for Jordanian firms. 
 
Liquidity has mixed effects on the debt ratio, as the theories and the literature suggested; the 
initial view suggests that liquidity has a negative effect on the debt ratio because the firm can 
use this increased liquidity to finance its investments rather than depend on external sources 
of financing such as debt-financing, which is a more expensive source as the Pecking Order 
theory suggests. Also, according to Prowse’s (1990) argument about liquidity and the 
relationship between shareholders and debt-holders, liquidity can be used as a sign to show 
how shareholders are able to manipulate the available liquidity at the expense of debt-holders. 
The second view suggests that liquidity has a positive effect on the debt ratio because, with 
more liquidity, the firm is able to service a higher level of debt in its capital structure if any 
financial obligations are due. The results from the sample of Jordanian firms show that the 
relationship between a firm’s liquidity and its total debt ratio is significantly negative. This 
result supports the Pecking Order theory view, as the firm with more liquidity will use that 
available liquidity to finance its investments rather than depend on debt-financing which 
carries a higher cost. Also, in Jordanian firms’ case, as we showed earlier, most of the firms’ 
debts are short-term debts; so, firms will borrow less if they have liquidity rather than depend 
on short-term debt, since their liquidity will be sufficient to cover the short-term needs, which 
account for the larger portion of total debt in the Jordanian market at about 75% of the total 
debt. 
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Assets tangibility is one of the variables that affect the debt structure of the firm; with more 
tangible assets, debt can be more secured as these tangible (fixed) assets can be used as 
collateral in case of bankruptcy. The results from our sample show that assets tangibility has a 
significant negative relationship with the firm’s total debt ratio. Again, as we mentioned 
before, the structure of the debt in Jordanian firms can provide a better explanation of why 
there is a negative relationship rather than a positive one as we expected. Since short-term 
debt in Jordanian firms represents about 75% of the total debt, having more tangible assets 
will not be seen as a good sign. This is because, for short-term debt which will mature in less 
than one year, the firm needs to have short-term assets to match this maturity since the 
tangible assets are long-term assets; this means that, if the short-term debt matures, the firm 
may not be able to meet that short-term financial obligation using the tangible assets. So, in 
Jordanian firms’ case, we found that assets tangibility has a negative effect on firms’ debt. 
Chittenden et al. (1996), Bevan and Danbolt (2002) and Song (2005) found that that the assets 
tangibility and the long-term debt have a positive relationship while there is a negative 
relationship between assets tangibility and the short-term debt. 
 
The overall model has an adjusted R square value of 81.41% which means that the previous 
set of explanatory variables can explain 81.41% of the total debt ratio; it is also has an F 
statistic of 89.19 which is significant at the 1% level, which means that the overall model is 
significant at 1%. 
 
Having investigated how the total debt ratio in Jordanian firms is affected by a group of 
explanatory variables, we will now investigate how the same explanatory variables will affect 
the long- and short-term debt ratios for the same sample of Jordanian firms, starting with the 
long-term debt ratio and then moving on to the short-term debt ratio. 
 
Secondly, we come to the long-term debt ratio model; in this model we regressed the long-
term debt ratio measured as long-term liabilities to total assets to the same group of 
explanatory variables that we used in the first model which has the total debt ratio as 
dependent variable. Firm’s size has a significant positive relationship with long-term debt, as 
we mentioned earlier. This result supports the transaction theory which states that larger firms 
are more able to access debt markets at relatively lower cost compared to smaller firms and 
are thus better able to diversify their investments which will reduce the chance of bankruptcy 
and allow those firms to obtain more debt. 
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Growth opportunities show a significant negative relationship with long-term debt. Again, as 
suggested by (Myers 1977) and Titman and Wessels (1988), this relationship is negative since 
growing firms invest in valuable assets that can generate income and add value as long as the 
firm remains in business. This negative relationship also results from the higher agency costs 
associated with growing firms. Another reason for this negative relationship is that firms in 
the Jordanian capital market depend more on equity-financing to support their growth; Table 
A1 in appendix A shows the new equity-financing for firms in the Jordanian capital markets 
during the analysis period. 
 
Firm’s profitability has a negative and significant relationship with long-term debt ratio. 
Pecking Order theory can be used to explain this result as this theory suggests that firms will 
use the cheapest source of financing to provide their required funds before considering other 
sources, starting with the cheapest to the more expensive until they cover all the funds they 
need. So, profitable firms will use their internal funds which are the cheapest source of 
financing to provide the needed funds, which explains the negative relationship between a 
firm’s profitability and its long-term debt ratio. 
 
The relationship between non-debt tax shield and long-term debt is significantly positive. This 
relationship is expected to be negative since, with the availability of other tax shields from 
non-debt sources, the benefits of having debt in the firm’s capital structure compared to the 
costs associated with debt-holding will decline, and this is expected to lead to a lower debt 
ratio in the firm’s capital structure. On the other hand, the non-debt tax shield such as the one 
we used in this study is calculated as the depreciation expenses to the total assets, which 
means that it can also be seen as a proxy for the level of the fixed assets inside the firm. In 
other words, the positive relationship between the non-debt tax shield and the long-term debt 
can be explained as follows: as Jordanian firms hold more fixed assets, these fixed assets give 
the lenders more security for their loans to the firms and explain why firms with higher non-
debt tax shields still have higher long-term debt ratios compared to the firms with lower non-
debt tax shields. 
 
Liquidity has a dual effect, as we mentioned earlier. It could have a negative effect, as 
Pecking Order theory suggests, when the firm depends on its own liquidity rather than using 
external debt or equity-financing. Or it could have a positive effect as this liquidity will 
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support a higher level of debt by allowing the firm to meet more financial obligations. Earlier, 
we found that total debt ratio and liquidity are negatively related, but with long-term debt 
ratio the relationship is positive, but only at the 10% significance level. With long-term debt, 
firms should be able to meet more financial obligations in the long and the short term 
including the interest expenses (short term) and the principle amount of the debt (long term); 
the availability of liquidity will support this higher level of debt, which explains the positive 
relationship between liquidity and long-term debt. 
 
Assets tangibility will provide security for the firm’s debt, as these fixed assets can be used as 
collateral in case of bankruptcy. The more tangible (fixed) assets that the firm has, the more 
long-term debt it can take on. The results showed that, for Jordanian firms, the relationship 
between assets tangibility and long-term debt is positive; as we explained, with more fixed 
assets firms in Jordan can take on more long-term debt as these long-term debts can be 
secured with more fixed assets available to those firms. 
 
The overall model has an adjusted R square value of 66.89% which means that the previous 
set of explanatory variables can explain about 67% of the long-term debt ratio; it is also has 
an F statistic of 22.49 which is significant at the 1% level, which means that the overall model 
is significant at the 1% level. 
 
Thirdly, we come to the short-term debt ratio model; in this model we regressed the short-
term debt ratio, measured as current liabilities to total assets, to the same group of explanatory 
variables that we used in the first two models. Of the six explanatory variables, only two 
variables are significantly related to short-term debt. 
 
Liquidity has a significant positive relationship with short-term debt. As we explained in 
previous models, according to the Pecking Order theory firms will depend on their own 
source of financing, which is cheaper than the other sources available. So, as suggested by the 
Pecking Order theory, we found that short-term debt is positively related to firm’s liquidity. 
 
Assets tangibility has a significant negative relationship with short-term debt. Tangible assets 
can be used as collateral for firms’ long-term debt; however, tangible assets have different 
maturities compared to the short-term debt so the effect of these tangible assets on the short-
term debt is negative since the firm cannot liquidize those assets to meet any financial 
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obligations associated with the short-term debt. This explains the significant negative 
relationship that we found in our sample. This relationship has been discussed by Chittenden 
et al. (1996), Bevan and Danbolt (2002) and Song (2005) who found that assets tangibility is 
positively related to the long-term debt ratio but is negatively related to the short-term debt 
ratio. 
 
Firm’s size, growth opportunity, profitability, and non-debt tax shield have no significant 
relationship with the short-term debt ratio. The most likely reason for these results is that the 
short-term debt ratio matures in less than one year, which makes the effect of those variables 
relatively low on this type of debt compared to the long-term debt ratio, which may explain 
why there is no significant relationship between them and the short-term debt ratio. 
 
The overall model has an adjusted R square value of 83.10% which means that the previous 
set of explanatory variables can explain about 83% of the short-term debt ratio; it also has an 
F statistic of 41.52 which is significant at the 1% level. 
 
4.4.3. Further analysis of the liquidity variable 
 
As the main aim of this chapter is to discover how the cash-holding decisions affect the 
capital structure, we will now take our analysis a step further by breaking down the liquidity 
variable into two components: the cash liquidity (CLIQ) which is measured as cash and cash 
equivalents to the total assets; and the non-cash liquidity (NCLIQ) which is measured as net 
working capital minus cash and cash equivalents to the total assets. 
 
Table 4.8 shows the results of our three new models. As with our basic models, the first 
column shows the results of the model where the dependent variable is the total debt ratio, the 
second column shows the results where the dependent variable is the long-term debt, and the 
third column shows the results where the dependent variable is the short-term debt. These 
three models are constructed by using the fixed-effect model for both cross-section and 
period. Further tests have been conducted to determine whether the ordinary least squares, 
fixed-effect, or random effects model is the most appropriate model for our set of data. These 
include the likelihood ratio tests which determine whether the fixed-effect model is preferred 
to the ordinary least squares model; if the results of the likelihood ratio test show a statistical 
significance, the fixed-effect model is preferred over the ordinary least squares model, but if 
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the results are insignificant then the ordinary least squares model is preferred over the fixed-
effect model. Table 4.9 shows the results of the likelihood ratio tests where panel A is for 
total debt model, panel B is for long-term debt model, and panel C is for short-term debt 
model. 
 
Similar to our analysis of the basic models, the results from the likelihood ratio test show 
significant values for the three models under investigation, which means that the fixed-effect 
model is preferred to the ordinary least squares model. 
 
For the Hausman test, the results were similar to our analysis of the basic models. For our 
three models, the Chi-Square statistic was significant, which means that the fixed-effect 
model is preferred over the random effects model. See table 4.10. 
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Table 4.8 
Regression results 
 
DEBTit = αit + β1 SIZEit + β2 GROWit + β3 PROFITit + β4 NDTS it + β5 CLIQit + β6 NCLIQit + β6 TANGit + u it. 
The dependent variable is debt ratio (DEBT) which has three forms; total debt ratio (TDEBT) which is the ratio 
of total liabilities divided by the total assets, long term debt ratio (LDEBT) which is the ratio of long term 
liabilities divided by the total assets, and short term debt ratio (SDEBT) which is the ratio of current liabilities 
divided by the total assets. The independent variables; (SIZE) firm’s size which is the natural logarithm of the 
total assets, (GROW) growth opportunities which is the ratio of book value of total assets, minus the book value 
of equity, plus the market value of equity divided by book value of assets, (PROFIT) firm’s profitability which is 
the return on assets ROA, (CLIQ) cash liquid assets which is cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets, 
(NCLIQ) non-cash liquid assets which is net working capital minus cash and cash equivalents divided by total 
assets, (NDTS) non-debt tax shield which is the depreciation expenses divided by the total assets, and (TANG) 
assets tangibility which is the ratio of fixed assets divided by the total assets. The numbers in brackets are t-
values, ***, **, * indicate coefficients are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. t-statistics are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity using White's (1980) correction. 
 
Dependent Variable 
TDEBT 
Fixed effects 
LDEBT 
Fixed effects 
SDEBT 
Fixed effects 
α0 
-0.4058 
(-1.3972) 
-0.9837*** 
(-7.1036) 
0.5779*** 
(3.0308) 
β1 (SIZE) 
0.0554*** 
(3.3875) 
0.0630*** 
(7.8296) 
-0.0076 
(-0.6777) 
β2 (GROW) 
-0.0095 
(-1.5967) 
-0.0116** 
(-2.1499) 
0.0021 
(0.4341) 
β3 (PROFIT) 
-0.2719*** 
(-4.2585) 
-0.2625*** 
(-6.4138) 
-0.0093 
(-0.2229) 
β4 (NDTS) 
0.3641 
(1.2709) 
0.4364*** 
(2.6712) 
-0.0723 
(-0.5278) 
β5 (CLIQ) 
-0.5007*** 
(-9.0035) 
-0.0139 
(-0.3985) 
-0.4867*** 
(-13.4197) 
Β6 (NCLIQ) 
-0.5904*** 
(-8.0778) 
0.0526** 
(2.3588) 
-0.6430*** 
(-19.8272) 
Β7 (TANG) 
-0.1500*** 
(-3.1883) 
0.0607** 
(2.5375) 
-0.2107*** 
(-6.2156) 
Adj. R square 81.48% 66.99% 83.58% 
F statistic 44.5015*** 21.0679*** 51.3354*** 
Number of observations 960 960 960 
 
  
182 
 
Table 4.9 
Likelihood ratio test 
 
Panel A 
 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section and period fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 23.0693 -79862 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 1090.5457 79 0.0000 
Period F 1.8968 -11862 0.0364 
Period Chi-square 22.9602 11 0.0179 
Cross-Section/Period F 20.5913 -90862 0.0000 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 1101.4771 90 0.0000 
     
     
 
Panel B 
 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section and period fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 15.3467 -79862 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 843.0404 79 0.0000 
Period F 4.4685 -11862 0.0000 
Period Chi-square 53.2373 11 0.0000 
Cross-Section/Period F 14.2456 -90862 0.0000 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 874.7748 90 0.0000 
     
     
 
Panel C 
 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section and period fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 33.3174 -79862 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 1343.5853 79 0.0000 
Period F 3.2446 -11862 0.0002 
Period Chi-square 38.9477 11 0.0001 
Cross-Section/Period F 29.8818 -90862 0.0000 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 1359.1982 90 0.0000 
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Table 4.10 
Hausman test 
 
Panel A 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 15.3787 7 0.0314 
     
      
Panel B 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 23.6073 7 0.0013 
     
      
Panel C 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 36.8575 7 0.0000 
     
     
 
The new models’ results are very similar to the basic models’ results in regard to the firm’s 
size, growth opportunities, profitability, non-debt tax shield, and assets tangibility
16
. So, in 
this section we will not discuss these variables as they have been analysed in the model 
analysis section; we will only analyse the new two variables (cash and non-cash liquidity) that 
we derived for the liquidity variable. 
 
For the total debt model, cash and non-cash liquidity have a negative and significant 
relationship with total debt ratio. As we explained before, this negative relationship supports 
the Pecking Order theory view which suggests that firms will depend on the cheapest 
available source of financing; this means that the firm’s dependency on debt-financing is 
lower when it has sufficient available liquidity to finance its operations and investments. 
 
                                                 
16
 Except for the growth opportunities in the total debt model; in the second model the growth opportunities 
become insignificant to the total debt ratio while in the first model it was significant at 10% level. A comparison 
of the t-Statistic and p-value for the two models shows that they are very close to each other (t-Statistic -1.6712, 
p-value 0.0951 for the first model, t-Statistic -1.5967, p-value 0.1107 for the second model). 
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For the long-term debt model, the cash liquidity did not show any significant relationship with 
the long-term debt ratio. A possible reason for this insignificant relationship is that, because 
of the long-term nature of this type of debt, the cash itself will not have a direct effect on the 
long-term debt ratio compared to non-cash assets or fixed assets which act as secure collateral 
for long-term debt; cash liquidity may play a more significant role in explaining the short-
term debt as the time horizon for this type of debt will be more affected by the available 
liquidity in its most liquid form (i.e. the cash form). On the other hand, the non-cash liquidity 
has a significant positive relationship with the long-term debt ratio; as explained earlier, with 
more liquidity in the form of non-cash assets, firms can support more long-term debt where 
this non-cash liquidity can be liquidized and used to support higher levels of long-term debt. 
 
Finally, for the short-term debt model we found further support for the Pecking Order theory, 
since both cash and non-cash liquidity show significant negative relationships with the short-
term debt. This means that firms in Jordan will depend on their own liquidity as cash and non-
cash liquidity to finance their short-term needs before using short-term debt-financing. 
 
4.4.4. The Dynamic model 
 
In these models we investigated the speed of adjustment of the total debt ratio, long-term debt 
ratio, and short-term debt ratio. Table 4.11 shows the results of these three models. Firstly, the 
results of the total debt ratio model showed that firms in Jordan adjusted their total debt ratio 
toward the target ratio quickly, as δ is equal to 0.3130, which means that α the speed of 
adjustment given by (1 – δ) is relatively high and equal to 0.6870; the speed of adjustment 
takes a value between 0 and 1, where 0 indicates that firms do not adjust toward the target 
debt ratio and the debt ratio in the current year is equal to the debt ratio in the previous year, 
while a value of 1 means that firms obtained their optimal debt ratio and the debt ratio in the 
current year is equal to the optimal debt ratio. In other words, the higher value of α (the speed 
of adjustment) means that the firm is close to its optimal debt ratio (Ozkan, 2001; Gaud et al., 
2005; Serrasqueiro and Macas Nunes, 2008). For the rest of the explanatory variables, the 
GMM produced some different results compared to those shown by the static fixed-effect 
model. Ozkan (2001) also noted some changes when he used the GMM model as some 
explanatory variables change their sign, significance level, or both. 
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Table 4.11 
Dynamic models results 
 
DEBTit = γ0 + δ DEBTit-1 + γ1 SIZEit + γ2 GROWit + γ3 PROFITit + γ4 NDTSit + γ5 CLIQit + γ6 NCLIQit + γ7 
TANGit + εi,t. The dependent variable is debt ratio (DEBT) which has three forms; total debt ratio (TDEBT) 
which is the ratio of total liabilities divided by the total assets, long term debt ratio (LDEBT) which is the ratio 
of long term liabilities divided by the total assets, and short term debt ratio (SDEBT) which is the ratio of current 
liabilities divided by the total assets. The independent variables; (SIZE) firm’s size which is the natural 
logarithm of the total assets, (GROW) growth opportunities which is the ratio of book value of total assets, 
minus the book value of equity, plus the market value of equity divided by book value of assets, (PROFIT) 
firm’s profitability which is the return on assets ROA, (CLIQ) cash liquid assets which is cash and cash 
equivalents divided by total assets, (NCLIQ) non-cash liquid assets which is net working capital minus cash and 
cash equivalents divided by total assets, (NDTS) non-debt tax shield which is the depreciation expenses divided 
by the total assets, and (TANG) assets tangibility which is the ratio of fixed assets divided by the total assets. 
The numbers in brackets are t-values, ***, **, * indicate coefficients are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels respectively. t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity using White's (1980) correction. 
 
Dependent Variable 
TDEBT 
GMM 
LDEBT 
GMM 
SDEBT 
GMM 
δ (DEBTit-1) 
0.3130*** 
(8.1746) 
0.4064*** 
(12.6889) 
-0.0141 
(-0.4846) 
γ1 (SIZE) 
0.0268 
(1.5779) 
0.0485*** 
(3.4493) 
0.0191 
(1.1871) 
γ2 (GROW) 
-0.0397*** 
(-3.0705) 
-0.1316*** 
(-24.7814) 
-0.0104 
(-1.0663) 
γ3 (PROFIT) 
0.0964* 
(1.6697) 
-0.1612*** 
(-3.2139) 
0.1749*** 
(3.4247) 
γ4 (NDTS) 
1.1630*** 
(3.6651) 
0.1663 
(1.4881) 
-1.2884*** 
(-4.0595) 
γ5 (CLIQ) 
-0.1200 
(-1.2334) 
-0.1823*** 
(-3.1008) 
-0.5281*** 
(-6.2892) 
γ6 (NCLIQ) 
-0.4987*** 
(-9.1771) 
0.1975*** 
(7.8545) 
-0.7383*** 
(-28.6382) 
γ7 (TANG) 
-0.0513 
(-1.5159) 
-0.0639** 
(-2.5744) 
-0.0534* 
(-1.7154) 
Wald test 485.2374*** 7,496.0500*** 911.1256*** 
Sargan test 50.5234*** 46.3178*** 45.1419*** 
Number of observations 800 800 800 
 
186 
 
Firm’s size under the GMM model showed a positive relationship with total debt ratio but it 
becomes insignificant; Ozkan (2001) found the same situation when the firm’s size variable 
become insignificant under the GMM model and it also became negatively related to debt 
ratio. Growth opportunities are still negatively related to total debt ratio and now become 
significant, thus supporting the Trade-off theory view. Profitability in the GMM, where the 
explanatory variables are now treated as endogenous, becomes positively related to the total 
debt ratio; this positive relationship, although weak (only at 10% level), can be explained by 
the fact that, with more profit, firms can afford more debt as they can pay back the debt and 
service it. Another reason is that a higher level of debt will help to reduce the taxable income 
and the free cash flow generated by the extra profit; also, more profit will reduce the 
likelihood of bankruptcy, thus allowing the firm to take on a higher level of debt. Non-debt 
tax shield under the GMM model is still positively related to total debt ratio and now becomes 
significant; this positive relationship can be explained by the notion that this variable can be 
seen as a proxy for the fixed assets as well, which means that firms with higher non-debt tax 
shields have more fixed assets which can be used to secure higher levels of debt. Liquidity in 
the form of cash and non-cash has a negative relationship with the total debt; as we explained 
before, this result supports the Pecking Order theory where liquidity can be used as a cheaper 
source of financing before the firm has to obtain more expensive financing such as debt. 
Assets tangibility, although insignificant, is still negatively related to total debt ratio. 
 
Secondly, under the long-term debt ratio model the speed of adjustment is also quick with α 
equal to 0.5936, and we can see that Jordanian firms adjusted their long-term debt quickly 
toward the optimal level. As for the rest of the explanatory variables, firm’s size, growth 
opportunities, profitability, and non-cash liquidity have the same results as the fixed-effect 
model, so we will not explain those results again. Non-debt tax shield, although retaining the 
same sign, now becomes insignificant; cash liquidity, on the other hand, becomes significant 
and still has the same sign. Assets tangibility becomes negatively related to the long-term debt 
ratio; this might be explained by the notion that tangible assets help to reduce the asymmetric 
information, which makes equity-financing preferable. 
 
Thirdly, for the short-term debt ratio the speed of adjustment is insignificant, which means 
that Jordanian firms do not have a target or optimal short-term debt ratio as short-term debt is 
more of an operational decision than a financing decision. As for the rest of the explanatory 
variables, firm’s size, growth opportunities, cash liquidity, non-cash liquidity, and tangibility 
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have the same results as the fixed-effect model, so we will not explain those results again. 
Non-debt tax shield is now significant again as this variable can be a proxy for the level of 
fixed assets and, since the short-term debt is measured as short-term liabilities, the difference 
in the time horizon for these two variables can explain this negative relationship. Profitability 
has a significant positive relationship with short-term debt; this can be explained by the notion 
that, with more profit, firms are able to repay their debts since the likelihood of bankruptcy is 
lower, meaning that these more profitable firms are able to afford more debt. 
 
4.4.5. Hypotheses analysis 
 
The first and second hypotheses; H2: Firm’s size has a positive effect on the firm’s capital 
structure. H3: Firm’s size has a negative effect on the firm’s capital structure. 
 
For the total and the long-term debt ratio in both models, firm’s size shows a positive 
relationship with the debt ratio. As we explained, this relationship is due to the Trade-off 
theory which suggests that larger firms are more able to access external sources of financing 
at cheaper cost since they are more likely to be diversified and have more collateral to secure 
the higher level of debt. Meanwhile, the results for the short-term debt ratio models showed a 
negative relationship with the firm’s size; as we explained, this negative relationship is due to 
lower asymmetric information, which makes equity-financing preferable. It may also be due 
to a higher transaction cost for the smaller firms, as Titman and Wessels (1988) argued. 
 
The third and the fourth hypotheses; H4: Growth opportunities have a negative effect on the 
firm’s capital structure. H5: Growth opportunities have a positive effect on the firm’s capital 
structure.  
 
The results of the total and the long-term debt models showed that this relationship is 
negative. These results support the Trade-off theory as growing firms have higher agency 
costs. For the short-term debt models, the relationship was insignificant. Also, as we 
explained before, Jordanian firms depend more on equity-financing to support their growth 
opportunities, for religious reasons. Also, as we mentioned, Myers (1977) and Titman and 
Wessels (1988) suggested that some of the assets acquired during the growth period are 
valuable as long as the firm remains in business; however, should the firm go bankrupt, the 
value of these assets would fall dramatically. The short-term debt is not directly related to 
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growth opportunities as the maturity of these two variables does not match; short-term debt 
matures in less than a year while growth usually accrues in the long run - more than a year. 
 
The fifth and sixth hypotheses; H6: Profitability has a positive effect on the firm’s capital 
structure. H7: Profitability has a negative effect on the firm’s capital structure. 
 
As the Pecking Order theory suggested and the results on total and long-term debt showed, 
profitability has a negative effect on debt ratio as the firm will depend on it as a cheaper 
source of financing rather than using more expensive sources such as debt-financing. 
 
The seventh and eighth hypotheses; H8: Non-debt tax shields have a negative effect on the 
firm’s capital structure. H9: Non-debt tax shields have a positive effect on the firm’s capital 
structure. 
 
Non-debt tax shield only showed a significant relationship with the long-term debt. This was 
a positive relationship which can be explained by the fact that non-debt tax shield can be a 
proxy for the size of fixed assets held by the firm, and not just as a tax shield; this means that 
the positive relationship is due to the fact that, with more fixed assets, long-term debt can be 
secured since the firm has more fixed assets for use as collateral in case of bankruptcy. 
 
The ninth and tenth hypotheses; H10: Liquidity has a positive effect on the firm’s capital 
structure. H11: Liquidity has a negative effect on the firm’s capital structure. 
 
The results for the long-term debt models only showed a positive relationship with liquidity in 
the forms of total liquidity, cash, and non-cash liquidity. These results suggested that a higher 
level of liquidity allows the firm to obtain more long-term debt as liquidity can help the firm 
meet the financial obligations associated with long-term debt, as the Trade-off theory 
suggested. On the other hand, the results for the total and short-term debt models showed that 
the relationship with liquidity is negative. These results support the view of the Pecking Order 
theory which suggested that firms started with the cheapest source available to finance their 
operations and investment. Liquidity will provide the firm with a cheaper source of financing 
which means that it will depend less on debt-financing, especially for short-term financing. 
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The eleventh and twelfth hypotheses; H12: Assets tangibility has a positive effect on firm’s 
capital structure. H13: Assets tangibility has a negative effect on firm’s capital structure. 
 
The more tangible and fixed assets the firm has the more secured its debt will be. These assets 
will be used as collateral for the firm debt in the case of bankruptcy, as the Trade-off theory 
suggested. This explanation of the positive relationship works for the long-term debt, but 
when it comes to the total debt and the short-term debt, the results showed a negative 
relationship. The Pecking Order theory suggested that the negative relationship can be 
explained by the fact that, with more tangible assets, the asymmetric information will be 
reduced, which makes equity-financing preferable. Also, tangible and fixed assets with long-
run maturity compared to the short-run maturity of the short-term debt could make the effect 
become negative as these tangible and fixed assets cannot be liquidised in a short period of 
time or without major losses. This may explain why short-term debt has a negative 
relationship with assets tangibility, as the results from our sample showed and as Chittenden 
et al. (1996), Bevan and Danbolt (2002) and Song (2005) found. 
 
The thirteenth hypothesis; H14: The effects of the firm’s characteristics on the long-term debt 
ratio are different from the effects on the short-term debt. 
 
The results from our sample showed that the long-term debt ratio and the short-term debt ratio 
models generated totally different results for the explanatory variables, as Tables 4.5 and 4.8 
showed; these different results are due to the different time maturity for these two forms of 
debt ratio. 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we investigated how the capital structure of Jordanian firms is affected by a 
group of explanatory variables; among these variables, we were interested in the liquidity 
variable. We started with basic models to gain a better understanding of how liquidity affects 
the debt ratio. These basic models measured debt ratio in three ways: total debt ratio, long-
term debt ratio, and short-term debt ratio. The effect of liquidity on debt ratio can be positive 
or negative; Pecking Order theory suggests that the effect should be negative since the firm 
will depend on its own liquidity before starting to use external sources which are more 
expensive. In another view, the effect of liquidity on debt ratio can be positive when this 
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liquidity is seen as a source for the firm to meet the financial obligations associated with the 
debt, thus allowing the firm to have a higher level of debt. Then we took the analysis a step 
further by breaking down the liquidity variable into two other variables: the cash liquidity 
variable and the non-cash liquidity variable. The new adjusted models provided us with 
results that were consistent with the results from the basic models. 
 
The sample of this research included 80 non-financial publicly traded firms listed in the 
Amman stock exchange. With 12 years’ data from the year 2000 to 2011, the final number of 
observations was 960. We used a balanced panel data analysis on our data; both the likelihood 
ratio test and the Hausman test were applied to determine the best model to use among the 
ordinary least squares, fixed-effect, or random effects models. Then we used a GMM model 
to understand how firms in Jordan adjusted their debt ratio toward optimal or target debt ratio. 
 
The results showed support for both the Trade-off theory and the Pecking Order theory; many 
other researchers, such as those we mentioned in the literature review section, had similar 
findings. The results showed that the variables that affect debt ratio are similar to those in 
developed financial markets. They also showed that the effect of the explanatory variables is 
different on different types of debt. Firm’s size has a positive effect on the firm’s total and 
long-term debt but has a negative effect on short-term debt. Growth opportunities have a 
negative effect on both total and long-term debt but have no significant effect on short-term 
debt. Profitability has a negative effect on total and long-term debt but no significant effect on 
short-term debt. Non-debt tax shield is only significant for long-term debt with a positive 
relationship. Assets tangibility has a significant negative effect on total and short-term debt 
and has a positive effect on long-term debt. 
 
For our main explanatory variable, liquidity in the forms of total liquidity, cash liquidity and 
non-cash liquidity, results showed that they have a negative effect on total and short-term debt 
but a positive effect on long-term debt. 
 
Finally, we found that Jordanian firms quickly adjusted their debt ratio toward the target or 
optimal ratio for the total debt ratio and for the long-term debt ratio, but have no target debt 
ratio for the short-term debt. 
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The results of this chapter provide us with both theoretical and practical implications; this 
chapter introduced a further analysis of the effect of cash and non cash liquidity on the capital 
structure decision. Also in this chapter we study the speed of debt ratio adjustment on a 
sample of Jordanian firms where no research has been done on this issue before. This chapter 
used a larger sample size and covered a longer period of time compared to any other research 
conducted on Jordanian firms or that included Jordanian firms as part of the sample. This 
chapter provides a better understanding on how the capital structure decision is affected by 
the firm’s characteristics in a developing country such as Jordan where there is a special issue 
related to Islamic religion; as Islam forbids the dealing with interest, this Islamic rules has a 
significant influence on the debt ratio, and this ratio is low compared to other countries either 
in developed or developing countries. Furthermore, most of the debt financing in Jordanian 
firms is short term debt, as the short term debt represents about two-thirds of the total debt 
ratio, and about one-third of the firms in our sample do not have long term debt financing. 
These results will help firms’ management to design their firms’ capital structure based on 
their firms’ characteristics and the religion rules, to avoid any shortage in financing as the 
debt financing is less preferable. It will also provide a guide for managers in other developing 
countries with similar circumstances to Jordan. 
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Chapter 5: General Conclusion 
 
In this dissertation we investigated the decisions on cash-holding by examining three main 
issues: the determinants of cash-holding; the value associated with cash-holding; and how 
cash-holding affected the firm’s capital structure decisions. These issues have been 
investigated based on empirical data taken from the Amman stock exchange. The Amman 
stock exchange is the only financial market in Jordan; it was established and formed in 1978 
after many years of unorganised securities trading in Jordan between 1930 and 1978. The 
financial market in Jordan was established to organise the securities exchange, protect the 
investors, and make the process of securities exchange fast, easy and safe; it is also intended 
to establish an appropriate investment environment, support the national economy of Jordan, 
and provide investors with the financial and statistical information that will help them in their 
financial decisions. 
 
Since it was established, the financial market in Jordan has been improved in many ways; the 
laws that control this market have been improved and amended in a way that will protect the 
investors and make the trading in securities safer, easier, faster and smoother. The structure of 
the Amman financial market has also been improved by replacing the Amman financial 
market with three new institutions: the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE), Jordan Securities 
Commission (JSC), and Securities Depository Centre (SDC). The security trading process has 
also been improved by introducing a computerised system in 2000 to replace the previous 
manual process. The financial and statistical information provided by ASE has been improved 
since 2000 to include more detailed financial data. The ASE index has been improved several 
times to give a better reflection of the market movements. 
 
Although the financial market in Jordan has been improved in many ways in the last few 
years, it is still a small, young and developing market; which means that it still needs to 
improve and grow. Since this market is still a young and developing market, the availability, 
of data might represent a challenge, especially if one wishes to investigate issues in detail or 
undertake further or deeper analysis. The sample size might also be a challenge as this is still 
a small market. Another important issue influencing the financial market in Jordan is Islamic 
regulations. Jordan is an Islamic country, and the Islamic regulations will play an important 
role in the market such as influencing the debt market and capital structure; since interest is 
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forbidden in Islam, we can see why the debt market is a very small market in Jordan, as the 
transaction size in the debt market is less than 0.06% compared to the equity market for the 
period from 2000 to 2011. Also, the total debt ratio for Jordanian firms is around 32%, but it 
is much higher in other countries such as the US (58%) and Germany (73%). 
 
For our empirical investigation we used a sample of listed non-financial firms. We excluded 
the financial firms from the research sample as those financial firms need to hold a certain 
level of cash as part of their business; had we included those firms, they would have affected 
the results of our models as those financial firms usually hold higher levels of cash. We also 
excluded new firms from our sample as the level of cash for those firms might not reflect the 
firms’ decisions on holding cash. Firms that have left the business, on the other hand, have 
been excluded from the sample as those firms have started the liquidation process, which 
means that the cash level that they hold is not based on management decisions; that cash, if 
any, comes from asset liquidation. Furthermore, those firms might not have any cash as all 
available cash has been used to meet their financial obligations. Another reason for excluding 
those firms is that they have a number of missing observations, which makes it impossible to 
measure some of the research variables. 
 
The sample covered the period from 2000 to 2011. Before the year 2000 the database of ASE 
only included certain items of financial data; that database included the major items of the 
balance sheet and the income statement, but some items that we needed to measure as 
research variables were not available on the database before 2000, such as cash. The data for 
2011 are the most recent data as the financial year 2012 has not yet ended. 
 
The first issue we investigated in our first empirical chapter (chapter 2) was the determinants 
of cash-holding. Investigating the determinants of cash-holding goes back to 1936 when 
Keynes defined the motives for cash-holding as transaction demand, precautionary demand, 
and speculative demand. Managing cash-holding become an interesting topic again in the 
1950s and 1960s, when many researchers investigated the motives for cash-holding. Since the 
late 1990s, researchers started to analyse the determinants of cash-holding by studying the 
effect of the firm’s characteristics on their decisions on holding cash. Those researchers who 
studied the determinants of cash-holding applied their models on different samples during 
different time periods; they used ordinary least squares OLS models, panel data models and 
cross-sectional models. 
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We used fixed-effect panel data models to investigate how firms’ characteristics including 
firm’s size, firm’s cash flow, growth opportunities, profitability, leverage, dividends and 
liquid assets substitutes affect the firm’s cash-holding. We also used the likelihood ratio test 
and the Hausman test to ensure that the fixed-effect model is most appropriate panel model 
compared to pooled ordinary least squares OLS model and random effect model; the results of 
these two tests showed that the fixed-effect model is the most appropriate model to use. 
 
The results from the fixed-effect model on the determinants of cash-holding showed that both 
profitability and dividends have significant positive relationships with corporate cash-holding, 
while firm’s cash flow, leverage, and liquid assets substitute have a significant negative effect 
on corporate cash-holding; on the other hand, firm’s size and growth opportunities showed 
insignificant relationships with corporate cash-holding. A robustness test has been carried out 
by using different ways of measuring the explanatory variables as well as dropping one 
variable at a time. The results from all models were highly consistent with our main model, as 
the signs associated with the research variables stayed the same and those variables that were 
significant remained significant. The results that we obtained from our empirical sample 
match the results obtained by several researchers and are also consistent with what the 
theories suggested, even for firms in a small, developing market such as Jordan. 
 
The second issue we investigated in our second empirical chapter (chapter 3) was the value 
associated with cash-holding. Since the early 2000s, many researchers have studied the cash-
holding value based on two models. The first model used is Fama and French’s (1998) 
valuation model, which was developed to study how taxes on dividend and debt affect the 
firm value. This model has been adjusted by several researchers who broke down the change 
in total assets variable into two components, cash and non-cash assets, to investigate how 
cash-holding contributes to the firm value. The second model used is Faulkender and Wang’s 
(2006) model, which has two advantages over Fama and French’s (1998) model: firstly, it 
controls for the risk factor by using the excess stock return; secondly, using the excess stock 
return rather than the market-to-book value is better since excess stock return is easier to 
measure and interpret. 
 
Although we applied both models, we used Faulkender and Wang’s (2006) model as the 
research model since it has some advantages over Fama and French’s (1998) model. The 
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results showed that cash is valued at a discount from its face value. Each 1 JD invested in 
cash is valued at 0.41 JD and this coefficient is 0.94 when we include a subsample using the 
period from 2000 until the year 2007; those two coefficients are not different statistically, 
which means that the lower value of the coefficient when we included the whole sample is 
due to the effect of the financial crisis, which significantly affected the measurement of stock 
returns during the latter period. The results also showed that, with higher levels of cash-
holding, each extra JD invested in cash has a positive effect on the firm value as, since the 
financial crisis, cash has become more appreciated as it is more difficult to obtain cash from 
external sources. The results also showed that, with higher levels of debt, each extra JD 
invested in cash has a declining value. Dividends did not have any significant effect on the 
firm value. 
 
The result is consistent with what the theories predicted; in developing markets with weak 
investor protection, weak corporate governance systems, higher information asymmetry, 
higher free cash flow problems and higher agency problems, cash-holding is valued at a 
discount. This result is also consistent with the findings of other researchers who studied 
developing markets or countries with weak investor protection, weak corporate governance 
systems, higher information asymmetry and higher free cash flow problems. However, the 
value of cash is at the low end in comparison to the existing studies, implying that these issues 
may be more significant in Jordan than in most other countries. This is clearly an aspect of the 
Jordan financial market that needs to be addressed by regulators and others in the future.  
 
The third issue we investigated in our third empirical chapter (chapter 4) was the determinants 
of the debt ratio and how cash affects the debt ratio. We investigated how firms’ 
characteristics affected the firm’s total debt ratio, long-term debt ratio and short-term debt 
ratio. We examined how firm’s size, growth opportunities, profitability, non-debt tax shield, 
liquidity, and assets tangibility affect debt ratio; then we examined how cash liquidity affects 
the debt ratio by breaking the liquidity variable into two variables: cash and non-cash 
liquidity. 
 
The results showed that the total debt ratio is positively related to the firm’s size, total debt 
ratio is negatively related to growth opportunities, profitability, total liquidity and liquidity in 
the forms of cash and non-cash liquidity, and assets tangibility, but non-debt tax shield is 
insignificantly related to the total debt ratio. Long-term debt ratio is positively related to the 
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firm’s size, non-debt tax shield, liquidity as total liquidity and with non-cash liquidity only, 
and assets tangibility, but is negatively related to growth opportunities and profitability. As 
for the short-term debt, it is only significantly related to liquidity (total and in the form of cash 
and non-cash liquidity) and assets tangibility, and it has a negative relationship with both 
these variables. 
 
Finally, we investigated a dynamic model to understand the speed of debt ratio adjustment. 
We used a Generalized Method of Moments model (GMM model) to investigate the speed of 
adjustment of the debt ratio; the results showed that Jordanian firms are quick to adjust their 
total and long-term debt ratio toward their target ratio. This implies that the relatively un-
developed debt market in Jordan does not present a barrier to firms being able to access the 
debt market, and raise the amount of debt that they require. 
 
To summarise, this research investigated some new issues; as in the determinants of cash 
holding we included a separated variable to measure profitability and operational cash flow. 
When we studied the value of cash holding we included the effect of the financial crisis on the 
cash value. Finally, when we studied the capital structure determinants we took the analysis a 
further step by breaking down the liquidity variable into two types of liquidity; cash and non-
cash liquidity, also, we studied the debt ratio speed of adjustment on Jordanian firms where 
this issue have never been studied before. 
 
The results from this research will help managers in Jordan and other developing countries 
which have similar circumstances as Jordan to determine their needs for cash to be held inside 
the firm, understand how that cash is evaluated by the shareholders, and how it affects firm 
value. It will also help those managers to design the firm’s capital structure taking into 
account the firm’s characteristics and other circumstances. 
 
5.1. Research limitations 
 
The main limitation of this research is related to the ASE itself, as this market is a developing 
market. This market was organized at the beginning of 1978, with only 66 firms listed at that 
time. The computerized system of securities trading started in the early 2000s, while the 
database of the firms’ financial data before the year 2000 was very limited and included only 
the main figures which are current, fixed and total assets, current and total liabilities, 
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authorized capital, total equity, net revenues/sales, earnings before tax, and net income/loss. 
Even after 2000, when the database started to include a more complete set of financial data for 
each of the firms, those data were only quantitative data and did not allow a very deep 
analysis. (The researcher was very keen to include some variables to measure the effect of 
corporate governance on the cash-holding decisions; unfortunately, due to the data’s 
unavailability, we could not measure the effect of corporate governance on the cash-holding 
decision; corporate governance usually measured as index, where this index is created based 
on several variables
17. The main variables on this index are related to firm’s insider, such as 
the number of those insider, whether they own any stocks, the percentage of their shares to the 
total shares, etc. Unfortunately, the database in ASE does not include any of those variables, 
also other database such as Bloomburg does not have corporate governance index for 
Jordanian firms). Also, as only a small number of firms were listed in the ASE we were 
limited in our sample size, especially as most of the firms listed in ASE are financial firms, 
accounting for about 45% of the total number of listed firms. 
 
5.2. Further Research 
 
As a suggestion for further research; including a variable or several variables to reflect market 
conditions as well as firm characteristics. The existing models include only firm 
characteristics. The presence of the financial crisis affects firms in many ways, especially the 
ability to obtain funds from external sources, which will have a significant effect on firms’ 
capital structure and also will affect firms’ cash holding decisions as this cash will be more 
important to replace the shortage of external funds. 
 
In this research we studied how cash holding affects firm’s value, and how it affects the 
capital structure decisions. One other potential issue to study is the effect of cash holding on 
firm investments. As the cash available inside the firm will provide it with a cheaper source of 
finance to invest and grow. 
                                                 
17
 Bloomburg database include a corporate governance index for countries and firms. This index is not available 
for the Jordanian firms. This index include 22 variables which are; 1) Size of the Board, 2) Classified Board 
System, 3) Number of Independent Directors, 4) Percentage of Independent Directors, 5) Percentage of Women 
on Board, 6) CEO Duality, 7) Independent Lead Director, 8) Presiding Director, 9) Board Average Age, 10) 
Board Duration, 11) Number of Board Meetings for the Year, 12) Audit Committee Meetings, 13) Board 
Meeting Attendance Percentage, 14) Outside Compensation Advisors Appointed, 15) Blank Check Preferred 
Authorized, 16) Say On Pay Provision, 17) Auditor Ratification, 18) Years Auditor Employed, 19) Executive 
Compensation Linked to ESG, 20) ESG Linked Compensation for Board, 21) GRI Criteria Compliance, 22) 
Global Reporting Initiatives Checked. (Appendix B provide more details) 
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One additional issue for further research, is to expand the models by adding more variables to  
study more detailed issues; such as adding a variable to measure the effect of the availability 
of the line of credit for the firm (if any) to understand how it might affect the determinants of 
cash holding; add a variable to study the stock repurchase on the firm’s value not only 
dividends, or adding any other variable which might have an effect on either cash holding 
determinants or debt ratio determinants. 
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Appendixes 
 
Appendix A: SEO for the Jordanian firms during the period from 2000 to 2012 
 
Table A1* 
Firm’s Code Capital** 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
JOIB 38,500,000 
 
1,500,000 
   
25,000,000 
JOKB 20,000,000 5,000,000 
  
6,250,000 8,750,000 35,000,000 
JCBK 40,000,000 
   
0 10,000,000 7,500,000 
THBK 100,000,000 
     
150,000,000 
AJIB 20,000,000 
   
10,000,000 
 
14,000,000 
JDIB 24,000,000 
      
UBSI 20,000,000 
   
5,000,000 15,000,000 15,000,000 
ABCO 23,000,000 
   
4,600,000 6,900,000 10,350,000 
INVB 27,226,764 
    
5,773,236 11,000,000 
EXFB 34,500,000 
   
7,000,000 30,500,000 44,000,000 
SGBJ 15,945,091 
   
6,508,653 4,516,809 
 
CABJ 20,000,000 
   
10,000,000 15,000,000 22,500,000 
BOJX 21,000,000 5,250,000 8,400,000 1,850,000 8,290,000 21,210,000 20,000,000 
AHLI 49,411,259 
   
10,588,741 12,050,000 37,950,000 
ARBK 88,000,000 
   
88,000,000 
 
180,000,000 
MEIN 3,520,000 
   
3,480,000 3,000,000 5,000,000 
AAIN 2,000,000 
    
500,000 2,500,000 
JOIN 10,000,000 
    
10,000,000 10,000,000 
GARI 2,000,000 
     
2,000,000 
DICL 2,000,000 250,000 250,000 300,000 560,000 
 
1,640,000 
JERY 3,000,000 
    
1,200,000 1,260,000 
UNIN 2,000,000 
   
1,000,000 2,964,218 1,035,782 
JOFR 3,850,000 
   
150,000 2,000,000 500,000 
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Table A1 continued 
Firm’s Code Capital* 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
HOLI 2,000,000 
    
1,000,000 575,000 
YINS 2,000,000 
    
1,000,000 2,000,000 
GERA 2,000,000 
     
800,000 
ARSI 2,000,000 
     
19,000,000 
AOIC 2,000,000 
   
500,000 1,250,000 6,250,000 
JEIC 2,500,000 
    
2,500,000 
 
ARIN 3,564,000 
   
436,000 1,000,000 3,000,000 
PHIN 2,000,000 
    
500,000 494,539 
AIUI 2,000,000 
    
2,000,000 
 
NAAI 2,000,000 
      
JIJC 4,600,000 
   
736,000 6,664,000 4,500,000 
AMMI 2,000,000 
    
2,000,000 
 
AGICC 5,000,000 
    
800,000 4,600,680 
TIIC 3,000,000 
    
600,000 4,400,000 
ARAS 2,000,000 
    
2,100,000 1,800,000 
ARGR 5,000,000 
    
1,500,000 2,275,000 
ARAI 3,000,000 
    
2,929,847 14,950 
BAMB 6,000,000 
   
3,600,000 5,400,000 5,000,000 
ABMS 10,000,000 
   
2,000,000 3,000,000 
 
JOEP 40,000,000 
   
5,000,000 5,000,000 10,000,000 
AIHO 15,500,626 
 
499,374 
 
4,000,000 
 
5,000,000 
IREL 4,000,000 
      
SHIP 1,200,000 
   
300,000 6,550,000 4,025,000 
PRES 4,500,000 
    
1,500,000 1,500,000 
JDPC 7,500,000 
      
MHFZ 2,500,000 
   
500,000 6,951,216 5,048,784 
TAJM 1,200,000 
   
-700,000 13,500,000 26,000,000 
JDFS 5,000,000 
      
JEIH 8,379,895 
    
2,932,963 3,687,142 
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Table A1 continued 
Firm’s Code Capital* 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
JOMA 600,000 
   
10,400,000 
  
JOPP 2,500,000 
   
800,000 
 
700,000 
SITT 3,437,564 
   
1,562,436 2,000,000 6,200,000 
JOIT 15,354,498 
    
1,630,496 12,528,895 
ZEIC 8,475,000 
      
AIEI 20,250,000 
     
20,250,000 
TRTR 3,455,200 
      
JOTF 4,199,965 
   
800,035 2,500,000 7,500,000 
ABLA 3,878,514 
      
UNIF 5,000,000 
    
1,000,000 511,057 
UINV 11,000,000 
   
5,500,000 33,500,000 
 
AFIN 4,000,000 
  
-1,500,000 
   
ULDC 5,000,000 
   
1,964,285 8,035,715 30,000,000 
SPIC 9,161,465 
   
2,838,535 5,800,000 2,700,000 
AIPC 11,750,000 
     
4,250,000 
UAIC 16,500,000 
   
3,500,000 20,000,000 80,000,000 
SPTI 2,050,000 
     
930,236 
AEIV 4,527,218 
    
4,471,984 9,109,670 
SIJC 4,000,000 
      
REDV 4,000,000 
   
3,000,000 43,000,000 
 
EJAD 1,375,000 
      
AAFI 7,450,075 
     
1,490,015 
UCFI 4,910,000 
      
ARED 3,667,067 
     
16,332,933 
ITSC 12,134,646 
   
-1,516,831 
  
JOCE 4,000,000 
    
489,863 10,137 
PETT 6,000,000 
    
6,000,000 3,000,000 
CICO 6,905,200 
    
14,032,562 1,062,238 
NAQL 900,000 
    
7,100,000 
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Table A1 continued 
Firm’s Code Capital* 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
JPTD 14,500,000 
     
2,500,000 
RJAL 56,000,000 
   
10,000,000 
  
RJAA 1,600,000 
      
IEAI 13,000,000 
    
2,000,000 14,953,604 
REAL 2,500,000 
     
7,496,082 
BIND 1,000,000 
    
1,000,000 4,500,000 
DKHS 6,000,000 
     
1,500,000 
IBFM 5,000,000 
    
14,901,979 1,393,138 
INMA 5,500,000 
    
1,500,000 
 
INVH 6,000,000 
      
AMWL 20,000,000 
    
16,877,500 5,622,500 
OFTC 7,400,000 
      
JRCD 15,000,000 
     
15,000,000 
SECO 7,500,000 
      
AMAL 7,500,000 
      
CEBC 5,000,000 
      
AMAD 6,000,000 
      
WIVA 1,500,000 
      
EMAR 4,199,779 
     
7,543,643 
TAMR 211,923,247 
     
6,576 
MEET 5,000,000 
      
COHO 3,615,000 
      
MSFT 12,000,000 
      
AWTD 1,000,000 
      
BLAD 10,000,000 
      
JOMC 500,000 
      
JMIL 715,094 
     
149,906 
DERA 25,000,000 
      
ABUS 10,000,000 
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Table A1 continued 
Firm’s Code Capital* 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
FUTR 15,500,000 
      
MANR 3,400,000 
      
RAMM 6,000,000 
      
CARD 10,000,000 
      
LEAS 5,000,000 
      
THDI 2,000,000 
      
AMLK 55,000,000 
      
SHRA 6,000,000 
      
AMWJ 14,000,000 
      
MANE 5,000,000 
      
ENTK 3,423,060 
      
UGLT 4,200,000 
      
APCT 4,500,000 
    
-3,000,000 3,500,000 
ACDT 665,004 
    
665,004 
 
WOOL 1,400,000 
   
-400,000 200,000 
 
ATTA 2,800,000 
    
2,849,989 300,453 
EICO 15,000,000 
    
1,500,000 3,500,000 
LIPO 3,300,000 
     
-2,800,000 
IDMC 1,125,612 
   
9,874,388 3,000,000 
 
INTI 3,000,000 
      
JPPC 9,000,000 
   
-3,000,000 4,000,000 6,000,000 
JODA 2,625,000 
      
GENM 1,000,000 
   
500,000 
  
ICAG 9,000,000 
    
2,696,942 2,700,000 
NAST 4,000,000 
      
DADI 20,000,000 
      
IPET 4,000,000 
   
0 0 1,000,000 
JOWM 4,000,000 
    
4,000,000 2,000,000 
JOCF 5,000,000 
   
2,500,000 
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Table A1 continued 
Firm’s Code Capital* 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
JOPI 3,250,000 
    
325,000 
 
JOTN 1,000,000 
    
500,000 
 
AJFM 2,000,000 
    
-748,242 125,176 
JOIC 1,363,351 
   
272,671 
 
163,602 
WOOD 1,875,000 
     
625,000 
WIRE 7,500,000 
    
2,500,000 2,500,000 
JOSL 4,502,576 
    
-1,534,966 
 
UCVO 2,500,000 
   
1,000,000 1,000,000 
 
NATC 7,200,000 
   
1,800,000 
  
JOIR 8,000,000 
   
2,000,000 3,250,000 
 
JNCC 8,000,000 
   
1,760,000 
 
3,740,000 
ELZA 7,500,000 
    
2,500,000 1,500,000 
NMCO 30,000,000 
      
RMCC 3,000,000 
   
1,000,000 6,961,106 1,138,894 
JOST 15,000,000 
     
8,075,000 
MPHA 9,500,000 
    
369,263 320 
UTOB 7,500,000 
   
2,500,000 5,000,000 
 
IENG 5,000,000 
    
2,175,097 
 
ICER 4,000,000 
    
2,000,000 
 
INOH 1,350,000 
    
2,900,000 
 
AIFF 6,000,000 
     
4,500,000 
NDAR 6,500,000 
    
1,750,000 1,750,000 
MECE 31,764,458 
   
8,235,542 
 
53,927,552 
ASPMM 6,000,000 
    
1,500,000 1,500,000 
AMAN 4,000,000 
    
3,000,000 
 
UADI 2,436,646 
   
563,354 
  
JVOI 3,000,000 
      
SLCA 2,000,000 
   
366,815 
  
JIIC 2,000,000 
   
-974,257 
 
974,257 
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Table A1 continued 
Firm’s Code Capital* 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
TRAV 4,000,000 
    
600,000 
 
JPHM 16,000,000 
     
4,000,000 
FNVO 3,000,000 
    
1,500,000 
 
AQRM 5,000,000 
    
2,000,000 7,000,000 
MBED 6,000,000 
     
3,000,000 
GLCI 8,500,000 
      
CJCC 3,000,000 
      
IPCH 5,000,000 
      
PHIL 1,600,000 
      
NCCO 50,000,000 
      
Total 1,889,612,874 10,500,000 10,649,374 650,000 244,646,367 459,341,581 1,074,167,761 
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Table A1 continued 
Firm’s Code 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Final capital 
JOIB 
 
16,250,000 
    
81,250,000 
JOKB 
 
25,000,000 
    
100,000,000 
JCBK 5,750,000 6,325,000 3,478,750 7,305,375 2,410,773 
 
82,769,898 
THBK 
 
2,000,000 
    
252,000,000 
AJIB 56,000,000 
     
100,000,000 
JDIB 
  
26,000,000 25,000,000 14,000,000 
 
89,000,000 
UBSI 40,000,000 
 
5,000,000 
   
100,000,000 
ABCO 11,212,500 8,409,375 6,447,188 9,080,937 19,057,137 942,863 100,000,000 
INVB 11,000,000 6,325,000 8,675,000 7,500,000 7,750,000 14,750,000 100,000,000 
EXFB 7,000,000 9,280,000 17,720,000 
   
150,000,000 
SGBJ 
 
13,485,277 
  
9,544,170 
 
50,000,000 
CABJ 7,500,000 5,000,000 8,000,000 12,000,000 
  
100,000,000 
BOJX 14,000,000 
   
55,100,000 
 
155,100,000 
AHLI 
    
16,500,000 23,500,000 150,000,000 
ARBK 
 
178,000,000 
    
534,000,000 
MEIN 3,000,000 
  
2,000,000 1,000,000 
 
21,000,000 
AAIN 5,000,000 
     
10,000,000 
JOIN 
      
30,000,000 
GARI 4,000,000 
     
8,000,000 
DICL 
 
3,000,000 
    
8,000,000 
JERY 
 
2,540,000 
    
8,000,000 
UNIN 
 
1,000,000 
    
8,000,000 
JOFR 2,600,000 
     
9,100,000 
HOLI 425,000 
     
4,000,000 
YINS 3,000,000 
     
8,000,000 
GERA 
 
1,200,000 
    
4,000,000 
ARSI 
      
21,000,000 
AOIC 
 
1,000,000 1,850,000 2,150,000 2,500,000 
 
17,500,000 
JEIC 
 
20,000,000 -20,000,000 
   
5,000,000 
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Table A1 continued 
Firm’s Code 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Final capital 
ARIN 
      
8,000,000 
PHIN 755,461 
 
250,000 
   
4,000,000 
AIUI 
 
2,000,000 
  
2,000,000 
 
8,000,000 
NAAI 1,500,000 4,500,000 
    
8,000,000 
JIJC 
   
1,650,000 
  
18,150,000 
AMMI 2,000,000 2,000,000 
    
8,000,000 
AGICC 
      
10,400,680 
TIIC 
 
2,000,000 2,000,000 
   
12,000,000 
ARAS 2,100,000 
   
-4,000,000 2,500,000 6,500,000 
ARGR 
 
1,225,000 
   
-2,000,000 8,000,000 
ARAI 
  
-1,500,000 2,555,203 
  
7,000,000 
BAMB 
      
20,000,000 
ABMS 
 
1,500,000 1,000,000 
   
17,500,000 
JOEP 6,000,000 4,000,000 
 
5,600,000 
  
75,600,000 
AIHO 
  
7,000,000 
   
32,000,000 
IREL 
     
2,000,000 6,000,000 
SHIP 
      
12,075,000 
PRES 
    
2,500,000 
 
10,000,000 
JDPC 
 
62,500,000 
    
70,000,000 
MHFZ 
    
-5,000,000 
 
10,000,000 
TAJM 
  
15,170,859 15,829,141 29,000,000 
 
100,000,000 
JDFS 
    
2,500,000 
 
7,500,000 
JEIH 
 
11,125,000 
    
26,125,000 
JOMA 
      
11,000,000 
JOPP 
 
500,000 
    
4,500,000 
SITT 
   
1,800,000 
  
15,000,000 
JOIT 
      
29,513,889 
ZEIC 
  
3,525,000 
 
3,000,000 
 
15,000,000 
AIEI 
      
40,500,000 
218 
 
Table A1 continued 
Firm’s Code 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Final capital 
TRTR -20,450 
     
3,434,750 
JOTF 
 
1,500,000 
    
16,500,000 
ABLA 2,121,486 34,000,000 
   
-2,221,727 37,778,273 
UNIF 
  
20,000 
   
6,531,057 
UINV 
      
50,000,000 
AFIN 7,500,000 5,000,000 
    
15,000,000 
ULDC 
      
45,000,000 
SPIC 2,500,000 2,760,000 
    
25,760,000 
AIPC 
      
16,000,000 
UAIC 27,500,000 
  
7,000,000 
  
154,500,000 
SPTI 94,764 
     
3,075,000 
AEIV 16,891,128 12,000,000 
    
47,000,000 
SIJC 500,000 
     
4,500,000 
REDV 
 
41,500,000 
    
91,500,000 
EJAD 
 
2,750,000 
   
1,500,000 5,625,000 
AAFI 
 
1,059,910 
    
10,000,000 
UCFI 
   
3,090,000 
  
8,000,000 
ARED 5,000,000 15,000,000 
    
40,000,000 
ITSC 4,382,185 
     
15,000,000 
JOCE 
    
-2,177,193 
 
2,322,807 
PETT 
      
15,000,000 
CICO 
      
22,000,000 
NAQL 3,000,000 1,100,000 
    
12,100,000 
JPTD 
 
4,500,000 
    
21,500,000 
RJAL 18,373,350 
     
84,373,350 
RJAA 
  
968,575 7,431,425 
  
10,000,000 
IEAI 46,396 
     
30,000,000 
REAL 
      
9,996,082 
BIND 6,500,000 7,000,000 
    
20,000,000 
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DKHS 
 
4,700,000 2,800,000 
   
15,000,000 
IBFM 7,453,290 
     
28,748,407 
INMA 
      
7,000,000 
INVH 6,000,000 
   
-9000000 
 
3,000,000 
AMWL 
   
2,500,000 
  
45,000,000 
OFTC 34,600,000 
     
42,000,000 
JRCD 
  
4,500,000 
   
34,500,000 
SECO 42,500,000 
     
50,000,000 
AMAL 
 
7,500,000 
    
15,000,000 
CEBC 20,000,000 
 
9,000,000 
  
-28,055,910 5,944,090 
AMAD 
 
600,000 
   
1,400,000 8,000,000 
WIVA 
 
3,500,000 5,000,000 
   
10,000,000 
EMAR 226,578 1,810,000 3,005,670 3,214,330 
  
20,000,000 
TAMR 52,250 500 
    
211,982,573 
MEET 2,500,000 7,500,000 
    
15,000,000 
COHO 2,385,000 
     
6,000,000 
MSFT 
 
5,000,000 
 
850,000 
  
17,850,000 
AWTD 
   
9,000,000 
  
10,000,000 
BLAD 
  
1,500,000 500,000 
  
12,000,000 
JOMC 1,000,000 
  
-100,000 140,000 
 
1,540,000 
JMIL 135,000 23,000 477,000 240,000 
  
1,740,000 
DERA 3,800,000 11,200,000 
    
40,000,000 
ABUS 10,000,000 
  
10,000,000 
  
30,000,000 
FUTR 
  
21,000,000 
   
36,500,000 
MANR 76,600,000 
     
80,000,000 
RAMM 
 
1,000,000 
 
7,000,000 
  
14,000,000 
CARD 
 
4,223,184 500,000 736,159 
  
15,459,343 
LEAS 
  
2,000,000 
   
7,000,000 
THDI 
    
300,000 
 
2,300,000 
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AMLK 
 
5,000,000 -59,000,000 
  
-500,000 500,000 
SHRA 
    
3,300,000 
 
9,300,000 
AMWJ 
  
9,401,408 6,598,592 
  
30,000,000 
MANE 
  
105,000,000 
   
110,000,000 
ENTK 
   
1,503,370 
  
4,926,430 
UGLT 
  
3,800,000 
  
-1,400,000 6,600,000 
APCT 
 
15,000,000 
   
-10,000,000 10,000,000 
ACDT 
      
1,330,008 
WOOL 
      
1,200,000 
ATTA 6,049,558 
     
12,000,000 
EICO 
      
20,000,000 
LIPO 2,835,942 
     
3,335,942 
IDMC 7,000,000 
     
21,000,000 
INTI 
 
4,000,000 4,000,000 
  
3,500,000 14,500,000 
JPPC -2,211,126 -7,388,874 -3,840,000 12,440,000 
  
15,000,000 
JODA 1,375,000 
     
4,000,000 
GENM 
      
1,500,000 
ICAG 
 
-9,396,942 5,000,000 
   
10,000,000 
NAST 
  
-2,000,000 2,000,000 
  
4,000,000 
DADI 
    
3,000,000 
 
23,000,000 
IPET 
      
5,000,000 
JOWM 2,500,000 2,500,000 
    
15,000,000 
JOCF 
      
7,500,000 
JOPI 
      
3,575,000 
JOTN 
  
376,973 123,027 
  
2,000,000 
AJFM 137,693 485,373 
 
-113,847 
  
1,886,153 
JOIC 
      
1,799,624 
WOOD 1,000,000 1,000,000 
  
500,000 
 
5,000,000 
WIRE 
 
7,500,000 
   
-700,253 19,299,747 
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JOSL 1,032,390 1,000,000 
   
-43,611 4,956,389 
UCVO 
      
4,500,000 
NATC 
      
9,000,000 
JOIR 
  
3,400,000 
   
16,650,000 
JNCC 
 
13,500,000 13,000,000 
  
-1,110,790 38,889,210 
ELZA 
 
991,948 2,508,052 
   
15,000,000 
NMCO -29,044,100 44,100 
    
1,000,000 
RMCC 
 
12,900,000 
    
25,000,000 
JOST 
 
11,925,000 
    
35,000,000 
MPHA 
      
9,869,583 
UTOB 
      
15,000,000 
IENG 
      
7,175,097 
ICER 
      
6,000,000 
INOH 
      
4,250,000 
AIFF 
      
10,500,000 
NDAR 
      
10,000,000 
MECE 6,072,448 
  
40,000,000 10,000,000 
 
150,000,000 
ASPMM 
      
9,000,000 
AMAN 
      
7,000,000 
UADI 
      
3,000,000 
JVOI 
 
1,000,000 
    
4,000,000 
SLCA 
      
2,366,815 
JIIC 
      
2,000,000 
TRAV 
      
4,600,000 
JPHM 
      
20,000,000 
FNVO 
      
4,500,000 
AQRM 
      
14,000,000 
MBED 
 
1,000,000 
 
600,000 
  
10,600,000 
GLCI 
  
1,512,464 
   
10,012,464 
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CJCC 
   
300,000 700,000 
 
4,000,000 
IPCH 
 
2,000,000 
    
7,000,000 
PHIL 
  
400,000 1,000,000 
  
3,000,000 
NCCO 
    
5,000,000 
 
55,000,000 
Total 481,231,743 628,451,851 218,946,939 208,383,712 169,624,887 4,060,572 5,400,267,661 
* The numbers in this table represent the total capital increases (in case the firm increases their capital more than one time in the same year) or 
the net capital increases (in case the firm increases and decreases their capital in the same year), capital increases include public offering, private 
offering, stock dividends, and returned earnings capitalization. 
** represent the firm’s capital as at the end of 2000 if the firm has been established before the year 2000, or the firm original capital if the firm 
established after the year 2000. 
Source: Securities Depository Centre. 
 
  
223 
 
Appendix B: Bloomburg Corporate Governance Index 
 
The following are the components of Bloomburg Corporate Governance Index where each 
variable is weighted in terms of importance, with board of directors’ variables carrying 
greater weight than other variables. This index take the value between 0.1 and 100. 
 
1) Size of the Board 
Number of Directors on the company's board, as reported by the company. Full time Directors 
only. Deputy members of the Board will not be counted. Europe: Where the company has a 
Supervisory Board and a Management Board, this is the number of Directors on the 
Supervisory Board. Field is part of the Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) group 
of fields. 
 
2) Classified Board System 
Indicates the company has a two or three tier classified/staggered board system. This field is 
part of the Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) group of fields. 
 
3) Number of Independent Directors 
Number of Independent Directors on the company's board, as reported by the company. 
Independence is defined according to the company's own criteria. Europe: Where the 
company has a Supervisory Board and a Management Board, this is the number of 
Independent Directors on the Supervisory Board. Field is part of the Environmental, Social 
and Governance (ESG) group of fields. 
 
4) % Independent Directors 
Independent directors as a percentage of total board membership. Field part of Environmental, 
Social or Governance (ESG) group of fields. 
 
5) % Women on Board 
Percentage of Women on the Board of Directors, as reported by the company. Europe: Where 
the company has a Supervisory Board and a Management Board, this is the Percentage of 
Women on the Supervisory Board. Field is part of the Environmental, Social and Governance 
(ESG) group of fields. 
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6) CEO Duality 
Indicates whether the company's Chief Executive Officer is also Chairman of the Board, as 
reported by the company. "N" indicates the two roles are separate. Field is part of the 
Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) group of fields. 
 
7) Independent Lead Director 
Indicates whether the company has an independent lead director within the board of directors.  
For companies with Presiding directors, please refer to ES169 (PRESIDING_DIRECTOR) 
This field is part of the Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) group of fields. 
 
8) Presiding Director 
Indicates whether the company has a presiding director in its board of directors. For 
companies with independent lead directors, please refer to ES168 
(INDEPENDENT_LEAD_DIRECTOR). This field is part of the Environmental, Social and 
Governance (ESG) group of fields. 
 
9) Board Average Age 
Average age of the members of the board. Field part of Environmental, Social or Governance 
(ESG) group of fields. 
 
10) Board Duration (Years) 
Length of a board member's term, in years. For boards which allow renewal of terms, it is the 
length of a single term prior to renewals. Field part of Environmental, Social or Governance 
(ESG) group of fields. 
 
11) Number of Board Meetings for the Year 
Total number of corporate board meetings held in the past year. Field part of Environmental, 
Social or Governance (ESG) group of fields. 
 
12) Audit Committee Meetings 
Number of meetings of the Board's Audit Committee during the reporting period. Field part of 
Environmental, Social or Governance (ESG) group of fields. 
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13) Board Meeting Attendance % 
Percentage of members in attendance at board meetings during the period. Field part of 
Environmental, Social or Governance (ESG) group of fields. 
 
14) Outside Compensation Advisors Appointed 
Indicates whether the company appoints outside executive compensation advisors. This field 
is part of the Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) group of fields. 
 
15) Blank Check Preferred Authorized 
Indicates whether the company is authorized to issue blank check preferred stock without 
shareholders' approval. This field is part of the Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) 
group of fields. 
 
16) Say On Pay Provision 
Indicates whether the company has a say on pay provision. This is marked Y when the 
provision has been voted FOR by shareholders at the most recent Annual General Meeting 
(AGM). It is marked N when the provision has been voted AGAINST by the shareholders at 
the most recent AGM. This field is part of the Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) 
group of fields. 
 
17) Auditor Ratification 
Indicates whether the auditor has been ratified in the recent shareholder meeting. This field is 
part of the Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) group of fields. 
 
18) Years Auditor Employed 
Indicates the number of years the auditor has been employed. This field is part of the 
Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) group of fields. 
 
19) Executive Compensation Linked to ESG 
Indicates whether executive compensation is linked to Environmental, Social and Governance 
(ESG) goals. This field is part of the Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) group of 
fields. 
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20) ESG Linked Compensation for Board 
Indicates whether board compensation is linked to Environmental, Social and Governance 
(ESG) goals. The field is part of the Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) group of 
fields. 
 
21) GRI Criteria Compliance 
Indicates whether the company is in compliance with Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
criteria. Field part of Environmental, Social or Governance (ESG) group of fields. 
 
22) Global Reporting Initiatives Checked 
Indicates whether the company's application level was checked by the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI). This field is part of the Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) group 
of fields. 
 
 
 
 
